Racial Threat as Potential Outgroup Entry:
Historical Evidence Using New Mass Transit

Tyler Reny
Department of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
ttreny@ucla.edu

ABSTRACT

A corpus of research on "racial threat" explores the effect of the presence of ethnic minorities on white political behavior. One critical vehicle for racial threat that has gone unexplored in this literature is new mass transit, with its capacity to establish arterial connections between segregated communities and generate interracial conflict. I argue that the case of mass transit development induces a cross-pressure, where self-interest in the form of potential patronage of the system is countered by aversion to the prospective entry of outgroups. Utilizing a unique historical case where funding for the establishment of an urban mass transit system was put to a popular vote, I uncover evidence that racial threat nullified the effect of self-interest in white voter support for the funding initiative. My findings elucidate an important arena for the study of racial threat and how it evokes countervailing forces of self-interest and outgroup aversion.

One of the oldest and largest bodies of work in the study of American politics is the literature on “racial threat,” which explores the effect of racial context on white Americans’ political attitudes and behavior. Beginning with V.O. Key’s (1949) investigation of the impact of the size of geographically proximate African American populations on white voting behavior in the American South, the literature on racial context has seen continued growth (Enos 2016; Hopkins 2012; Oliver 2010; Reny and Newman 2018). One primary methodological issue in the study of racial context is residential self-selection (Oliver 2010), as estimating the causal effect of local minority population characteristics on political behavior is hindered by the tendency for neighborhood racial composition to shape individuals’ residential location decisions in the first place (Clark 2009; Tam Cho et al. 2013). Scholarship has attempted to overcome this issue by various means, including the use of field experiments (Enos 2014) and the identification of case studies involving sudden and sizable demographic shocks (Hangartner et al. 2018; Hopkins 2012; Enos 2016; Reny and Newman 2018).

One vehicle for the study of racial threat that centers on demographic change which has gone relatively undeveloped in the political science literature is new mass transit (NMT). Most urban areas throughout the United States are racially segregated due to discrimination in housing practices (Clark 2009; Massey and Denton 1993). The establishment of NMT has the capacity to create high-speed and affordable arterial connections between segregated white and minority communities, potentially increasing the entry of nonwhites into predominately white areas previously cutoff due in part to transportation cost barriers (Ong and Miller 2005). The urban planning literature documents how the delivery of NMT to minority enclaves historically constitutes a source of contention, with white residents opposing NMT due to ethnic prejudice and apprehension over outgroup entry (Bullard et al. 2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008). The political science literature has examined the unwillingness of whites residing in racially diverse settings to contribute to public goods believed to benefit racial outgroups (Alesina et al. 1999; Glaser 2002; Hopkins 2009). However, absent from this corpus of work are studies focusing specifically on NMT, where a principal theme is the concern among whites that the inauguration of the public good will cause their residential setting to become more diverse (Bullard et al. 2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008).

In this article, I focus on NMT as a novel arena for investigating the role of racial threat on white Americans’ political behavior. I argue that NMT represents a unique vehicle for triggering racial threat that is distinct from the conceptualization and operationalization of threat in the existing literature. The bulk of existing studies on racial threat assess the effect of the size or growth of a geographically proximate outgroup on white political attitudes (Oliver 2010; Gay 2006; Newman 2013) and behavior (Enos 2016; Giles and Buckner 1993; Voss 1996), with a common underlying feature being the measurement of *already occurred* or *occurring* outgroup entry. In contrast, the case of NMT offers the literature the innovation of the conceptualization and operationalization of racial threat as *potential outgroup entry*---what I call *prospective racial threat*. Recent work leveraging rapid demographic shocks claim an advantage of their design to be observing outcome variables before white residential selection processes occur (Hopkins 2009; Reny and Newman 2018). My focus on NMT extends this design goal by using a treatment (outgroup entry) that occurs in the future; thus, outcome measures are collected before white residential selection processes commence. In short, I argue that the analysis of NMT completes the temporal spectrum of intergroup threat treatment effects by adding to published work evaluating the effect of *past* outgroup exposure (Goldman and Hopkins 2018) and *present* outgroup exposure (Enos 2014; Key 1949; Oliver 2010) research investigating the effect of *future* outgroup exposure.

To examine NMT as a vehicle for racial threat, I take advantage of a unique historical case where the funding necessary for the establishment of a new urban mass transit system was put to a popular vote. I focus on the case of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, and a local ballot measure, Proposition A, in the 1962 General Election that would issue a $792 million bond to fund the construction of the BART. A contentious component of the system plan was the Transbay Tube, which would facilitate the entry of African American riders from heavily-black cities in the East Bay (e.g., Oakland) into employment and recreation centers in predominately-white San Francisco in the West Bay. I argue that Proposition A evoked a cross-pressure for white voters in San Francisco residing near planned BART stations, as the proposed system promised the benefit of ease-of-access to fast and affordable mass transit but also the racially threatening prospect of the entry and increased presence of African Americans. Using fine-grained historic administrative data on precinct-level election results in San Francisco County combined with data from the 1960 Census, I analyze the countervailing effects of self-interest and racial threat on voter support for the funding measure. My analyses uncover evidence that racial threat nullified self-interest in shaping white voter support for Proposition A. The robustness of this finding is established by ancillary analyses using ecological inference, placebo tests, and checks on the theorized mechanisms.

NEW MASS TRANSIT AS A VEHICLE FOR RACIAL THREAT

Theories of racial threat posit that, among the dominant ethnic group, living in geographic proximity to large or rapidly growing ethnic outgroups will engender actual and/or perceived interracial competition over economic, political, or social resources and lead to racial hostility and support for anti-minority policies and candidates (Key 1949; Enos 2017). A common feature of studies on racial threat is analysis of the effect of a "treatment" that has *already occurred*—in nearly all extant studies, the presence or entry of the outgroup in question took place decades or even centuries before the outcome of interest is measured. For example, examinations of racial threat in the U.S. South (Key 1949; Giles and Buckner 1993; Voss 1996) analyze the effect on white voting behavior of the size of nearby black populations which may have been established hundreds of years prior (Acharya et al. 2016) and stabilized at their measured size decades or generations before data collection. The selective migration of people during the time windows between outgroup entry and data collection introduces the possibility of selection bias (Enos 2016; Sampson 2012) which in turn hinders estimation of the causal effect of outgroup presence on white political behavior.

Recent studies attempt to overcome this issue by leveraging dramatic influxes of an outgroup (Hangartner et al. 2018; Hopkins 2012; Reny and Newman 2018) or experimentally manipulating exposure to an outgroup (Enos 2014; Shook and Fazio 2008). The goal of this research is the collection of data when outgroup entry is recent or in progress and "white flight" has yet to occur, or when outgroup exposure is randomly assigned. This work makes a vital contribution to the literature by employing design-based approaches that augment our confidence in estimated effects of exposure to outgroups. Yet, recent work focusing on demographic shocks combined with older studies focusing on prevailing outgroup population size still only define two points on the temporal spectrum of outgroup entry and exposure: *past* and *present*. One point on this spectrum yet to be explored is *future* outgroup entry.

