The Immigration-to-Reproduction Shift: Latino Population Growth and White Support for Legal Abortion

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Abstract

The literature on White Americans' reaction to demographic change continues to focus on immigration despite the fact that the ethnic diversification of the United States is increasingly driven by non-White births. We extend past research on White backlash against ethnic diversification to the domain of reproductive policy—testing the idea that prejudiced Whites will support abortion in response to growing minority populations as a means of slowing demographic change via non-White reproduction. Using large-N and original surveys of the American public, we find that Whites residing in locales with substantial growth in the Latino population are more supportive of access to legal abortion. This relationship is not observed among non-Whites and is confined to Whites higher in prejudice. We replicate these findings with a series of pre-registered experiments showing that priming prejudiced Whites to think about Latino population growth increases their support for racially-targeted abortion as well as other reproduction-limiting policies.

Word Count (Excluding References): 9741

"We can't restore our civilization with somebody else's babies."

Representative Steve King, IA-5

"2024 did actually have a slight uptick in births, in America. Bad news. It was just the anchor babies from the illegal immigrants."

Peachy Keenan, 2025, NatalCon

Introduction

The United States has become more ethnically diverse over the past 40 years, with non-Latino Whites moving from roughly 80% of the population in 1980 down to 57% in 2020. This diversification has been driven by immigration[1] and high birth rates among non-Whites.[2] At the forefront of this process is the Latino population, the largest ethnic minority group in the country. Between 1980 and 2000, most Latino growth was attributable to immigration; however, beginning in the 2000s, annual Latino births began outpacing immigration and, by 2020, most Latino population growth was driven by reproduction.[3] Between 2022 and 2023, Latino growth accounted for roughly 71% of the nation's total population growth, driven primarily by births.[4] At the same time, the White population began to decline in 2016, as deaths among Whites outpaced births.[5] Accompanying these ongoing demographic shifts has been growing concern among White Americans over their loss in numerical, cultural, economic and political dominance (Craig and Richeson, 2014; Gest et al., 2018). One controversial

[1]https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states-2022

[2]https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-now-outnumber-white-births/

[3]https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2679432/key-facts-about-us/3702727/

[4]https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024/population-estimates-characteristics.html

[5]https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/brookings_policybriefs_reports/11/

embodiment of Whites' concern over demographic change is belief in the "Great Replacement": a White nationalist conspiracy theory claiming a clandestine effort by leaders across Western nations to demographically and culturally replace White European populations with non-Whites through international migration and declining White birth rates.[6] This idea has been discussed for years on Fox News[7] and recent survey data indicates that roughly 30% of Americans—and over half of those identifying with the Republican Party—agree with key features of this conspiracy theory.[8]

Despite the shift in the source of Latino population growth from immigration to reproduction, the scholarly literature on White backlash to ethnic diversification remains dominated by studies on Whites' opposition to immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Branton et al., 2011; Earle and Hodson, 2022; Hopkins, 2010; Maggio, 2023; Newman, 2013) and endorsement of nativist politicians (Hill et al., 2019; Maggio, 2021; Newman et al., 2018; Reny et al., 2019), with little-to-no research exploring possible effects on Whites' preferences over reproductive policies. This omission in the literature is notable given that growth in the Latino population is forecast to continue being driven by births,[9] which would imply a shift in the locus of efforts by Whites to curb demographic change from policies regulating the amount of immigration to those affecting levels of reproduction. In sum, Latino population growth, and the *immigration-to-reproduction shift* in Latino population growth, are predominant forces shaping the nation's ongoing demographic transformation. The research question we ask is: Do these forces factor into White Americans' preferences over reproductive policies? We find this question particularly salient in light of the June 2022 Supreme Court ruling on *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, which ended the federal constitutional right to abortion and intensified political conflict over state-level abortion bans.[10] Following the

[6]https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained

[7]https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/17/great-replacement-theory-is-ignorant-both-broadly-narrowly/

[8]https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2022/10/31/umass-poll-significant-numbers-support-great-replacement-theory-on-immigration/

[9]https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf

[10]http://bit.ly/4sxCgV7

Dobbs decision, prominent media outlets drew an explicit connection between abortion policy and growing minority populations by publicizing reports highlighting the disproportionate effect of abortion bans on the rapidly growing Latina population of childbearing age.[11] Meanwhile, the Trump Administration and its allies have adopted a conspicuously pronatalist stance, citing plummeting birth rates as the impetus for subsidizing IVF treatments and offering a $5,000 "baby bonus" to new mothers[12]—a stance critics suggest is racially coded given that birth rates are declining among Whites while increasing among Latinos.[13]

Drawing on public opinion research on abortion and literature on racial threat and demographic change, we hypothesize that White Americans will embrace policies that restrict reproduction when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that this process should be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites most averse to growing ethno-racial diversity and the loss of Whites' dominant status. Our empirical tests use observational data leveraging subnational differences in Latino population growth to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans, as well as pre-registered survey experiments that directly manipulate the salience of Latino growth and reproduction.

Using one of the largest national surveys of the adult American population—the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey (N=494,796)—we demonstrate that residing in an area experiencing large growth in the Latino population is associated with heightened support for legal abortion. A series of ancillary tests mitigate concern that this relationship reflects residential selection: It is observed only among Whites and not among Black, Latino, or Asian respondents; it does not appear for Black or Asian population growth; it is not associated with more liberal gender-related attitudes unrelated to abortion; and panel data show that permissive abortion attitudes do not predict moving to high-Latino-growth counties. Above all, using several measures of racial prejudice, we show that it is only among Whites harboring

[11] https://latino.ucla.edu/research/abortion-bans-latinas/

[12] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/critics-question-trump-baby-bonus-proposal-s-just-completely-bananas-rcna203007

[13] https://vinnews.com/2025/04/24/the-view-host-claims-trumps-baby-bonus-encourages-white-women-to-have-children/

high levels of prejudice that we observe positive and substantively meaningful relationships between exposure to Latino population growth and support for legal abortion. Critically, we replicate these results using another large-N dataset: the 2016-2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES; N=263,735). We accompany these large-N findings with an original survey showing that, among prejudiced Whites, perceived local Latino population growth is also positively associated with support for Latina contraception and abortion when explicitly framed as population control—a pattern that does not appear for White women's access to the same policies, regardless of prejudice level. Finally, using two pre-registered survey experiments, we demonstrate that, when presenting abortion, contraception, and sterilization as policy tools for slowing population growth, depicting the target women as Latina (versus White) leads to increased policy support but only among the most prejudiced Whites.

Ethnic Diversity and the Politics of Reproduction

The politics of reproduction encompasses a range of issues, with one of the central being policies affecting access to abortion. Indeed, a review of research exploring public opinion on reproductive policy finds that the majority of scholarly attention has been given to the legality of abortion (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018). As such, we focus on abortion policy as an epicenter of past and current conflict within the realm of reproductive politics. With this in mind, we turn to the question of what is known about the factors shaping public opinion on abortion, with an eye toward building testable hypotheses about the impact of exposure to shifting ethno-racial demographics on Whites' abortion policy preferences.

Americans' preferences on reproductive policy, especially abortion, are a known function of individual-level factors like pre-adult family socialization (Pacheco and Kreitzer, 2016), educational attainment, religious identity and beliefs, and views toward the role of women in society (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018; Jelen and Wilcox, 2003; Osborne et al., 2022).[14] Less is known about how factors operative in people's environment shape their

[14]The politics of reproduction encompasses a range of issues, from access to contraceptives and healthcare

reproductive policy preferences. To the extent research on public opinion related to abortion policy addresses the political environment, the focus has been on Supreme Court rulings (Brickman and Peterson, 2006; Clark et al., 2024; Wlezien and Goggin, 1993), state-level political culture (Cook et al., 1993b), and state and local religious context (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018; Cook et al., 1993a; Olson, 2019), with little research focusing on racial context and shifting demographics. A handful of studies explore the relationship between White Americans' racial attitudes and their opposition to abortion (Allen and Olson, 2022; Baker et al., 2022; Deckman et al., 2023); however, this work does not theoretically or empirically incorporate Whites' ethno-racial environment. This serves as a basis for extending longstanding theories of group conflict and racial threat to Whites' attitudes on abortion.

Realistic group conflict theory contends that conflict between groups is a product of feelings of threat and antipathy that arise from competition over resources (Jackson, 1993; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Within this framework, research on "racial threat" (Key, 1949) hypothesizes that the size of geographically proximate non-White groups will drive Whites' perception of threat and support for anti-minority policies and politicians (Carsey, 1995; Giles and Buckner, 1993; Glaser, 1994). Recent research finds this process to be particularly operative in instances involving drastic *changes* in the size of a proximate non-White group (Enos, 2016; Hopkins, 2012; Reny and Newman, 2018a), which is consistent with sub-variants of group conflict theory emphasizing the potential for anti-minority violence following the entry or growth of non-Whites in White communities (Green et al., 1998). While originally formulated to explain White-Black relations in the American South, the racial threat hypothesis has been adapted over time to reflect shifting demographic trends in the United States, such as the dramatic influx of Latino immigrants beginning in the 1970s (Campbell et al., 2006; Citrin et al., 1990; Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013).