Theories of racial threat argue that the mechanism linking outgroup presence to anti-minority political attitudes and behavior is actual or perceived interracial competition and the desire to maintain dominant status (Bobo and Tuan 2006). This framework can be expanded to allow for a future time horizon, where racial threat is effectuated in scenarios where the entry or growth of an outgroup is forthcoming and triggers perceptions of threat via future resource competition and loss of ingroup dominance. Indeed, variants of group conflict theory focusing on demographic change already emphasize white concern over future outcomes, such as changing neighborhood racial identity (Green et al. 1998) and eroded white dominance (Bobo 1988; Craig and Richeson 2014). This work establishes a foundation for the relevance of future-oriented fears in bringing about anti-minority attitudes and behavior. What is needed to move the literature forward is identifying an arena in which potential outgroup entry and population growth is paramount. While extant survey experimental work explores the threatening effect of the hypothetical entry of immigrant groups (Ferwerda et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2015), the discipline is placing an increasing premium on real-world treatments and behavior occurring outside of the artificial survey context (Hangartner et al. 2018; Enos 2014) especially in light of evidence that treatment effects observed in survey experiments may fail to materialize in the real world (Barabas and Jerit 2010).

One real-world vehicle for racial threat that focuses on future outgroup entry is new mass transit (NMT). NMT refers to the establishment of systems of large-scale transportation in metropolitan areas comprised of buses or trains. NMT serves as a critical vehicle for racial threat due to (1) the entrenched level of racial segregation in urban areas throughout the U.S. (Massey and Denton 1993; Trounstine 2019), and (2) its capacity to establish high-speed and affordable arterial connections between segregated white and minority populations, thus enhancing minority access to recreation and employment centers in predominately-white urban areas. White opposition to NMT due to apprehension over racial mixing is well-documented in the planning literature (Bullard et al. 2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008) and examples can be found in nearly any U.S. city with mass transit. Fear of racial mixing and crime famously halted the expansion of Atlanta's MARTA trains and buses into largely white Fulton and DeKalb counties (Jarvie 2019), and similar fears are rumored to have blocked the expansion of Boston's Red Line into Arlington (Lynch 2018), DC's Metro into Georgetown (Schrag 2014), and the LA Metro light-rail into Beverly Hills (Ulin 2018). Where proposed NMT systems are approved, there are myriad examples of their creation of arterial connections between white and minority urban enclaves (e.g., NYC, D.C., and Chicago).

Given that NMT in many instances involves the potential entry or growth of ethnic minority groups into predominately white spaces, it provides scholars with opportunities to examine its impact on white political behavior. According to prior work, the experience of racial threat is a function of the salience of an outgroup, which is theorized to be driven by outgroup *proximity* and *size*. Enos (2016) applies the racial threat framework to the case of public housing in Chicago and argues that the most racially threatened whites were those in closest proximity to projects housing large black populations. Reny and Newman (2018) apply this framework to the "Second Great Migration" of African Americans to the American West and argue that the most racially threatened whites were those in closest proximity to California neighborhoods experiencing dramatic black population growth. Finally, Hangartner et al. (2019) apply this framework to Greece's exposure to the Syrian refugee crisis, arguing that the most threated Greeks were those in closest proximity to refugee entry points. When applied to the case of NMT where the planned system will establish arterial connections between white and minority populations, this framework suggests that the most racially threated whites will be those residing in *closest proximity* to planned transit stations serving as exit points for incoming outgroup passengers. This may especially be the case where planned stations are situated in neighborhoods already containing small enclaves of the outgroup, where NMT evokes the prospect of the expansion of the *size* of the outgroup and potential loss of white majority-status.

PROXIMITY TO TRANSIT HUBS: SELF-INTEREST AND OUTGROUP AVERSION

Importantly, while proximity to NMT stations may capture the likelihood of exposure to daily influxes of outgroups, it may also capture another relevant process: *self-interest*. Unlike the cases analyzed by Enos (2016), Reny and Newman (2018), and Hangartner et al. (2018), where proximity singularly captures increasing closeness to the site of large outgroup populations, proximity to NMT stations may under some conditions simultaneously capture exposure to incoming outgroup passengers *and* access to a vital public good. NMT can transform life for residents in urban areas previously lacking mass transit. In the absence of mass transit, urban dwellers in American cities typically rely on auto-based transportation, which engenders problems such as traffic congestion and long commutes, the dissolution of social capital and civic life (Kunstler 1996), and stress and other health problems associated with commuting and air pollution (Jackson and Koctitzky 2001). NMT can improve and shorten commutes, decrease stress, reduce pollution, and increase home values and development. Importantly, like many location-based public goods (e.g., parks and libraries), proximity to the good decreases the costs associated with use. As such, proximity to planned stations captures the ease-of-access and likelihood of use, which I conceptualize as self-interest. To be sure, self-interest is often considered a financial phenomenon; however, scholarship demonstrates that the concept can apply to a broad array of policy domains where an individual possesses a clear, certain and substantial personal stake in the outcome (Chong et al. 2001). Compared to those residing further away from planned stations, residents located near NMT stations may have a greater self-interest in supporting the establishment of the system due to intended ridership and/or the prospect of increasing business development and home values (Cervero 2007; Hess and Almeida 2007).

In sum, proximity to transit stations may capture an important "cross-pressure" (Brader et al. 2014), as residents near planned transit stations may simultaneously possess greater self-interest in seeing the system established and experience the highest level of racial threat. Thus, one challenge for the use of NMT as a vehicle for studying racial threat is resolving the issue where the same variable—*proximity to new transit stations*—capturing threat may also capture self-interest. One means of resolving this is to focus on heterogeneity in the racial composition of urban enclaves housing planned transit stations. Critically, I rely on the presence of *minority enclaves* to theoretically adjudicate the conditions under which proximity to planned stations should evoke the strongest cross-pressure between self-interest and racial threat. The presence of preexisting minority enclaves is relevant for the potential entry of additional outgroup members via NMT, as it has implications for the overall *size* of an outgroup, which, along with proximity, is theorized to be a central driver of racial threat (Enos 2016).

While segregation in urban areas has major dividing lines, typically by waterways (Trounstine 2016), even the predominately "white side" of town in major American cities contain small enclaves with minority populations. Focusing on the 1960s, which is the time period used in the analysis that follows, we observe small minority enclaves situated in the predominately white sections of segregated cities: Pacoima in the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles, Maywood in the Westside suburbs of Chicago, and the north end of Hell's Kitchen in Manhattan, among others. One way of addressing cross-pressure is to leverage variation in the racial composition of enclaves housing planned transit stations to capture variation in the salience of potential incoming outgroup riders, and thus variation in the strength of operation of self-interest vis-à-vis racial threat. In cases where planned stations are situated in white enclaves embedded within predominately white sections of a city, the size of an outgroup population entering via NMT is overall relatively small. However, planned stations situated in minority enclaves of predominately white sections of a city would imply that incoming outgroup passengers will *expand the size of an already present outgroup enclave.*