Given the present juncture of demographic trends in America, where the source of Latino-

to maternity leave and policies encouraging reproduction. We focus on abortion policy as the central arena of conflict within this domain, consistent with reviews finding that the majority of scholarly attention to reproductive policy has been given to the legality of abortion (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018).

driven ethnic diversification has shifted from immigration to reproduction, the grounds are ripe for yet another adaptation of racial threat theory—this time to the domain of reproductive politics. The presumed mechanism underlying prior findings is that people support policies perceived to mitigate a threat (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brandt et al., 2021; Huddy et al., 2007): Whites threatened by growing Latino populations favor policies believed to curb Latino-driven diversification. For decades, this policy outlet was immigration, with the locus of White backlash being support for restrictive policies that would slow the *entry* of Latinos into the United States. However, with the *immigration-to-reproduction shift* in the source of Latino population growth, an outlet of increasing importance may be policies affecting rates of Latino reproduction, such as those shaping access to legal abortion. In sum, with Latino immigration slowing in the 21st century and Latino growth primarily driven by high birth rates, the desire to curb Latino growth may lead threatened Whites to oppose policies that create barriers to the ability of members of the Latino community to limit their own reproduction by averting childbirth.

Prior research finds that not all citizens react the same way to contact with immigrant minorities or shifting racial demographics. Individual differences in partisanship (Homola and Tavits, 2018), ideological identification (Brown et al., 2022), and authoritarian orientations (Johnston et al., 2015; Velez and Lavine, 2017) have been found to condition Americans' reactions to contact with immigrants and increasing ethnic diversity. A presumed mechanism underlying these findings is that racial prejudice—or factors highly correlated with it—shapes the likelihood that a member of a dominant ethno-racial group will have an averse reaction to growing ethnic diversity. In short, Whites who dislike racial and ethnic minorities should be the most likely to react to minority population growth with a desire to curb the growth. This desire may lead to elevated support for policy tools (e.g., legal abortion) that may curtail growing ethnic diversity. We therefore hypothesize that White Americans will embrace permissive reproductive policies when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that

this process will be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites.[15]

Reproductive Policy and (Racialized) Population Control

The feasibility of these predictions hinges on the extent to which abortion is perceived by the general public as a tool for slowing population growth. Survey data suggest widespread recognition of this connection, especially in foreign contexts. When asked about the reasons for high birth rates in developing nations, 89% of Americans viewed "lack of access to birth control" as an important reason. Given this, it is unsurprising that roughly 70% of Americans reported favoring providing aid for birth control to help reduce population growth in poverty-stricken countries.[16] In a study soliciting Americans' support for various policy tools to control population growth in developing nations, 85% of Americans favored providing free birth control to women and 53% favored making abortions easily available.[17] It is a longstanding fact that the prevalence of legal abortion is associated with lower population growth rates (Mumford and Kessel, 1986; Tietze, 1975) and the American public evinces considerable awareness of this relationship, at least when considering policy interventions in foreign nations. Having established a basis of support for the presumption that Americans make a connection between abortion and population growth, the next set of connections to be addressed are between race, shifting racial demographics, and reproductive policy.

The idea that race and shifting demographics play a role in the politics of reproduction is far from new. Against the backdrop of declining birth rates among native-born Whites in the early 20th century, former President Theodore Roosevelt denounced the use of contraceptives among educated White women, or what he termed "good stock Americans," as "race suicide" (Tone, 2002). By the mid-20th century, 32 of the 50 states had eugenics boards overseeing

[15]Although permissive reproductive policies could also mitigate White births, we posit that prejudiced Whites may discount this trade-off when Latino-driven population growth is salient. Prejudiced Whites hold stereotypes that non-Whites are differentially more likely to have abortions than White women (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2025), suggesting that prejudiced Whites may not perceive meaningful White birth mitigation from permissive reproductive policies—a "generalized ideational concept" that encourages them to support such policies as tools to mitigate Latino population growth (Bobo and Massagli, 2001).

[16]Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Poll: July 2004

[17]Gallup News Service Poll: April 1992

sterilization operations disproportionately targeting non-White populations,[18] with White supremacists in the South explicitly supporting forced birth control to stop the "black tide which threatens to engulf us."[19] Latina women were particularly targeted: In California, where nearly a third of all documented compulsory sterilizations occurred, doctors frequently sterilized Latinas, often without meaningful consent (*No Más Bebés* 2016; Novak et al., 2018; Stern, 2005b).[20] The impetus behind these sterilization laws and campaigns were multifaceted, though a central component was limiting the reproduction of groups considered undesirable—those with "deleterious genes" from "degenerate stock"—to the larger national racial project (Reilly, 2015; Stern, 2005a). These historical moments highlight that reproductive policy preferences among Whites are seemingly malleable and shaped by salient changes in the size of Whites vis-a-vis non-White groups and by the ethno-racial groups envisioned as recipients of reproductive interventions.

The early 20th-century concept of "race suicide" has re-emerged in the contemporary White nationalist conspiracy theory known as the "Great Replacement." Modern White nationalist leaders speak explicitly about the role of reproduction in shaping national demography. Tom Metzger, a former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, articulated the importance of a reproduction strategy for securing a White future, stating: "Very little abortion should be tolerated among our white race, while at the same time, abortion and birth control should be promoted as a powerful weapon in the limitation of non-White birth... Covertly invest in non-White areas, invest in ghetto abortion clinics. Help to raise money for free abortions in primarily non-White areas" (Kaplan, 2000). These views were echoed by Greg Johnson, editor of the White nationalist webzine *Counter-Currents*, who argued that abortion should be tolerated in multiracial democracies because it delays the point at which White Americans become a numerical minority and "works in our demographic favor" by shrinking "non-white

[18]https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwanted-sterilization-and-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states/

[19]https://www.mississippifreepress.org/12782/the-troubling-past-of-forced-sterilization-of-black-women-and-girls-in-mississippi-and-the-south

[20]Women on the island of Puerto Rico faced among the highest rates of sterilization in the world. Between 1940 and 1970, an estimated third of the women on the island were sterilized (Sotomayor, 2020)

voting blocs" (Johnson, 2016).

Such views are not limited to fringe White nationalist forums or leaders. Narratives surrounding the "Great Replacement" and the role of reproduction in shaping the nation's demographic future have become increasingly common across mainstream websites and social media platforms, with discussions on X, Quora, and Reddit frequently echoing demographic anxieties and racially contingent views on fertility, abortion, and population growth. We include examples in Table 1 below. These ideas have diffused into the consciousness of the mass public. Nearly half (46%) of White Americans believe that a majority-minority America will undermine traditional American customs and values,[21] and a 2014 survey fielded by the National Hispanic Media Coalition found that 57% of White—and 86% of prejudiced White—Americans agreed that "have too many children" describes Hispanics or Latinos "very" or "somewhat" well (see Figure A3). Original survey data we collected in 2025 via CloudResearch Connect (n = 990, July 2025) further confirm diffuse support for central tenets of "Great Replacement" ideology, with majorities or large minorities agreeing that demographic change will alter the nation's culture (51%), is being intentionally engineered by elites (24%), or will import conflict and undermine law and order (17-33%). Even more explicit views on racialized reproduction emerged in responses to an open-ended question embedded in another of our surveys (N=1,483, July 2025) also collected via CloudResearch Connect.[22] Following a battery of questions measuring support for reproduction-limiting population control methods for either Latinas or White women, we asked respondents to explain, in their own words, why they answered as they did. The bottom portion of Table 1 presents a selection of illustrative responses. These responses reveal that many of our respondents view reproductive health through an explicitly racialized lens, frequently expressing enthusiasm for limiting abortion for White women while explicitly supporting it for Latinas.

[21] Pew Research Center, 2019

[22] This is the same survey used for our conceptual replication and our second survey experiment, see Section C.2.