The racial threat framework—particularly sub-theories focusing on "white flight" and tipping-points (Clark 1992)—suggests that whites may tolerate the presence of minority populations as long as their size remains small and whites remain the predominant racial group. However, as minority populations grow to achieve more than a "token presence" in white neighborhoods, feelings of racial threat among whites are expected to rise (Bobo et al. 1986). Thus, when NMT implies the entry of outgroup riders, proximity to planned stations in white sections of a metropolitan area should impart less racial threat than proximity to planned stations in minority enclaves of white sections of a metropolitan area, as the latter scenario involves greater outgroup salience via larger potential outgroup size. As such, self-interest should be operative for whites residing close to white-enclave stations, as self-interest is only minimally countervailed by racial threat. However, for white voters residing in close proximity to minority-enclave stations, self-interest should be strongly countered by racial threat, resulting in a strong cross-pressuring. I label this the *Cross-Pressuring Hypothesis.*

Figure 1. Racial Composition of the SF Bay Area During Formation of the BART System

<u>A: West and East Bay</u>

<u>Panel B. Central San Francisco</u>



Note: Maps indicate tract-level black population percentage for the greater SF-Oakland Bay Area (Panel A) and downtown SF centered on the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts with BART train icons indicating the location of BART stations (Panel B). The Fillmore-Tenderloin is a custom polygon based on district boundaries from Google Maps, with black population averaged across underlying tracts. Data from the 1960 U.S. Decennial Censuses.

THE BART TRAIN AND 1962 ELECTION

The construction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in the early 1960s in the San Francisco Bay Area provides a rare and ideal historical case to test the concept of racial threat as potential outgroup entry and the cross-pressuring hypothesis. Following WWII, it was clear that there was a strong need for NMT in the Bay Area, as the region's population was growing rapidly, traffic congestion increasing, and ferry traffic across the bay reached peak capacity (Healy 2016). Planning for rapid transit was initiated by civic leaders in 1946 and culminated in the formation of the BART District in 1957. The District was an administrative entity comprised of the five counties in the Bay Area (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo) and tasked with designing a plan for the system, which was completed in 1961. In contrast to many urban mass transit systems in the U.S., the funding for the construction of the BART was put to a popular vote in the form a local ballot measure named Proposition A. Proposition A would provide $792 million in funds for building the system. The vote, which needed 60 percent support to pass, appeared on the ballot in the 1962 General Election and was voted on by all residents in the counties comprising the BART District.

Proposition A affords a rare opportunity to assess the operation of racial threat in white voter support for the establishment of the BART system. In addition to providing observable voting behavior, features of the case render it highly suitable, or a "most likely case," for observing racial threat. First, the Bay Area in 1960 was highly racially segregated between the West and East Bay: African Americans primarily resided in the East Bay in cities such as Oakland, Richmond, Berkeley and Emeryville, while the West Bay comprised of the city and county of San Francisco was predominately white, with only 10% of the population in 1960 being African American. Importantly, the slim African American population in SF was largely concentrated in one enclave in the center of the city, as well as two nascent enclaves on the periphery. Figure 1 panel A provides an overview of the racial composition of the West and East Bay during the formation of BART system, rendering a clear depiction of the concentration of African Americans in the East Bay.

Second, the BART would establish a new arterial connection between predominantly-white SF and predominately-black Oakland via the Transbay Tube. One of the most central and contentious features of the BART system was the construction of 3.6 miles of underwater tube which would enable rapid transit between West Oakland and downtown SF in less than 3 minutes at speeds of over 70 miles per hour. Thus, white and black communities previously separated by a body of water and a heavily congressed toll-bridge would be connected quickly and affordably by subaqueous rail.

Third, rail lines and stations were public knowledge because of a widely circulated "Composite Report" released in 1962 by the BART District in collaboration with regional engineering, financial, and economic consultants. In addition to making public the system map, this report outlined the expected size and direction of passenger flows, with a primary expectation being large flows of passengers from Oakland into employment and recreation centers throughout SF via the Transbay Tube (Parsons Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel et al. 1962). Findings from this report were widely disseminated by BART public relations and advertising campaigns and by regional media outlets (Healy 2016). Ads and media stories emphasized how the system would provide mobility to the "non-white ghetto", offering residents the ability to "move out of the ghetto life on a daily basis; for others, on a lifetime basis" (Self 2003) and allowing for the "easy and early mixing of race and class" (Brown 1969). One ad appearing in the magazine *San Francisco Business* argued that, by creating "accessibility to sources of training, learning and wage-earning," the system would be "of particular value to those caught in the net of stagnation and immobility in the ghetto" (Brown 1969).

Thus, voters knew the proposed station locations and the expected flow and racial composition of riders, which establishes the feasibility of a "treatment" composed of a potential influx of black passengers into stations in SF. Racially coded concerns about "crime" coupled with concerns about cost and population growth made for a contentious public debate, leading two counties—Marin and San Mateo—to exit the BART District before the vote over Proposition A took place (Healy 2016). With Marin and San Mateo exiting, the main arena for the operation of racial threat surrounding the BART was SF. Applied to voting on Proposition A, the racial threat framework would predict that threat would be maximal, and therefore BART support suppressed, among whites in SF residing in closest proximity to planned BART stations.

While there is strong evidence of racial contention surrounding the BART, there is also significant evidence that self-interest was a highly operative factor in the vote. The BART train was expected to introduce 75 miles of train to the Bay Area; modern trains traveling up to 70 mph would service 37 stations (8 in SF alone), many with off-street parking, and move 30,000 seated passengers per hour in each direction. Rides were expected to be fairly inexpensive, costing each rider an average round trip fare of $0.60 (compared to the average $1.80 daily cost for automobile drivers) and each Bay Area homeowner an average of $27 dollars per year in taxes. In addition, the train was expected to boost local employment, increase home values, position the Bay Area as an engine of economic growth and opportunity, and improve access to social and cultural opportunities (Parsons Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel et al. 1962). The stakes of the policy were clear to voters, as were the proposed costs and benefits (Chong et al. 2001), thus, increasing proximity to planned stations may capture increasing self-interest among voters in seeing the system established. One potential means of adjudicating the effect of proximity is to focus on stations located in black neighborhood enclaves in SF. Applied to voting on Proposition A, the cross-pressuring hypothesis would predict that whites residing in close proximity to planned stations situated in black enclaves would experience the greatest cross-pressure between a self-interest in easy-access to and use of the train and the countervailing concern over the potential expansion in the size of an extant black enclave.

This expectation can be operationalized by focusing on variation in the racial composition of the neighborhoods in SF housing planned BART stations. Two stations in particular, Powell Street and Civic Center, were situated next to the oldest and most prominent black enclave in the center of the city—the neighboring Fillmore and Tenderloin Districts. The first black church, Third Baptist Church, was established in SF in 1852 in the Fillmore District and the only black community of note in SF from the mid-19th through the mid-20th century was in the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Indeed, according to the 1940 Decennial Census, over 4,000 African Americans resided in the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts of SF, which prior to the "Second Great Migration" (Reny and Newman 2018), was the only Black enclave in the city. Figure 1 panel B depicts the racial composition of central SF, highlighting the presence of African Americans in the Fillmore-Tenderloin. These Districts comprised the epicenter of black SF—often referred to as the "Harlem of the West" (Elberling 2017)—due to having the largest jazz music scene on the West Coast and serving as a hotspot for contentious racial politics. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, white communities neighboring these Districts who were worried about the expanding black population supported an urban redevelopment plan that razed black homes and cultural establishments in the Fillmore and halted northward expansion of the neighborhood with the construction of the Geary Expressway (Elberling 2017).