Table 1: Example Commentary from Social Media and Original Survey Data

Source	Sample Quotes
Reddit	"There is no real good solution. Unless we ban abortion for just whites and asians and let hispanics and blacks abort innocent children, that is."
	"Joke's on you, I support abortion and don't support rapid population growth in minorities."
	"I am all for the right to chose for non whites "
X	"That's why we need to encourage more abortion. Blacks abort at 4-5x the rate that White women do. We need to push abortion hard to the Latino, African, and Muslim Americans.
	Abortion should be free and easily accessible...for blacks, Indians/Pakis, and Chinese. It should be completely outlawed for Whites and Japanese.
	I support 100% free and unfettered access to abortion for Blaques and Hispanics.
Quora	"I think abortion should be legal for any woman as long as she is not white. Minorities deserve their rights to abortion. What is your opinion?"
	"Why can't we have a grand bargain on abortion: no abortions for Whites but let everyone get them at any stage before birth, with them being free for Blacks?"
	"If women of color would rather abort their children than give them birth, why do whites worry about being replaced, rather than just sitting back and allowing non-whites to dwindle their own numbers?"
Original Survey 2025	"Abortion for white women should be illegal. Abortion for minorities in America should be required if not strongly encouraged."
	"I was thinking about how necessary it is to have more babies. Especially white people so the foundation of the country remains the same. We need more whites and to eliminate immigration completely."
	"I think latinas typically have too many children as is, even when it's not reasonable or affordable for them. It would serve them well to regularly take contraception and be able to terminate unwanted pregnancies."
	"The population of non-Whites will continue to rise if we don't cease the promoting of their reproduction and cultures. Far too many illegal, and legal immigrants have come into this country. Their population is beginning to grow to a point of rivalling the White population, and all the while, Whites are taught to not care. We are taught that we shouldn't prioritize the survival of our race and culture, in a world that openly wants the extinction of the White race. I don't like abortion for Whites. For non-Whites however, I see it as a means to an end."
	"We need to limit how much the foreign people can reproduce. I would not be opposed to no citizens being sterilized permanently. White people are being replaced and it needs to be stopped."

Overview of Data and Methods

The primary expectations we seek to test are that White Americans will embrace permissive reproductive policies when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that this process will be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites. We test these expectations across three empirical studies.

Our first study employed secondary analyses of large-N survey data and leverages existing subnational differences in Latino population growth throughout the United States to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans. National level demographic processes do not necessarily unfold uniformly across the nation; instead, they tend to manifest more in some regions or localities and less in others. This is the case with nationwide economic trends, such as economic downturns (Hall et al., 2021; Healy and Lenz, 2017) and growing income inequality (Newman, 2020), as well as Latino population growth (Newman and Velez, 2014). This offers researchers a natural opportunity to leverage spatial differences in Latino growth to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans. Prior research demonstrates that people are aware of the demographic characteristics of their surrounding residential environment (Newman et al., 2015b) and that a wide range of political beliefs, policy preferences, and behaviors are shaped by experiences rooted in their local context (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Nathan and Sands, 2023). As such, we take advantage of heterogeneity in Latino population growth at the local level to capture Whites' exposure to Latino-led demographic change and test whether such exposure is systematically related to preferences over abortion policy.

Our second study presents a conceptual replication using an original national survey that adds value in two ways: It uses a subjective, but more direct, measure of local exposure to Latino growth, and it increases the specificity of our dependent variable by soliciting preferences over abortion, contraception, and sterilization when explicitly proposed as a means of slowing race-specific population growth. Finally, our third study complements our observational tests with two pre-registered survey experiments that directly manipulated

the salience of Latino population growth by varying the ethnicity of the women (Latina versus Anglo-White) in questions soliciting support for access to abortion, sterilization, and contraception as means of slowing race-specific population growth.

Study 1: Large-N Survey Data

Our first empirical test used the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey (NS) fielded between 2019-2021 (Tausanovitch and Vavreck, 2021; Tausanovitch et al., 2019),[23] one of the largest political science surveys of the American public ($N = 494,796$). We focused on the $N = 314,000$ respondents identifying as non-Latino White, and strategically used the responses of Black ($N = 50,860$), Latino ($N = 66,923$), and Asian ($N = 20,100$) respondents for comparison purposes.

To measure preferences on abortion, we rely on three questions appearing in all weekly NS waves. Respondents were presented with the following three policy positions: 1) never permit abortion, 2) permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger, and 3) permit late-term abortion. These are common abortion policy preference outcomes in the literature (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). For each position, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree, disagree or were unsure, and we recoded these items to range from (0) to (1) with (0.5) equal to "Unsure" and (1) always being the pro-abortion stance. The dependent variable in our analysis is an additive index of these three recoded items, which we label the *Legal Abortion Index*. For ease of interpretation of regression results, we rescaled this index to range from 0 to 1 (mean=0.55, sd=0.31), with higher values indicating greater support for unrestricted, legal abortion.[24]

Our analyses use county as the operative unit for measuring respondents' local context.[25]

[23]https://www.voterstudygroup.org/data/nationscape. The NS was fielded between July 2019 and January 2021 in 77 weekly waves. Managed samples were provided by Lucid and matched national quotas for age, gender, race, ethnicity, region, income, and education.

[24]Results are robust to running models on scale items separately and to alternative codings of "unsure" responses (see Figure A1, Models 2-5).

[25]The NS includes respondent zipcode indicators, which we cross-walked to corresponding counties

The NS contains respondents from 3,056 counties, 97% of all U.S. counties. Prior scholarship demonstrates that Americans are aware of the ethno-racial composition of their counties (Newman et al., 2015a; Velez and Wong, 2017) and are particularly attuned to changes in county-level Latino populations (Newman and Velez, 2014), making counties a theoretically and empirically validated level of aggregation for capturing individuals' local demographic environments. Our findings hold using zipcodes instead of counties (Figure A1, Model 6). Using the 2005-2009 and 2015-2019 5-year American Community Surveys (ACS), we calculated the 10-year change in county-level Latino population share by subtracting 2005-2009 from 2015-2019 estimates.[26] The resulting variable is labeled Δ *% Latino* (mean=0.03, sd=0.02, min=-0.12, max=0.23). We repeat this procedure for Black and Asian populations for comparison purposes. All demographic change variables were rescaled between 0-1.

The NS includes several measures of Whites' animus toward ethno-racial minorities. Our first measure, *Old-Fashioned Racism (OFR)*, captures opposition to interracial marriage and dating (Tesler, 2013; Virtanen and Huddy, 1998), rescaled between 0-1 with higher values indicating greater opposition to interracial relations. Our second measure, *White-Latino Favorability*, captures the difference in respondents' favorability toward Whites versus Latinos, a common measure of racial prejudice (Acharya et al., 2016; Reny and Newman, 2021).[27] Our third measure is *Racial Resentment* (Kinder and Sears, 1981), an additive scale based on two items capturing beliefs about Black Americans' responsibility for their own socioeconomic outcomes.[28] Although *Racial Resentment* and half of the *OFR* scale refer to Black people, prior research demonstrates that anti-Black and anti-Latino attitudes are linked (Mora and

using HUD's 2021 zip-to-county crosswalk (see https://www.huduser.gov/apps/public/uspscrosswalk/home). Zipcodes are restricted and not included in the replication file; access requires permission from NS principal investigators.

[26]Our use of a 10-year window is consistent with prior research (Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013; Reny, 2017) and our results are robust to both shorter and longer time spans (see Figure A1, Models 7-8).

[27]Using proxies for White group consciousness or White identity that Jardina (2019) uses, we find weak-to-mixed evidence that the relationship between local Latino population growth and support for legal abortion is moderated by White identity, suggesting that antipathy toward the outgroup, not favoritism for the in-group, is the predominant moderator (see Table A5).

[28]While racial resentment is typically measured using a 4-item scale, the NS survey only included two items.

Paschel, 2020). We use multiple indicators of prejudice to reflect variation in preferred measurement of this construct (Huddy and Feldman, 2009) and to assess consistency of findings across measures.

Our analytic strategy uses OLS regression models adjusting for an extensive set of individual and "pretreatment" contextual confounders that the literature suggests may be prognostic of legal abortion support or both the outcome and Δ *% Latino*.[29] Individual controls include: age, gender, education, income, evangelical identification, Catholic identification, partisanship, ideology, and an index of anti-sexist beliefs (sexism scale). Osborne et al. (2022) find age, religious adherence, ideological conservatism, sexism (see also Cizmar and Kalkan (2023)), and Republican partisanship are negatively associated with pro-abortion beliefs. Conversely, they find education and income are positively associated with pro-abortion beliefs. Contextual controls include 2005-2009 ACS county-level estimates of Latino population share, total population, median household income, % college educated, % unemployed, population density, and county % Republican two-party vote share in the 2008 Presidential Election (Algara and Amlani, 2021). These controls are meant to account for Latino population selection based on urbanicity, socio-economic factors, and political factors. We also control for change in the proportion of the county Republican two-party vote share between 2008-2016 since ethnic demographic shifts may be associated with partisan demographic shifts due to the, on average, predominantly Democratic composition of the Latino population (Wakefield et al., 2025). Moreover, we control for the county-level per capita religious adherent rate for all religions, Evangelicals, and Catholics in 2020 from the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies as a proxy for individual-level religiosity. Our assumption is that people living in highly religious counties may be, on average, highly religious themselves, a reasonable assumption based on prior evidence (Kaiser and Oswald, 2022). Prior evidence also shows the adherent rate correlates strongly with behavioral measures of church attendance

[29]By "pretreatment" we mean contextual variables measured in 2005-2009, at the beginning of the time window where we measure Latino population growth. We include missingness dummies for variables with missing values and rescaled all non-binary independent variables to range from 0-1.