The racial threat framework would suggest that whites residing near planned stations in the Fillmore-Tenderloin would be more concerned about the entry of black passengers from the East Bay than whites whose nearest planned station was in a white enclave. Indeed, if racial threat is maximized by proximity to a large or growing black population (Enos 2016; Key b1949), then whites residing near the Fillmore-Tenderloin would be most threatened by the BART, as entering black passengers may expand the size of a prominent black enclave. In turn, such voters should have experienced the strongest cross-pressure between the personal benefits of immediate access to the BART and the experience of racial threat. In the following section, I subject this expectation (e.g., the *cross-pressuring hypothesis*) to empirical scrutiny.

To foreshadow, I should note that the Fillmore-Tenderloin, while the oldest and most culturally and politically prominent, was not the only black enclave in SF in 1962. Indeed, two other black enclaves existed in 1962: Balboa Park and Hunters Point. As of 1962, however, these two enclaves were nascent, having formed in the 1950s after WWII during the Second Great Migration. In contrast, the black population in the Fillmore-Tenderloin was established in the mid-19th century and expanded following the 1906 SF earthquake. Moreover, Balboa Park and Hunters Point were geographically marginal relative to the Fillmore-Tenderloin, as Balboa Park resides on the southern border of the city and Hunters Point is notoriously isolated on the southeastern stretches of the city and is disconnected from the BART system (Figure 1 panel A). Thus, my analysis focuses on the Fillmore-Tenderloin as the principal black enclave in SF, and I utilize the presence of nascent black communities in Balboa Park and Hunters Point for robustness checks presented following my main results.

DATA AND METHODS

My empirical strategy centers on analyzing the effect of voter proximity to BART stations on support for Proposition A in SF County. I constructed a dataset from historical administrative data from the California Secretary of State (CASOS), San Francisco City Hall (SFCH), and the U.S. Census Bureau[1]. Election results for SF County were reported by the CASOS in the “1962 Statement of the Vote” at the precinct-level (each containing an average of

[1] The CA Secretary of State and SF City Hall data is archived at the San Francisco History Center at the San Francisco Public Library.

500 residents), which is the finest level of aggregation available for election results in California.

My dataset includes election results for N=1,326 precincts, and my dependent variable is precinct-level support—percent "Yes" vote—for Proposition A (mean=67.2, sd=8.4, min=30.9, max=89.8). While historic accounts of this vote depict voters in SF County as strongly favoring the BART (Healy 2016), the precinct-level results uncover notable and previously unacknowledged variation in support for the BART throughout the city. My key independent variable is *Proximity to Station*, which is the proximity (Euclidean distance) of the centroid of each precinct to the exact location of the nearest planned BART station. To calculate this distance, I collected hand-drawn historic precinct maps from SFCH used between 1961 to 1965, employed "georeferencing" (Gandhi 2016a) to construct a complete map of SF County with all precinct boundaries[2], and then used QGIS mapping software to geolocate each BART station in SF using its current day address (which corresponds to their planned locations). Precincts in SF are organized as numbered units within State Assembly Districts, which enables the CASOS data to be matched with precinct maps from SFCH.

I conceptualize *Proximity to Station* as a compound continuous "treatment" variable simultaneously capturing two factors: (1) increasing access to and ease-of-use of the BART system, and (2) increasing exposure to the potential points of entry of black passengers from the East Bay. According to my theoretical framework, the relative salience of each factor captured by *Proximity to Station* should be altered by a moderating variable: the racial composition of the enclave housing a BART station. The moderating variable in my analysis is *Black Enclave*, which is coded "1" for precincts whose nearest planned BART station is one of the two stations (Powell St. and Civic Center) situated near the historically-black Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts, and "0" otherwise. For precincts whose nearest station was located outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin in a predominately-white enclave of SF, my framework suggests that the entry of black passengers would be much less salient relative to the benefits of access to and ease-of-use of the system. Thus, for these precincts, I conceptualize *Proximity to Station* as capturing increasing self-interest in the establishment of the BART system and

[2] This process involved converting hand-drawn precinct maps into spatial polygons and geolocating each on a current San Francisco street grid. I include the completed geo-referenced precinct map in Appendix A.

passage of Proposition A. In contrast, for precincts whose nearest station was located next to the predominately black Fillmore-Tenderloin, my framework suggests the presence of a cross-pressure, where the benefits of a nearby station were countered by the stations' location in a black enclave, making the entry of black passengers from the East Bay more salient. Thus, for these precincts, I conceptualize *Proximity to Station* as capturing increasing cross-pressuring between self-interest and the racial threat of an expanding black enclave.

My analytic strategy involves the use of moderated multivariate regression. While this limits my ability to make definitive causal claims, I both control for a variety of conceivable confounders and conduct a series of validity checks and placebo tests to help me rule out alternative explanations and omitted variable biases. Demographic variables for each precinct were obtained from tract-level data from the 1960 Decennial Census using a weighted spatial join (Gandhi 2016b). My analysis includes precinct-level controls for income level (% of residents with incomes > $25K), home values (% of housing units with values > $35K), home ownership (% of housing units that were owner-occupied), racial composition (% white), residential tenure (% taking residence prior to 1940), and population density. For more information about the data, including variable measurement and descriptive statistics, see Appendix A. I estimate a moderated linear regression model, where precinct-level support for Proposition A is regressed on *Proximity to Station*, *Black Enclave*, *Proximity* × *Black Enclave*, and the above listed controls.

RESULTS

The main results from my analysis are presented in Figure 2 (Table A1). This figure depicts the change in predicted "Yes" vote for Proposition A moving proximity to the nearest planned train station from its minimum to its maximum and holding all other variables at their means for precincts whose nearest station is in a white neighborhood (left) or in a black neighborhood (right). For voters whose nearest station would be located in white enclaves, we see that increasing proximity to the station is associated with a 2.4 point increase (p=.005) in aggregate support for the BART. This effect is comparable to treatment effects observed in studies of voting behavior (Gerber and Green 2015). Thus, when focusing on voters for whom the racial implications of NMT were arguably less salient, as an influx of black riders would not challenge the neighborhood predominance of whites, we see suggestive evidence of self-interest in the form of voters closer to the train being significantly more likely to vote in favor of its funding.

Figure 2. Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A



Note: Figure plots change in predicted Proposition A yes vote moving proximity from minimum to maximum value when the nearest proposed station is in a white enclave (left) or black enclave (right) with bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals. Black Enclave stations are defined as Civic Center and Powel Street stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts. Full results presented in Table A1.