(A) Mean Abortion Support by County Δ % Latino Decile



(B) The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Preference



Figure 1: Local Exposure to Latino Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences. Panel A presents mean values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) along decile values of Δ *% Latino* (x-axis) for White (A), Black (B), Latino (C) and AAPI (D) respondents with bootstrapped 95% CIs. Panel B presents predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) along values of Δ *% Latino* (x-axis) for White (A), Black (B), Latino (C) and AAPI (D) respondents, holding control covariates at their mean. Annotations denote min-max influence of Δ *% Latino*. 95% CIs displayed derived from cluster robust SEs. Rugs indicate distribution of raw data. Source: Nationscape.

observed via cellphone data (Pope, 2024).[30] All models include weekly survey wave fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the county level. See Appendix A.1 for more information about question wording and variable measurement.

[30]Although the change in two-party vote and religious adherent measures are imperfect in that they are at least partially measured "post-treatment," we feel it is important to control for both political and religious contexts in the model. Their exclusion from the models do not change any of the substantive findings.

Results

We begin by examining the bivariate relationship between county-level Latino population growth—binned into deciles—and support for legal abortion. Among White respondents, we observe a clear, primarily monotonic increase in mean support for legal abortion as local Latino population growth rises. In contrast, among Black and Latino respondents the relationship is fairly flat while among Asian American respondents it trends negative (Figure 1, Panel A).

We then examine the relationship between county-level Latino population growth and support for legal abortion using covariate-adjusted models. Panel B of Figure 1 displays predicted *Legal Abortion Index* values from fully specified models moving Δ *% Latino* from its observed minimum to maximum, holding all else equal. Among Whites, the estimated coefficient for Δ *% Latino* is statistically significant (β=0.12, $p < 0.001$) and substantively meaningful—representing 31% of the outcome standard deviation, equivalent to 93% of the outcome's association with partisanship and 76% of its association with evangelicalism, two highly prognostic controls.

In contrast, the estimated coefficients for Δ *% Latino* among Black (β=0.01, p = 0.91), Latino (β=-0.02, p = 0.41), and Asian respondents (β=0.01, p = 0.92) are small and statistically insignificant. We view these as theory-affirming null results given that the theorized process—feelings of threat to dominant group status—is less applicable to subordinate non-White groups. Additionally, changes in local Black or Asian populations are not significantly associated with increased White support for abortion (Figure A2). The unique association between Whites' abortion attitudes and Latino growth accords with the status of Latinos as the group at the forefront of demographic change, the documented depiction of Latinos as a threat in media and elite discourse, and the immigration-to-reproduction shift in Latino population growth (Reny and Manzano, 2016) (see Figure A3).

The results in Figure 1 hold when modeling a bivariate relationship (Figure A1, Model 1), including survey weights (Figure A1, Model 9), additively controlling for: state and

region fixed effects (Figure A1, Models 10-11), latitude and longitude to account for spatial autocorrelation (Figure A1, Model 12), shifts in other contextual covariates (Figure A1, Model 13), and using an ordered logit model (Table A6). Controlling for changes in contextual covariates over time—including total population, population density, and socio-economically disadvantaged populations—suggests the relationship between Δ *% Latino* and support for legal abortion is not driven by population pressure or classism in general, but rather efforts to mitigate Latino population growth specifically. Our findings are also robust to trimming influential outliers for Δ *% Latino* (Figure A1, Models 14-18) and to re-operationalizing Δ *% Latino* using median, tercile, or quartile splits (Table A7). Sensitivity analyses (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020) indicate that an omitted variable would need to be more than 9 times as large as ideology or 11 times as large as evangelical identification to render the association null (Table A8), suggesting our results are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias.

Last, we demonstrate in Figure A4 that, when disaggregating Δ *% Latino* into Latino foreign-born growth (i.e., immigration) and non-foreign-born growth (i.e., "natural increase"),[31] our results are primarily driven by native-born Latino growth and not immigration. This ancillary finding is consistent with the immigration-to-reproduction shift serving as the salient demographic process extending the impact of Latino growth beyond Whites' immigration policy preferences to their views on reproductive policy.

Figure 2 presents moderation analyses exploring the relationship between county Latino growth and support for abortion conditional on racial prejudice. Across three distinct measures—*OFR*, *White-Latino Favorability*, and *Racial Resentment*—we observe striking consistency: Whites high in prejudice drive the relationship between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index*. The interactions between Δ *% Latino* and *OFR* ($\beta = 0.11$, SE $= 0.05$, $p < 0.05$), *White-Latino Favorability* ($\beta = 0.28$, SE $= 0.07$, $p < 0.001$), and *Racial Resentment* ($\beta = 0.25$, SE $= 0.06$, $p < 0.001$) are each positive and statistically significant,[32]

[31]This may also include internal migration of non-foreign-born Latinos

[32]Corroborating nulls in Figure 1, we similarly show that a relationship between Δ % Black or Asian and support for abortion does not emerge even for those Whites highest in prejudice. See Table A9.



Figure 2: The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Policy Preferences Conditional on Whites' Ethno-Racial Attitudes. Panels A-C characterize predicted values of the Legal Abortion Index (y-axis) along shifts in relative county Latino population (x-axis) for White respondents at the minimum (grey) and maximum (black) of Old-Fashioned Racism, Racial Resentment, and White-Latino Favorability respectively. Control covariates held at means. Annotations denote interaction coefficients of interest (theoretically expected to be *positive*). 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Nationscape.

while among Whites lowest on each moderator, we observe statistically insignificant and substantively small associations between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index*.

Our results also allow us to adjudicate between competing interpretations. One alternative account is racialized paternalism, whereby abortion is supported as a means of assisting non-Whites perceived as incapable of helping themselves (Moore, 2020). Were this mechanism at work, the positive association may be most pronounced among Whites *low* in prejudice;[33] the absence of such a pattern weighs against this account. Moreover, if our associations of interest were driven by paternalism, then we should expect Δ *% Latino* (and its interaction with racial attitudes) to be positively associated with support for increasing government access to health care (presumably for poor Latinos). Falsification tests show this is not the case, and in fact, consistent with a prejudice account, we find Whites who favor Whites more than Latinos are *less likely* to support health care access in the presence of Latino population growth (Table A11). Therefore, prejudiced Whites may be not motivated to

[33]But see Rabinowitz (1988) and Woodward (2001), who provide historical evidence that prejudice may be associated with paternalism.

support abortion to facilitate health care for new Latino residents, but rather motivated to support abortion to limit the Latino population. We further find no consistent evidence that prejudiced non-Whites support abortion in response to local Latino growth (Table A10), implying threats to White demographic dominance specifically are driving our results.

Importantly, the results in Figure 2 hold when implementing the linear interaction check recommended by Hainmueller et al. (2019) (Figure A5). We also verify that our moderation effects hold while controlling for interactions between Δ *% Latino* and covariates correlated with prejudice (specifically, partisanship, ideology, evangelicalism, income, college education). While these additional interactions weaken the *OFR* interaction term, the *Racial Resentment* and *White-Latino Favorability* interactions remain statistically significant and substantively large (Table A12). These results suggest racial prejudice is a superordinate mechanism driving support for legal abortion in response to Latino population growth and help rule out alternative explanations for why Whites may adopt pro-abortion attitudes in response to Latino growth, such as sensitivity to economic competition among low-income and uneducated Whites.

CES Replication

To assess replicability, we reproduced our core analyses using the Cooperative Election Study (CES) (Ansolabehere et al., 2025), pooling the 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2022 waves (N=263,735)—the only waves containing both abortion policy preference and racial attitude items. The CES outcome is an additive index of four binary pro-abortion items, the independent variable is county-level change in Latino population share, and the moderator is a *Racism Index* capturing antipathy toward non-Whites (see Appendix A.16 for full details). We used the same controls as in the Nationscape analysis with fixed effects for CES survey-year and robust county-clustered standard errors. Control covariate differences include: 1) usage of individual-level religiosity measures instead of county-level proxies, which is beneficial since religiosity may be an important omitted variable and 2) the absence of adjusting for

sexism since sexism measures are not included across CES waves.[34]. The results replicate: county Latino population growth is positively associated with support for legal abortion among Whites but not non-Whites (Figure A6, Panels A and B), and this relationship is strongest among Whites highest in the *Racism Index* (Figure A6, Panel C). These findings mitigate concerns that our results are artifacts of the Nationscape sample, its specific outcome question wording, or its temporal context.

Addressing Residential Selection Bias

One well known concern with contextual analyses is residential selection bias (Hedman and Ham, 2012): Whites who hold more permissive stances on abortion may choose to reside in areas experiencing Latino population growth, whether due to a preference for diverse settings or a predilection for correlated area characteristics. We highlight a series of findings that greatly mitigate this concern, implying Whites do not reside in Latino-diversifying areas as a function of their political commitments on abortion. These findings are consistent with prior work suggesting residential selection is primarily driven by factors independent of politics or race (Mummolo and Nall, 2017).

First, all models include controls for respondent partisanship, ideology, county-level partisan vote preferences, and county-level shifts in partisan preferences, reducing concern that the estimated coefficients for Δ *% Latino* merely reflect underlying political orientations. Moreover, the positive association between Latino population growth and support for legal abortion emerges only among Whites highest in racial prejudice—a group more likely to hold conservative, rather than liberal, views on abortion (Strawbridge et al., 2025).

Second, the results in Figure 1, Panels B-D, reveal no relationship between Latino growth and abortion preferences among non-White respondents. If the findings for Whites were due to liberals selecting into diversifying settings, we should observe at least some trace of this

[34]However, the absence of controlling for sexism should not be a problem since it does not undermine the association between Δ *% Latino* and abortion policy preferences in the Nationscape results. This is because sexism is not associated with Δ *% Latino* despite being strongly associated with support for legal abortion.

among non-Whites as well. The absence of such a pattern provides further evidence against residential selection as an alternative explanation.

Third, we assess specificity by re-estimating the model using four gender-related attitudinal outcomes unrelated to abortion—hostile sexism, favorability toward liberal female politicians (Harris, Warren), and perceptions of gender-based discrimination (Table A13).[35] If progressive Whites select into diversifying areas, Δ *% Latino* should predict these outcomes as well. We find no consistent evidence of such a pattern: pooled coefficients across the four models yield a null estimate (0.037, 95% CI: $[-0.038, 0.111]$). That exposure to Latino growth is associated with more liberal views on abortion but not gender-related attitudes unconnected to reproduction weighs against selection and serves as a validity check on our theory.

Fourth, we directly test whether Whites favoring legal abortion select into areas experiencing Latino growth using three panel surveys: the 2010-2014 CES Panel ($N = 7,993$ Whites), the 2011-2016 Voter Study Group Panel ($N = 1,221$ Whites), and the 2020-2022 CES Panel ($N = 7,710$ Whites). Using a cross-lagged approach, we assess whether support for legal abortion in the first wave predicts moving to counties with greater Latino growth, adjusting for Latino growth in the respondent's initial county (see Table A16 for full results). For both the full sample of Whites and the subsample of movers, the abortion support coefficients are statistically null and substantively zero (Figure 3), suggesting that support for legal abortion does not motivate selection into increasingly Latino areas.

Finally, if residential selection were driving our results, the association should be attenuated among long-term residents who may be less likely to be motivated by residential selection on the basis of political preferences or changes in neighborhood composition. Subsetting our CES replication data to respondents who have lived in their address or city for 5 years or more,[36] we find the association between Δ *% Latino* and support for legal abortion is substantively unchanged (Figure A8), implying residential selection plays little role in explaining our results.

[35]We remove sexism from the right-hand-side of our regression models when conducting these falsification tests.

[36]The Nationscape does not allow us to identify long-term residents.



Figure 3: Support for Legal Abortion and Selection into Increasingly Latino Counties. The x-axis is the dataset used for the analysis. The y-axis is the coefficient for attitudes characterizing support for legal abortion in 2010, 2011, and 2022 for the CES 2010-2014, VSG, and CES 2020-2022 surveys respectively. The outcome of interest is the change in the proportion of the population that is Latino between 2000-2010 (or 2010-2020 for the CES 2020-2022 data) for counties that respondents report living in for 2014 (CES 2010-2014), 2016 (VSG), and 2022 (CES 2020-2022). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs. Source: 2010-14 CES, 2020-22 Panel Surveys, and 2011-2016 VSG Panel Survey.

Study 2: Original Survey Data

While the results in the previous sections conform to theoretical expectations, they do not provide direct evidence that Whites are thinking about abortion in terms of curbing Latino population growth, and they rely on objective contextual measures of exposure to Latino growth. To address these limitations, we collected original survey data using a perceptual measure of local Latino growth and outcome measures explicitly framing reproductive policies as means of slowing race-specific population growth.

We recruited a non-probability opt-in sample of adult Americans via Cloud Research's Connect Platform in July 2025 ($N = 1,483$ non-Latino Whites; see Appendix C.2). Although the sample is not representative of the national adult White population (it is more Democratic and liberal-leaning than the national population), prior research demonstrates online opt-in surveys produce correlations between variables consistent with nationally representative probability surveys (Pasek, 2016). We measured exposure to Latino population growth by

asking respondents whether the Hispanic/Latino population in their local area had increased, stayed the same, or decreased over the past 10 years, with responses ranging from "Decreased a lot" to "Increased a lot." Prior evidence suggests people are aware of demographic changes in their local area (Velez and Wong, 2017). For our dependent variables, respondents were randomly assigned to a version of a question explicitly positioning reproductive policies as a means of slowing either Latino or White population growth:

> The following are some ways that have been proposed to help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please select if you favor or oppose each of the following:
>
> 1. Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them
> 2. Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception
> 3. Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)

Half the sample received items referencing Latina women and half White women. Response options ranged from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly favor" (6-pt). Akin to our analysis in Figure 2, we assess the association between perceived local Latino growth and support for reproductive policies as population control (abortion, contraception, sterilization, and an additive scale of these three policy outcomes), conditional on prejudice, measured using an *OFR* scale identical to that in the NS.[37] All models adjust for age, gender, education, income, partisanship, ideology, and evangelicalism. All variables are rescaled between 0-1.

Figure 4 characterizes the association between perceived local Latino population growth and White support for reproductive policies framed as population control targeted toward

[37]With "black" replaced by "non-white" on the dating item. Results are identical using the White-Latino favorability scale (Figure B9).



Figure 4: Perceived Local Population Growth and Support for Abortion as a Means of Population Control. The y-axis characterizes predicted values for favoring various reproductive policies as population control for Latina (panels A and B) and White women (Panels C and D). The x-axis characterizes perceptions of local Latino population growth which ranges from "Decreased a lot" (0) to "Increased a lot" (1). Shades denote the lowest and highest levels of old-fashioned racism. Annotations on Panel B denote coefficient for interaction between local Latino population growth and *OFR*. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Cloud Research Connect Survey July 2025.

Latinas (Panels A and B) and White women (Panels C and D). While the first-order association between perceived Latino growth and support for Latina-targeted reproductive policies is positive but statistically insignificant—likely due to much lower statistical power relative to the Nationscape—the moderation results on Figure 4, Panel B, closely mirror Figure 2 in Study 1. Among the most prejudiced Whites, moving from perceived decline (0) to the largest perceived increase (1) in the local Latino population corresponds to a 0.48-point increase in support for Latina abortion ($d = 1.76$), a 0.56-point increase in support for subsidized Latina contraception ($d = 1.86$), a 0.7-point increase in support for Latina sterilization ($d = 2.29$), and a 0.59 point increase in support for an additive scale of the aforementioned reproduction-limiting policies ($d = 1.99$). Among the least prejudiced Whites, perceived Latino growth is unrelated to these outcomes.

The lower panels (C and D) of Figure 4 provide further theory-consistent evidence: perceived shifts in the local Latino population are unrelated or negatively related to support for these policies when framed as targeting White women, regardless of prejudice level. These findings indicate that the mechanism at work is not a generalized commitment to gender liberalism or racial paternalism, but rather a racialized Malthusianism—an effort to curtail Latina reproduction in the midst of perceived demographic change.

Our Study 2 moderation results are robust to the binning estimator recommended by (Hainmueller et al., 2019) (Figure B10) and controlling for "omitted interactions" that could drive support for reproductive-limiting policies such as the interaction between perceived Latino population growth and partisanship, ideology, Evangelical identity, income, and college education (Table B17). Again, these results suggest racial prejudice is a superordinate mechanism motivating support for limiting reproduction among Latinas net of partisanship, ideology, religion, and socio-economic insecurity and/or concerns related to economic competition with new Latino residents.

Study 3: Experimental Evidence

The previous studies offer consistent observational evidence of a systematic connection between Latino-led demographic change and reproductive policy preferences among White Americans, particularly those high in prejudice. These studies leveraged local differences in actual or perceived Latino population growth to capture the salience of Latino-driven ethnic diversification. While we took care to demonstrate the robustness of these results to omitted variable and selection bias, there is value added in assessing whether our findings hold when experimentally manipulating the salience of Latino population growth.