For voters whose nearest station would be located in a black enclave, however, the estimated effect of *Proximity to Station* is zero. This effect is striking in comparison to that observed for stations in white enclaves, as it represents a complete attenuation of the previously observed effect of *Proximity to Station*. These results suggest that the presence of racial considerations facilitated by the prospect of the BART expanding the size of a nearby black enclave functioned to nullify the self-interest effect observed among voters residing in close proximity to stations in white neighborhoods. Worthy of note is the imprecision in the estimated effect of proximity for precincts near black enclave stations, which is more likely due to wider variation in voter behavior in these precincts than reduced common support (Hainmueller et al. 2018), as there are n=330 precincts whose nearest station is in the Fillmore-Tenderloin and considerable variation in *Proximity to Station* among these precincts (see

Appendix A). The decrease in the point estimate for *Proximity to Station* from 2.4 (Station - White Enclave) to 0 (Station – Black Enclave) is on par with the observed effects of cross-pressure in recent research on elector behavior (Brader et al. 2014).

Robustness Checks

In this section, I conduct a series of critical checks on my results. The function of these checks varies, with some intended to aid ecological inference or rule out confounding variables and alternative explanations for my results, while others are intended to serve as validity or placebo tests aimed at corroborating the mechanism underlying my results. Across each test, I find that my results hold and that the findings conform to theoretical expectations concerning the "treatment" variable, moderator, and mechanism generating the results.

To begin, my main results hold when using beta regression, which bounds the dependent variable between 0 and 1 (Table A2) and when using walking distance as an alternative to Euclidean distance to measure *Proximity to Station* (Table A2). Next, I turn to an obvious concern with my findings: my aggregate election results include all voters, which limits my ability to draw conclusions about the behavior of white voters specifically. To be sure, the ability to observe my results among white voters constitutes an important validity check: in theory, the findings in Figure 2 should be driven by white voters and not observed among black voters. To provide such a test, I utilize ecological inference (King 1997), which allows me to leverage precinct variation in racial composition and support for Proposition A to estimate the white and black vote in each precinct. I re-estimate the main model using estimates of the white and black vote as dependent variables, and present the results from these analyses in Figure 3 (Table A3). The estimated effects of *Proximity to Station* observed for the full vote are nearly identical when analyzing the white vote, which provides an important validity check on the main results. Interestingly, when analyzing the black vote in panel A, there is suggestive evidence that proximity to stations in the Fillmore-Tenderloin is associated with an *increase* in support for Proposition A, though this effect is not statistically significant. These findings present important evidence of the racialized nature of the vote, with only the white vote systematically varying as a function of proximity to BART stations and the racial composition of the neighborhood housing a planned station.

Figure 3: Effect of Proximity on White and Black Voting for Proposition A



Note: Predicted change in support for Proposition A among white voters (left) and black voters (right) in white and black enclaves, holding all other variables at their means. 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. "Black Enclave" Stations are Civic Center and Powell Street and all other stations are classified as "White Enclave" stations

A separate concern is the presence of alternative explanations for my findings due to omitted variables. First, it is possible that white voters residing in close proximity to planned stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin happen to be more politically right-leaning than those residing in close proximity to planned stations outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. While controlling for partisanship may introduce post-treatment bias into my analysis, I nonetheless demonstrate in Table A4 that my results hold when controlling for precinct partisanship. Second, it is possible that my results are due to the higher density of development near the Fillmore-Tenderloin, where a higher share of residents are able to walk as their primary means of transportation and thus have a lower self-interest in NMT. In short, it is possible that *Proximity to Station* is capturing the density of pedestrian-commuters for voters whose nearest station is in the black enclave of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Additionally, the relatively lower density of development outside of central SF, where the Fillmore-Tenderloin are located, could mean that *Proximity to Station* in these areas is capturing the density of auto-commuters. To assuage these concerns, I demonstrate in Table A4 that my results hold when controlling for the percent of the precinct population who walk, as well as who drive, as their primary means of transportation.

An additional check on my results concerns testing whether the nullification of the self-interest effect for white voters near the Fillmore-Tenderloin is confined to residing near a black enclave versus any enclave housing an ethnic outgroup. A key theorized mechanism underlying my results is that residing near a black enclave makes the prospective entry of black passengers more salient. If this is the case, we should not observe a nullification of the self-interest effect for proximity to stations in enclaves housing non-black minority groups, such as Latinos. I understand this expectation as "outgroup treatment-enclave correspondence," where there should be an observable link between the outgroup underlying the NMT treatment (entry of African Americans from the East Bay) and the outgroup inhabiting the enclave with a planned BART station. If I were to find that *Proximity to Station* exerted null effects for white voters whose nearest station is in a Latino enclave, it would suggest that the mechanism generating the nullification effect for voters near black enclave stations is not specific to concerns about growing black populations but instead potentially due to (1) aversion to using NMT when the nearest station is located in an enclave housing *any nonwhite minority group*; or (2) aversion driven by a general opposition to public goods that might be perceived as primarily benefiting an out-group (Nelson and Kinder 1996).
I test this by separating out two planned stations located in heavily Latino enclaves with few to no black residents: the 16th Street and 24th Street stations located in San Francisco's Mission District. The results in Figure 4 (Table A5) indicate that the seeming self-interest effect captured by *Proximity to Station* holds when focusing on voters whose nearest station is situated in either a predominately non-Latino white enclave or a Latino-heavy enclave. Importantly, for the full vote, and the white vote specifically[3], I only observe null effects for *Proximity* when the nearest planned station is in a black enclave. These results provide evidence that the nullification of the self-interest effect among whites is confined to residing near a black enclave, which correspondents to the treatment (i.e., potential influx of black riders). In this way, these findings provide suggestive evidence of the theoretical mechanism I

[3] This result holds when I purge the estimated white vote of possible inclusion of Latino voters counted as "White" by the 1960 Decennial Census by restricting the analysis to precincts whose estimated Spanish surname population is less than 15% (see Table A5).

posit, which is apprehension among white voters residing near a black enclave in the potential expansion of the black population.

Figure 4: Outgroup Treatment-Enclave Correspondence



Note: Predicted change in support for Proposition A among all voters (left), white voters (middle) and black voters (right) in white, Latino, and black enclaves, holding all other variables at their means. 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

An additional concern with my results is that the attenuation of the self-interest effect observed for voters near a black enclave is not due to proximity to the Fillmore-Tenderloin making the entry of black riders more threatening, but rather that the *volume of black riders exiting the BART* would be larger for these downtown black enclave stations (Civic Center and Powell St.) compared to stations outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. In other words, rather being driven by variation in the racial composition of the enclave housing a BART station (i.e., variation in my moderator), what varies is the “treatment” itself, with the Fillmore-Tenderloin receiving a larger potential treatment of incoming black passengers. A compelling means of assuaging this concern is to focus on the southernmost planned BART station in Balboa Park, which rests on the southern border of the city. While the Fillmore-Tenderloin in 1962 housed the county’s most prominent and longstanding black population, a nascent black community was forming in Balboa Park following the Second Great Migration in the 1950s. If the attenuation of the self-interest effect observed among white voters residing near the Fillmore-Tenderloin is due to the presence of a black enclave making the entry of black riders more salient and threatening, I should observe a nullification of self-interest among white voters whose nearest planned station is in Balboa Park, as it housed a budding black community. Figure 5 (Table A5) demonstrates that *Proximity to Station* exerts a null effect (β=.013, se=.029, p=.639) for the white vote among the precincts (n=301) who's nearest planned station is Balboa Park station. This finding highlights the importance of the location of a station in a black enclave making the entry of black riders more salient and threatening: even when focusing on a black enclave that was relatively new and less geographically and socially prominent than the Fillmore-Tenderloin, I still observe an attenuation of the self-interest effect.