If our theoretical framework is correct, prejudiced White Americans should increase their support for abortion in response to a stimulus that primes Latino, relative to White, population growth. To test this, we fielded two preregistered survey experiments[38] designed to assess whether exposure to information about Latino demographic expansion increases support for population-limiting and racially-targeted reproductive policies among racially prejudiced Whites.

Both experiments were embedded in surveys fielded with Cloud Research Connect, the first between March 24-25, 2024 ($N = 1,134$ White adults, *March 2024 Survey*) and the second on July 17, 2025 ($N = 1,483$ White adults, *July 2025 Survey*).[39] Prior research demonstrates that heterogeneous treatment effects from experimental stimuli in non-probability samples correspond to those in representative surveys (Coppock et al., 2018), suggesting our estimates may reasonably generalize to the White population.

Prior to the experiments, participants completed demographic items and measures of prejudice including *OFR* (both surveys) and *White-Latino Favorability* (*July 2025* only).[40] Participants were then randomly assigned to receive the same population-growth question

[38]Pre-registrations for both experiments are posted at OSF and the anonymized links can be found in Appendix C.1 and C.2.

[39]This second survey provided the data used in Study 2; however, for that analysis, we did not estimate the average treatment effect of the question wording manipulation, which we estimate for Study 3.

[40]We dropped N=11 from the *March 2024* survey and N=15 from the *July 2025* survey for failing an attention check, though their inclusion has no impact on findings.

used in Study 2, with the manipulation varying whether the referenced women were Latina (treatment) or White (control). We rely on *OFR* for our main analyses; moderation effects are substantively identical using *White-Latino Favorability* (see Appendix C.2.2-C.2.3).

One may be concerned that our primes are unrealistic in inducing respondents to think about racially disparate reproductive policies. However, our qualitative analysis of open-ended survey responses and social media data demonstrates that some Whites hold racially contingent views on reproductive policy (see Table 1), attitudes that political-economic elites like Elon Musk have amplified by repeatedly communicating about the threat of declining White fertility relative to non-White population growth.[41]

The outcomes were identical to Study 2: support for abortion access, subsidized contraception, and subsidized sterilization for [Latina/White] women, analyzed individually and as an additive index, all rescaled 0 to 1. All models were estimated using OLS with robust standard errors, interacting *OFR* with the treatment indicator and adjusting for control covariates (age, gender, college, income, partisanship, ideology, evangelicalism).[42] Full pre-registered results can be found in Appendix C.

Figure 5 presents the treatment effects for each outcome and the additive index, moderated by old-fashioned racism, from covariate-adjusted models for both experiments. Respondents low in prejudice express consistently high support for all three policies regardless of condition. Among those highest in prejudice, however, support is low in the "White" condition but increases substantially in the "Latina" condition (Figure 5, top plots of Panels A-B). Corresponding marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals are displayed in the bottom plots of Panels A-B.

In the first experiment (*March 2024*), those assigned to the "Latina" condition at the maximum level of prejudice are 0.11 points more supportive of abortion ($d = 0.32$, $p < 0.10$), 0.14 points more supportive of contraception ($d = 0.58$, $p < 0.05$), 0.15 points more supportive of sterilization ($d = 0.51$, $p < 0.05$), and 0.14 points higher on the additive reproduction-

[41] See: `https://bsky.app/profile/lorak.bsky.social/post/3m72b2w6ias2r`

[42] Results without covariate adjustment are less precise but substantively identical. See Appendix C.

limiting policy index ($d = 0.52$, $p < 0.05$) than the control condition (Table C21). Among lower-prejudice respondents, the "Latina" condition does not change attitudes on abortion or contraception but does decrease support for sterilization, likely reflecting prosocial attitudes toward Latinas among less racist Whites.

The results are substantively identical and significantly stronger in our second experiment (*July 2025*, Figure 5, Panel B). At the maximum level of prejudice, those in the "Latina" condition are 0.27 points more supportive of abortion ($d = 0.74$, $p < 0.001$), 0.34 points more supportive of contraception ($d = 1.14$, $p < 0.001$), 0.34 points more supportive of sterilization ($d = 1.07$, $p < 0.001$), and 0.32 points higher on the additive index ($d = 1.07$, $p < 0.001$) than counterparts in the "White" condition (Table C28). Like Experiment 1, lower-prejudice respondents are less likely to support contraception and sterilization in the Latina condition, again suggesting sensitivity to the usage of these policies to limit non-White reproduction.

In Appendix C, we report a series of preregistered robustness checks across both experiments. Our main results are substantively identical without covariate adjustment (Tables C21 and C28) and substituting a differential in favorability toward "poor Whites" versus "poor Latinos" (Table C29) or White-Latino favorability (Table C30) as the moderator. We also address the possibility that our prejudice measure proxies for generalized opposition to reproduction among lower-income populations. We find no evidence of "Latina" treatment moderation by affect toward the middle class, wealthy individuals, or class-based resentment, and no evidence that affect toward "poor Whites" moderates the treatment effect (Table C31). Rather, treatment effects are driven by Whites unfavorable toward the Latino poor specifically, not the White poor or the poor in general (Table C25). The absence of moderation by non-racialized class cues strengthens our interpretation that the results are fundamentally racial rather than class-based.

We also rule out omitted interaction bias from partisanship and ideology. In Experiment 2, we show the heterogeneous effect of the "Latina" condition by old-fashioned racism is robust to adjusting for interactions between the "Latina" condition and both partisanship

(A) Experiment 1: March 2024



(B) Experiment 2: July 2025



Figure 5: Predicted values of support for reproductive policy outcomes in Latina versus White treatment conditions conditional on racial prejudice in two experiments with corresponding marginal effects plots. The y-axis characterizes predicted mean support for each policy outcome or the marginal effect of treatment by prejudice. 90% and 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. These results were estimated with covariate adjustment. Models without covariate adjustment can be found in Appendix C. Source: Cloud Research Connect Surveys March 2024 and July 2025.

and ideology (Table C32). These results suggest our heterogeneous effects are not driven by partisanship, ideology, or the correlation between these factors and old-fashioned racism. Finally, our experimental results replicate using the `interflex` binning estimator for our old-fashioned racism moderator, implying our results are not driven by linearity assumptions inherent to our models (Hainmueller et al., 2019) (Figures C13, C14).

Conclusion

A perennial feature of American politics is backlash among the Anglo-White core (Aguirre and Turner, 2010) to large-scale episodes of ethno-racial demographic change, from 19th-century nativist reactions to Irish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants (Higham, 2002; Jacobson, 1999) to responses to Asian immigration (Gaines and Cho, 2004) and Black internal migration (Boustan, 2010; Reny and Newman, 2018b). Beginning in the 1970s, Latino population growth took center stage, prompting White backlash directed toward immigration policy (Chiricos et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2012; Schildkraut, 2001). In this article, we explore the political consequences of the most recent trend in this ongoing transformation: the *immigration-to-reproduction shift* in Latino population growth.

Our findings suggest this shift may direct the perennial forces of White backlash toward a policy outlet that is novel in recent history but firmly rooted in historical precedent: reproductive policy. Using large-N and original survey data as well as pre-registered experiments, we offer strong and consistent evidence that prejudiced White Americans react to Latino population growth with heightened support for permissive abortion and contraception policies. These findings are robust to alternative modeling choices and operationalizations, replicate across data sources, are not attributable to residential selection, and hold across different methods of capturing the salience of Latino-led demographic change. Given that racial and religious conservatism tend to be correlated (Deckman et al., 2023) and attitudes on abortion exhibit relative stability over time (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003), our findings are all the more

notable in illustrating the power of ethno-racial demographic change in potentially shifting relatively rigid socio-political attitudes.

Our findings also suggest that racialized Malthusianism provides a useful framework for understanding how demographic change shapes political conflict. Whereas classical Malthusianism located danger in overpopulation straining material resources, its racialized variant underscores anxieties about outgroup reproduction and the erosion of ingroup dominance. This perspective extends prior work on racial threat (Key, 1949) by shifting focus from minority presence or mobilization in the present to their capacity to generate future generations who may reshape the racial and political order. Reproductive politics thus becomes a terrain of racial contestation, with abortion and contraception understood not only in moral or gendered terms but as mechanisms with ethno-racial demographic consequences—a logic resonating with contemporary "Great Replacement" narratives and a longer history of racialized population control (Bridges, 2011; Roberts, 1997).

Our findings illuminate several avenues for future research. First, researchers could extend our survey-based findings to observed behavior using state and local ballot measures on abortion, assessing whether exposure to Latino population growth is associated with elevated pro-choice vote shares among White voters. Second, future work could examine links between demographic shifts and other facets of reproductive politics, such as funding for sex education or maternity leave. Finally, researchers could explore whether our findings extend to other immigrant-receiving nations with growing immigrant birth rates.