Figure 5: Effect of Treatment for White Voters Near Alternative Black Enclaves



Note: Predicted change in support for Proposition A among white voters moving values of Proximity to Station from minimum to maximum and holding all other variables at their means for precincts whose nearest planned station is Balboa Park station (left) and Hunters Point (right). Full results presented in Table A6.

Moving on, an important validity check involves demonstrating that the results I have presented so far are driven by the interactive dynamics of proximity to a planned BART station and a black enclave. In theory, proximity to a black enclave lacking a station should have *no effect* on white voter support for Proposition A, as the "treatment" (entry of black passengers from the East Bay) would be absent. One way of testing this is to utilize a black enclave in SF lacking a planned station: Hunters Point. Hunters Point is located on the remote southeastern stretches of the city. Similar to Balboa Park, the black community in Hunters Point in 1962 was recent relative to the Fillmore-Tenderloin, having become established in the 1950s following WWII. Critically, Hunters Point was and still is far removed from the BART system, with the nearest stations (24^{th} Street Mission and Glen Park) being over 4 miles from the heart of Hunters Point. I calculated the distance from the centroid of each precinct in southeastern SF to the center of Hunters Point and demonstrate in Figure 5 (Table A6) that proximity to Hunters Point exerted a null effect (β=.016, se=.041, p=.684) on the white vote for Prop A. This finding is critical—it illustrates that voter behavior was driven by the location BART stations and that residing near a black enclave lacking a station exerted no effect on the white Vote.

Next, a critical check on my results involves placebo tests on irrelevant outcomes: the effects I have shown should be confined to the vote over the BART train (Proposition A), and should not be observed for measures on the 1962 ballot having nothing to do with the BART. Figure 6 presents the results from two tests where I estimate the model underlying Figure 2 replacing the vote over Proposition A with two ballot measures unrelated to the BART train: (1) Proposition 1A involving a $270 million bond to fund higher education facilities, and (2) Proposition 4, concerning tax assessments for agricultural lands. The proximity of white voters to planned BART stations should have no systematic relationship to their support for either ballot measure. Of specific interest is Proposition 1A, which is similar to Proposition A in terms of involving support for issuing a bond to fund public goods; however, unlike Proposition A, Proposition 1A has nothing to do with NMT or the BART system. Thus, Proposition 1A provides an ideal placebo test to determine whether the pattern of relationships I uncover in Figure 2 has less to do with voter proximity to planned BART stations and more to do with the happenstance of having (white) voters who support public goods provision in general residing near planned stations outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. The results in Figure 6 (Table A7) illustrate this is not the case, as there are null effects for *Proximity to Station* for the white vote regardless of whether the nearest planned station is in a white or black enclave. These null results mitigate concern over a feasible alternative explanation for my main results: the "diversity discount" (Hopkins 2009), whereby white voters in more diverse contexts oppose public goods spending (e.g., on NMT) believed to benefit an outgroup. The null effects in Figure 6—especially for Proposition 1A—indicate that whites residing near planned stations in white enclaves, while more likely to support the BART train, were not more likely to support a different public goods funding initiative. These additional analyses impart added validity to my main findings given these placebo outcomes do not pertain to the BART system.

Figure 6. Placebo Tests on Irrelevant Outcomes



Note: Figure plots the change in predicted Yes vote for Propositions 1A and 4 moving proximity to station from minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at their means, with 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. See Table A7for full model results

My final check concerns a key theorized mechanism generating my results: a cross-pressure between self-interest and racial threat and the assumption that the voters experiencing the highest degree of cross-pressure were white voters residing close to the planned stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin. According to the literature, one of the primary repercussions of the experience of cross-pressuring is reduced participation (Brader et al. 2014; Mutz 2002). Thus, to the extent that the null effect of *Proximity to Station* among white voters residing close to planned stations in the Filmore-Tenderloin is due to the experience of cross-pressure, we should observe evidence of cross-pressuring via lower overall engagement with Proposition A. To assess this, I analyze total votes cast for Proposition A by precinct. For this analysis, the use of ecological inference was not an option due to the lack of precinct-level information of the citizen voting-age population or voter registration figures that could serve as a denominator for estimates of precinct turnout. The best available option was to estimate a regression for total votes cast for Proposition A while controlling for total precinct population over the age of 20, as the 1960 Census only provides estimates for population over 16 or 20 years of age. Such a model would enable the estimation of the effect of *Proximity to Station* holding constant variation in the size of the precinct population old enough to vote.

Figure 7. Evidence of Cross-Pressuring—Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Total Votes Cast for Proposition A



Note: Figure plots the change in predicted number of votes cast for Proposition A moving proximity to station from its minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at their means, with 90% confidence intervals in predominately white precincts (precinct Percent Black in 1960 is either less than 15% or less than 5%). See Table A8 for full model results.

Figure 7 (Table A8) presents the effects of *Proximity to Station* on total votes cast for Proposition A among predominately white precincts. As can be seen, increasing proximity to a station is associated with a significant decrease in votes cast for Proposition A among voters whose nearest planned station is in a white enclave. However, this negative effect is significantly enhanced (β=-.216, se=.120, p=.072) when focusing on voters whose nearest station is in the black enclave of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Indeed, the negative effect of *Proximity to Station* for white voters residing closer to planned stations in the Fillmore-Tenderloin is double the size of the effect for white voters residing close to planned stations in white enclaves of the city. Substantively, and focusing on precincts that are 95% or greater white, proximity to a station in a white enclave is associated with roughly 26 fewer votes cast for Proposition A, whereas proximity to a station in the Fillmore-Tenderloin black enclave is associated with roughly 69 fewer votes cast for Proposition A, a nearly three-fold decrease. These findings lend credence to the claim that Proposition A evoked a cross-pressure for white voters in SF.

CONCLUSION

The findings presented in this article highlight how considerations of the racial impact of public goods decisions (e.g., NMT) can shape voter behavior and consequently the social geography of urban and suburban spaces. These decisions can impact decades or centuries of future urban planning decisions, in many cases entrenching segregation (Massey and Denton 1993), devastating minority urban neighborhoods (Avila 2014), aggravating geographic political polarization (Nall 2015), and exacerbating political, social, and economic inequalities.

This article makes several important contributions to the literature on racial threat. First, the literature on racial threat is moving towards greater reliance on case studies involving large demographic changes to empirically assess the effect of exposure to outgroups on dominant-group political behavior. As such, I identify NMT as an additional case for evaluating theories of racial threat, as NMT often precipitates demographic shifts and increases racial mixing. Second, my focus on NMT introduces the concept of racial threat as *potential outgroup entry*. While existing work has given considerable attention to white Americans' apprehension over the entry of racial outgroups into their communities, most studies on racial threat focus past or present exposure to already present, and often long-standing, outgroups. As such, this focus on NMT is attractive in light of concerns over residential self-selection, as the “treatment” is future oriented and offers a case where observation of political behavior could occur before (additional) outgroup entry or dominant-group exit happen.