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Appendices

Contents

A Study 1

A.1 Data Details

Nationscape is a survey consisting of nearly half a million interviews conducted between July 2019 and January 2021, covering the final year of Donald Trump's presidency, 2020 U.S. presidential nominating contests, COVID-19 pandemic, Black Lives Matter movement, 2020 presidential campaign, election, and its aftermath, including the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2020, and the inauguration of Joe Biden as the 45th president of the United States. The survey began on July 10, 2019, and includes interviews with roughly 6,100 people per week. The sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population. Sample for Nationscape is provided by Lucid, a market research platform operating an online exchange for survey respondents. Nationscape samples match a set of representative demographic quotas on age, gender, race/ethnicity, region, income, and education. Respondents are sent from Lucid directly to survey software operated by the Nationscape team. All respondents take the survey online and must complete an attention check before taking the survey. The survey is conducted in English (Tausanovitch and Vavreck, 2021; Tausanovitch et al., 2019).

A.1.1 Moderator Items

Variable	**Item Wording**	**Response Options**
Old Fashioned Racism 1 (Marriage)	I prefer that my close relatives marry spouses from their same race.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Old Fashioned Racism 2 (Dating)	I think it's alright for blacks and whites to date each other.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Racial Resentment 1	Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Racial Resentment 2	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
White Feeling Thermometer	How favorable is your impression of each group: Whites.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable
Latino Feeling Thermometer	How favorable is your impression of each group: Latinos.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable

A.1.2 Outcome Items

These items are combined into an additive index intended to approximate a latent attitude toward legal abortion (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.58$). Figure A1 shows results using individual items separately.

Variable	**Item Wording**	**Response Options**
Never Permit Abortion	We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Never permit abortion.	1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure
Permit Abortion in Certain Cases	Permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.	1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure
Permit Late-Term Abortion	Permit late term abortion.	1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure

A.1.3 Other Items (robustness checks and control variables)

Variable	Item Wording / Description	Response Options / Coding
Low Sexism Scale	Additive scale of four items (below). Mean = 0.69; Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.59$. Higher values = lower sexism.	Rescaled 0–1
Sexism Item 1	I would be more comfortable having a man as a boss than a woman.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Sexism Item 2	Women are just as capable of thinking logically as men.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Sexism Item 3	Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in the United States.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Sexism Item 4	Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.	1) Strongly agree – 5) Strongly disagree
Favorability Warren	How favorable is your impression of: Elizabeth Warren. Rescaled 0–1.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable; 5) Haven't heard enough
Favorability Harris	How favorable is your impression of: Kamala Harris. Rescaled 0–1.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable; 5) Haven't heard enough
Discrimination Women	How much discrimination is there today against: women. Rescaled 0–1.	1) A great deal – 5) None at all
Discrimination Whites	How much discrimination is there today against: white people. Rescaled 0–1.	1) A great deal – 5) None at all
Black Feeling Therm.	How favorable is your impression of: Blacks. Rescaled 0–1.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable
Asian Feeling Therm.	How favorable is your impression of: Asians. Rescaled 0–1.	1) Very favorable – 4) Very unfavorable
Income	Current annual household income before taxes.	Dummies: $\leq$\$25k, \$25–50k, \$50–85k, missing. Omitted: >\$85k
College	Highest level of education completed.	1 = College degree or above; 0 = otherwise
Age	What is your age? Rescaled 0–1.	Continuous
Female	What is your gender?	1 = female; 0 = all others
Party ID	3-part branching party ID. Rescaled 0–1.	Strong Dem (0) – Strong Rep (7)
Ideology	How would you describe your own political viewpoint? Rescaled 0–1.	1) Very liberal – 5) Very conservative; Not sure recoded to 3
Evangelical	Born-again or evangelical Christian?	1 = yes; 0 = no
Catholic	Present religion: Catholic?	1 = Catholic; 0 = otherwise
Longitude / Latitude	Based on centroid of respondent's county of residence.	Continuous

A.1.4 Census measured and other contextual variables

Variable	Description	Source / Notes
Δ % Latino (Black / Asian) (2019–2009)	Change in county-level % Latino (Black / Asian). Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09 & 2015–19
% Latino (Black / Asian) (2009)	County-level % Latino (Black / Asian). Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
Total Pop (2009)	County-level total population. Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
Median HH Income (2009)	County-level median household income. Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
% College (2009)	County-level % adults with BA or higher. Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
% Unemployed (2009)	County-level % unemployed (16+). Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
Pop. Density (2009)	County-level population density. Rescaled 0–1.	ACS 5-yr: 2005–09
% McCain (2008)	County-level McCain two-party vote share. Rescaled 0–1.	Algara & Amlani (2021)
Δ % GOP Vote (2016-2008)	County-level GOP vote share change from 2008-2016. Rescaled 0–1.	Algara & Amlani (2021)
Evangelical Adherents (2020)	County-level evangelical adherent count. Rescaled 0–1.	RCMS / ASARB
Catholic Adherents (2020)	County-level Catholic adherent count. Rescaled 0–1.	RCMS / ASARB
Total Adherents (2020)	County-level adherents of all major religions. Rescaled 0–1.	RCMS / ASARB
Zip code variables	Corresponding zip-code-level measures.	ACS 5-yr: 2007–11 & 2015–19

A.2 First Order Association Specification Curve



Figure A1: Alternative Specifications for the relationship between Δ % Latino and support for legal abortion. X-axis characterizes the covariate-adjusted coefficient for Δ % Latino where the outcome is the *legal abortion index*. Y-axis characterizes the type of alternative specification. Solid blank vertical line is when the coefficient = 0. Dashed vertical line is the coefficient from our main specification. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Nationscape.

A.3 In-Group Love or Out Group Hate?

Table A5: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion Conditional On White Identity

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.03	0.06*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Wht Fav	−0.07***		
	(0.02)		
Wht Fav Miss	−0.15***		
	(0.04)		
Δ % Latino * Wht Fav	0.09*		
	(0.04)		
Δ % Latino * Wht Fav Miss	0.25**		
	(0.09)		
Lat Unfav		−0.08***	
		(0.02)	
Lat Unfav Miss		−0.03	
		(0.04)	
Δ % Latino * Lat Unfav		0.13**	
		(0.04)	
Δ % Latino * Lat Unfav Miss		0.08	
		(0.09)	
Discrim Wht			−0.08***
			(0.02)
Discrim Wht Miss			−0.04
			(0.04)
Δ % Latino * Discrim Wht			0.08
			(0.05)
Δ % Latino * Discrim Wht Miss			0.01
			(0.09)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R^2	0.31	0.31	0.31

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. We find that the moderated association between Δ % *Latino* and support for legal abortion is positive and statistically significant using just a White favorability item (Model 1) but the effect is 44% smaller than the moderating effect of Latino unfavorability (Model 2). We further find no evidence that perceived anti-White discrimination, a measure of White identity used by Jardina (2019), moderates the relationship between Latino population growth and support for legal abortion (Model 3). These findings, together with the strong moderating results for other forms of prejudice (e.g. old-fashioned racism and racial resentment) on Figure 2, suggest that prejudice toward the outgroup is the predominant moderator for the relationship between local demographic change and support for legal abortion. Control covariates are included in all models, but control covariate coefficients are omitted from display in the table.

A.4 Ordered Logit Model

Table A6: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (Fully-Specified Ordered Logit Model)

	Legal Abortion Index
	(1)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.69***
	(0.08)
% Latino ('09)	−0.03
	(0.04)
Controls?	Y
Num. obs.	310239

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: Robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Control covariates are included in the model, but coefficients are omitted from display in the table.

A.5 Assessing Appropriateness of Linearity Assumptions

Table A7: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (Median, Tercile, Quartile Splits)

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino (Median Split)	0.01***		
	(0.00)		
Δ % Latino (Tercile 2)		0.01***	
		(0.00)	
Δ % Latino (Tercile 3)		0.02***	
		(0.00)	
Δ % Latino (Quartile 2)			0.00*
			(0.00)
Δ % Latino (Quartile 3)			0.01***
			(0.00)
Δ % Latino (Quartile 4)			0.02***
			(0.00)
% Latino ('09)	0.00	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White
Model	Median	Terciles	Quartiles
N Clusters	3017	3017	3017
Num. obs.	310239	310239	310239
Adj. R^2	0.32	0.32	0.32

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Lowest value of each split omitted as base-category. Control covariates are included in the models, but coefficients are omitted from display in the table.