Aside from these contributions, there are several limitations of my analysis worth addressing. First, while I argue that NMT offers an attractive case by potentially bypassing the problem of “white flight,” it is important to acknowledge that new transit stations are likely located nonrandomly, perhaps in lower SES or nonwhite neighborhoods. In the context of my study of the BART, however, concern over this issue is mitigated by several factors: SF in 1962 was predominately white, five out of eight planned BART stations were located in white neighborhoods and in prominent employment, tourist, and retail areas of the central city and inner-ring suburbs, and my analysis controls for prior economic conditions and racial composition. Second, my analysis represents a single historical case and relies on aggregate election results. While I view this case as unique and ideal in that support for the BART system was put to a popular vote, future research should strive to assess the robustness of my results using additional cases. To be sure, one of the benefits of NMT as an arena to assess racial threat processes is the seemingly ample opportunity for replication tests given many mass transit systems throughout the U.S. and abroad. Moreover, while precincts represent notably smaller levels of geographic aggregation than that usually found in the racial threat literature (e.g., county, zip code, tract) and I address the aggregate nature of my data and utilize ecological inference methods, future research could potentially utilize individual-level data which simply was not available in this case.

Finally, my exploration of NMT focuses on racial threat from the white-centered angle of how NMT may facilitate the entry of non-Anglo groups into white communities. However, NMT can also be used to explore the reaction of non-Anglo groups to the entry of whites. Indeed, recent work on gentrification finds that NMT can lead to gentrification (Grube-Cavers and Patterson 2015) and “white return” to urban areas experiencing white flight many decades prior. Focusing on the U.S., where many cities eschewed mass transit in favor of automobiles and freeway systems, we have seen a growth in NMT in the midst of concern over pollution, peak oil, and traffic congestion. Each of these cases affords an opportunity to explore processes of racial threat from the perspective of “gentrification threat” (Newman et al. 2016) and the effect of white entry into majority-minority communities.

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX A

Data and Variables

I. 1962 General Election Results

1962 San Francisco County election returns were hand tallied by the California Secretary of State, organized by state assembly district-precinct, and bound in a returns ledger that is currently housed at the San Francisco History Center in the San Francisco Public Library. The data were retrieved and digitized by the authors in October 2018. Figure I.1 is a picture of the first page of the election ledger.

Figure I.1: San Francisco County Election Returns Ledger



The data included Proposition A precinct vote returns for 1,326 precincts. My dependent variable is precinct-level support—percent "Yes" vote—for Proposition A (mean=67.2, sd=8.4, min=30.9, max=89.8).

II. 1960 Decennial Census

I pulled census tract data from the 1960 Decennial Census from the U.S. Census Bureau via Social Explorer (https://www.socialexplorer.com/). Polygons for cities and tracts were obtained from the IPUMS historic GIS map database.

My key independent variable is proximity to nearest BART station, calculated as the Euclidean distance (WGS84 projection lat/lon units) of the centroid of each precinct to the address of the nearest planned BART station (mean=18127.27, sd=5824.64, min=160.224, max=26435.5). Georeferencing of precinct polygons is explained in detail in the next section.

I include a variety of control variables in my models. I describe each and display basic descriptive statistics below.

Income level: Percent of residents in precinct with incomes > $25k (mean=0.02, sd=0.03, min=0, max=0.19)

Home values: Percent of housing units with values > $35k (mean=0.12, sd=0.20, min=0, max=1)

Home ownership: Percent of housing units that were owner occupied (mean=0.42, sd=0.30, min=0, max=1).

Racial composition: Percent of precinct that is White (mean=0.85, sd=0.20, min=0.01, max=1). Other models utilize measures of percent Black (mean=0.08, sd=0.20, min=0, max=0.68) and percent Hispanic surname (mean=0.07, sd=0.06, min=0, max=0.35).

Residential tenure: Percent of precinct taking residence prior to 1940 (mean=0.41, sd=0.19, min=0, max=1).

Population density: (mean=2,627.33, sd=3,519.31, min=4.39, max=45,941.78).

Drive to work: Percent of precinct that drives to work (mean=0.42, sd=0.14, min=0.02, max=0.74).

Walk to work: Percent of precinct that walks to work (mean=0.09, sd=0.11, min=0, max=0.63).

III. Georeferencing

To calculate precinct distance from BART stations and link precinct-level election returns to census data, I geo-referenced hand-drawn 1962 precinct maps (Gandhi 2016a). I collected historic precinct maps from San Francisco City Hall that were used for all elections between 1961 to 1965, photographed each map, and used QGIS mapping software to geolocate each precinct map onto a current street map of San Francisco. I include three examples below that show how the larger state assembly districts fit into SF county, how precincts fit within an assembly district, and the finished geo-references precinct shapefile for all of SF county.

Figure III.1 San Francisco County State Assembly Districts

Note: map indicates how SF County was parceled into state assembly districts.

Figure III.2 Precinct Map 18th Assembly District

Note: Polygons represent electoral precincts embedded in state assembly districts. Numbers correspond to electoral returns from the Secretary of State.

Figure III.3 Full Shapefile of Electoral Precincts San Francisco County



Note: Polygons represent geo-referenced electoral precincts for all of San Francisco County.

IV. Weighted Spatial Join

To generate precinct level estimates of census tract variables, I overlaid precinct shapefiles described above with 1960 tract shapefiles and used the sf package in R to conduct an areal-weighted interpolation (weighted spatial joins), reaggregating data from a larger polygon (tract) to a smaller polygon (precinct) (Gandhi 2016b).

V. Ecological Inference

To estimate White and Black voting trends we relied on Gary King's EI package (King 2004). EI provides a method for inferring individual-level behavior from aggregate data by implementing a statistical procedure outlined in King (King 1997).

Table A1. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A

	Moderated Regression Model	
Proximity to Station	.024**	(.008)
1960 Controls		
% Income>$25K	.096***	(.018)
% Value>$35K	.020	(.015)
% Home Owners	-.154***	(.009)
% White	-.106***	(.010)
Residential Tenure	-.001**	(.000)
Population Density	-.025	(.027)
Moderator		
Black Enclave	.012	(.021)
Interaction		
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.024	(.026)
Effect of *Proximity to Station* when *Black Enclave*=0	-.000	(.025)
Intercept	.818	(.011)
N	1,326	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an OLS regression model. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A2. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A

	Beta Regression		Walking Distance	
Proximity to Station	.107***	(.038)	-.024**	(.008)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.441***	(.083)	.097***	(.018)
% Value>$35K	.097	(.073)	.019	(.015)
% Home Owners	-.689***	(.040)	-.154***	(.009)
% White	-.533***	(.047)	-.106***	(.009)
Residential Tenure	-.138**	(.049)	-.001***	(.001)
Population Density	-.113	(.134)	-.024	(.027)
Moderator				
Black Enclave	.037	(.099)	.014	(.008)
Interaction				
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.082	(.124)	.031	(.023)
Effect of *Proximity to Station* when *Black Enclave*=0	.024	(.120)	.024	(.120)
Intercept	1.43	(.052)	1.43	(.052)
N	1,326			1,326