A.6 Sensitivity Analysis

Table A8: Sensitivity Bounds for Δ % `Latino` under Benchmark Confounders

Bound Label	$R^2_{D\sim Z|X}$	$R^2_{Y\sim Z|D,X}$	Treatment	Estimate	SE	t	Lower CI	Upper CI
9x ideology	4e-04	0.4281	d_platcty	0.0063	0.0063	0.9971	-0.0061	0.0186
11x evang	2e-04	0.6645	d_platcty	0.0083	0.0048	1.7120	-0.0012	0.0177

Note: Results from `sensmakr` package in R. A confounder nine times as strongly related to the outcome as ideology (partial $R^2 = 0.43$) would attenuate the coefficient to 0.0063 (t = 0.99). A confounder 11 times as strong as evangelical identity (partial $R^2 = 0.66$) would reduce the coefficient to 0.008 (t = 1.71), a still marginally significant finding. Thus, while the estimates may be formally fragile in terms of robustness values, benchmarking suggests that only unobserved confounders many times stronger than the strongest observed covariates such as ideology or religion would fully explain away the effect. We cannot think of an unobserved confounder that would be this powerful, especially since they would have to explain 43-66% of variance in support for legal abortion.

A.7 Heterogeneity By Racial Attitudes (Black and Asian Growth)

Table A9: Heterogeneity by growth in non-Latino groups

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino x OFR	0.11*		
	(0.05)		
Δ % Black x OFR	0.07		
	(0.06)		
Δ % Asian x OFR	−0.04		
	(0.03)		
Δ % Latino x W-L Fav.		0.28***	
		(0.07)	
Δ % Black x W-L Fav.		0.04	
		(0.08)	
Δ % Asian x W-L Fav.		0.01	
		(0.04)	
Δ % Latino x Resentment			0.26***
			(0.06)
Δ % Black x Resentment			−0.02
			(0.06)
Δ % Asian x Resentment			0.07**
			(0.03)
Δ % Latino	0.09***	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Δ % Black	−0.08**	−0.08	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Δ % Asian	−0.01	−0.02	−0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Old Fashioned Racism	−0.08*		
	(0.04)		
White-Latino Fav.		−0.19***	
		(0.05)	
Resentment			−0.23***
			(0.04)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
Num. obs.	310239	310239	310239
Adj. R^2	0.32	0.32	0.33

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. All models are White respondents only. Control covariate coefficients omitted from table, but controls are included in the models.

A.8 Heterogeneity By Racial Attitudes (Non-White Subsets)

Table A10: Heterogeneity by racial attitudes for other non-White ethno-racial groups

	Legal Abortion Index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ % Latino x OFR	0.02			0.05			0.05		
	(0.09)			(0.10)			(0.17)		
Δ % Latino x W-L Fav.		0.06			−0.04			−0.27	
		(0.10)			(0.14)			(0.16)	
Δ % Latino x Resentment			0.20*			−0.03			−0.42*
			(0.08)			(0.13)			(0.19)
Δ % Latino	−0.03	−0.05	−0.14**	−0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.14	0.25*
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Old Fashioned Racism	−0.04			−0.04			−0.06		
	(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.07)		
White-Latino Fav.		−0.07			−0.06			0.05	
		(0.04)			(0.06)			(0.07)	
Resentment			−0.25***			−0.11*			0.05
			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.08)
Subset	Latino	Latino	Latino	Black	Black	Black	Asian	Asian	Asian
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Num. obs.	65728	65728	65728	49726	49726	49726	22642	22642	22642
Adj. R^2	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.23	0.23	0.23

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Control covariate coefficients omitted from table, but controls are included in the models. County clustered robust SEs in parentheses.

A.9 Ruling Out Paternalism

Table A11: Latino population growth (and its' interaction with racial prejudice) is not associated with support for health care access

	Health Care Policy Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.03	0.03	0.08**	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) x OFR		0.00		
		(0.05)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) x W-L Fav.			−0.11*	
			(0.06)	
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) x Resentment				−0.08
				(0.05)
OFR		−0.03		
		(0.02)		
White-Latino Fav.			0.05	
			(0.02)	
Resentment				−0.12***
				(0.02)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Num. obs.	396224	396224	396224	396224
Adj. R^2	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Here, the health care policy index outcome is an additive index of 3 policy preference items measuring 1) agreement with providing an option for government-run insurance to all Americans; 2) agreement with subsidizing health insurance for lower income people not receiving Medicare; 3) agreement with abolishing private insurance and replacing it with government-run health care. Full controls are included in the models, but control variable coefficients are omitted from the table. County-clustered robust SEs in parentheses.

A.10 Accounting for Omitted Interaction Bias

Table A12: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice (adjusting for omitted interactions)

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino x OFR	0.06		
	(0.06)		
Δ % Latino x W-L Fav.		0.20**	
		(0.08)	
Δ % Latino x Resentment			0.15†
			(0.08)
Δ % Latino x Partisanship	0.06	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Δ % Latino x Evangelical	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Δ % Latino x College	−0.08*	−0.08*	−0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Δ % Latino x Income	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Δ % Latino x Ideology	0.14†	0.13†	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Δ % Latino	0.02	−0.06	−0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
OFR	−0.04		
	(0.02)		
White-Latino Fav.		−0.13***	
		(0.03)	
Racial Resentment			−0.17***
			(0.03)
Partisanship	−0.17***	−0.17***	−0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Evangelical	−0.16***	−0.16***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.05***	0.05***	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ideology	−0.34***	−0.34***	−0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3017	3017	3017
Num. obs.	310239	310239	310239
Adj. R^2	0.32	0.32	0.33

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Full set of control covariate coefficients omitted from table, but full set of controls are in all models.

A.11 Gender-Related Outcomes

Table A13: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Other Gender-Related Outcomes (White Respondents)

	Legal Abortion Index			
	Sexism (low)	**Fav. Warren**	**Fav. Harris**	**Discrim. Women**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	−0.01	0.06	0.04	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Num. obs.	313590	129947	147372	310322
Adj. R^2	0.14	0.45	0.45	0.13

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Control covariates are in models, but control coefficients are omitted from table. Pooled coefficient: 0.037, pooled SE: 0.038, pooled p-value: 0.33. Differences in sample size due to missingness in outcome variable and differences in *when* outcome measures were fielded throughout Nationscape survey.

A.12 Contextual Growth of Other Groups



Figure A2: Local Exposure to Latino, Black, Asian and Foreign-Born Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences Among White Respondents. Panels present predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) across county change in Latino (A), Black (B), and Asian (C) populations (x-axis) for White respondents. All predicted value estimates are from a single model including Δ % Latino, Δ % Black, Δ % Asian on the right hand side of the regression equation (plus baseline % Latino, % Black, and % Asian in 2009). Models are fully specified, control covariates are held at their means. Annotations denote min-max influence of Δ % Latino, Δ % Black, and Δ % Asian. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

A.13 Latinos "Have Too Many Children"



Figure A3: Anti-Latino Prejudice and How Well the Statement "Latinos Have Too Many Children" Describes the Group. Means with 95% CIs for each level of anti-Latino prejudice in White sample. Prejudice operationalized as additive index of agreement with negative Latino stereotypes (lazy, unintelligent, unpatriotic, criminal). Labels indicate percent of White respondents in each group who indicated that they thought the phrase "Latinos have too many children" described the group "Very well" or "somewhat well" Data from 2012 National Hispanic Media Coaltion survey. For more see https://www.chicano.ucla.edu/files/news/NHMCLatinoDecisionsReport.pdf.

A.14 Disaggregating Δ *% Latino*



Figure A4: Disaggregating Δ *% Latino* into Latino US-born and foreign-born growth. Predicted support for abortion with 95% CIs across range of Δ *% Latino (US-Born)* in Panel A and Δ *% Latino (Foreign-born)* in Panel B. Control covariates held at mean values. Coefficient for change in US-Born Latino population is 0.19 ($p < 0.001$), coefficient for change in foreign-born Latino population is 0.07 (insignificant). Coefficient difference test is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$, implying the positive association between Δ *% Latino* and support for legal abortion is driven primarily by US-born growth, not immigration. Source: Nationscape.

A.15 Interflex Plots



Figure A5: `interflex` binning estimator diagnostics. As a diagnostic check, we estimated nonparametric binning models (via the `interflex` package) to examine the functional form of the interaction between Δ % Latino and our three measures of prejudice. The binning procedure partitions the moderator into discrete bins and estimates the marginal effect of Δ *% Latino* within each bin, relaxing the assumption of linearity. Across bins, the estimated marginal effects varied smoothly in a manner consistent with a linear trend; we did not observe systematic deviations that would warrant a more flexible specification.

A.16 CES Replication Details

Outcome measurement: The legal abortion index is an additive index of four binary outcomes that measure support for always allowing abortion in addition to opposition to: prohibiting abortion in all circumstances or after 20 weeks; employer abortion prohibition in insurance plans; Federal prohibitions on spending toward abortion. See Table A14 for more outcome measurement details and specific question wording.

Moderator measurement: Within wave, the moderator is a *racism index* measuring several attitudes that characterize antipathy toward non-