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a beta regression model. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A3. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on White and Black Voter Support for Proposition A

	White Vote		*Black Vote*	
Proximity to Station	.023*	(.009)	.008	(.006)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.104***	(.020)	.063***	(.013)
% Value>$35K	.020	(.016)	.037***	(.011)
% Home Owners	-.163***	(.010)	-.118***	(.007)
% White	.088***	(.011)	.019**	(.007)
Residential Tenure	-.029*	(.012)	-.005	(.008)
Population Density	-.028	(.030)	.072***	(.020)
Moderator				
Black Enclave	.011	(.023)	-.015	(.015)
Interaction				
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.022	(.029)	.003	(.019)
Effect of *Proximity to Station* when *Black Enclave*=0	.001	(.027)	.011	(.019)
Intercept	.628	(.012)	.874	(.008)
N	1,326		1,326	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A4. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A Controlling for Partisanship and Density of Car and Pedestrian Commuters

	Control – Partisanship		*Control – Commuting*	
Proximity to Station	.017*	(.009)	.019*	(.009)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.111***	(.019)	.087***	(.018)
% Value>$35K	.027	(.015)	.023	(.015)
% Home Owners	-.156***	(.009)	-.177***	(.014)
% White	-.097***	(.011)	-.104***	(.010)
Residential Tenure	-.028**	(.011)	-.024*	(.011)
Population Density	-.010	(.028)	-.011	(.031)
Percent Democrat	.031*	(.014)		
Percent Drive			.058*	(.028)
Percent Walk			.024	(.020)
Moderator				
Black Enclave	.013	(.021)	.006	(.023)
Interaction				
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.023	(.026)	-.009	(.030)
Intercept	.792	(.016)	.789	(.018)
N	1,326		1,326	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A5. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on White and Black Voter Support for Proposition A

	Full Vote						**White Vote**					
	Station – *White Enclave*		Station – *Latino Enclave*		Station – *Black Enclave*		Station – *White Enclave*		Station – *Latino Enclave*		Station – *Black Enclave*	
Proximity to Station	.039**	(.015)	.030*	(.013)	.013	(.060)	.039*	(.016)	.030*	(.015)	.022	(.068)
1960 Controls												
% Income>$25K	.101***	(.030)	.053	(.058)	.145***	(.044)	.100**	(.032)	.056	(.064)	.154**	(.050)
% Value>$35K	-.031	(.037)	.074	(.076)	.023	(.019)	-.022	(.040)	.082	(.084)	.025	(.022)
% Home	-.164***	(.014)	-.128***	(.027)	-.087	(.092)	-.172***	(.015)	-.145***	(.031)	-.077	(.105)
% White	-.112***	(.025)	-.097***	(.022)	-.099***	(.017)	.101***	(.027)	.097***	(.025)	.092***	(.020)
Residential	-.037**	(.014)	-.040	(.032)	-.087	(.063)	-.036*	(.015)	-.040	(.036)	-.105	(.072)
Population	-.047	(.049)	-.208*	(.086)	.089*	(.043)	-.026	(.052)	-.219*	(.096)	.083	(.049)
Intercept	.824	(.028)	.812	(.018)	.805	(.060)	.616	(.030)	.626	(.020)	.613	(.068)
N	531		468		327		531		468		327	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A5 (Continued)

	Black Vote						White Vote (Spanish Surname <15%)	
	Station – *White Enclave*		Station – *Latino Enclave*		Station – *Black Enclave*		Station – *Latino Enclave*	
Proximity to Station	.017	(.011)	.008	(.010)	.109*	(.045)	.040*	(.020)
1960 Controls								
% Income>$25K	.064**	(.021)	.013	(.043)	.061	(.033)	.052	(.063)
% Value>$35K	.015	(.027)	.078	(.056)	.023	(.014)	.060	(.083)
% Home	-.131***	(.010)	-.102***	(.021)	.008	(.069)	-.068	(.053)
% White	.008	(.018)	.065***	(.017)	.008	(.013)	.098**	(.037)
Residential	-.015	(.010)	-.024	(.024)	.059	(.048)	-.124**	(.046)
Population	.063	(.035)	-.107	(.064)	.090**	(.032)	-.183	(.120)
Intercept	.894	(.020)	.846	(.013)	.761	(.045)	.626	(.026)
N	531		468		327		325	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A6. The Effect of Proximity to Balboa Park BART Station and Hunters Point on White Voter Support for Proposition A

	Proximity – Balboa Park		*Proximity – Hunters Point*	
Proximity to Station	.013	(.029)	.016	(.041)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.233*	(.103)	.113	(.165)
% Value>$35K	-.370	(.214)	.030	(.299)
% Home Owners	-.193***	(.027)	-.192***	(.057)
% White	.021	(.043)	.091*	(.045)
Residential Tenure	-.017	(.026)	.040	(.034)
Population Density	.009	(.345)	.041	(.163)
Percent Drive	.115	(.122)	.041	(.119)
Intercept	.626	(.080)	.585	(.091)
N	298		326	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A7. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for "Treatment-Irrelevant" Ballot Measures

	Prop 1A – Funding Higher Ed Facilities		*Prop 4 – Tax Assessments on Agricultural Lands*	
Proximity to Station	-.007	(.009)	-.004	(.010)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.069***	(.019)	.091***	(.021)
% Value>$35K	.037*	(.015)	-.018	(.017)
% Home Owners	-.104***	(.009)	-.072***	(.010)
% White	.103***	(.011)	-.011	(.012)
Residential Tenure	-.018	(.011)	-.034**	(.012)
Population Density	-.007	(.028)	-.038	(.032)
Percent Democrat	.129***	(.014)	-.178***	(.015)
Moderator				
Black Enclave	-.012	(.021)	.004	(.023)
Interaction				
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.002	(.026)	.015	(.029)
Effect of *Proximity to Station* when *Black Enclave*=0	-.009	(.025)	.011	(.028)
Intercept	.551	(.016)	.613	(.018)
N	1,326		1,326	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).

Table A8. The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Total Votes Cast for Proposition A

	Percent Black – Less than 15%		*Percent Black – Less than 5%*	
Proximity to Station	-.163***	(.037)	-.143***	(.038)
1960 Controls				
% Income>$25K	.263***	(.078)	.250**	(.080)
% Value>$35K	-.041	(.071)	-.048	(.076)
% Home Owners	.175***	(.042)	.139***	(.043)
% White	.390***	(.075)	.345***	(.080)
Residential Tenure	-.226***	(.048)	-.235***	(.049)
Population Density	.575***	(.162)	.430*	(.170)
Total Pop over	.256*	(.112)	.335**	(.121)
Moderator				
Black Enclave	.134	(.098)	.125	(.101)
Interaction				
Proximity × Black Enclave	-.216	(.120)	-.219	(.124)
Effect of *Proximity to Station* when *Black Enclave*=0	-.379***	(.115)	-.362**	(.119)
Intercept	4.88	(.077)	4.94	(.081)
N	1,085		967	

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed).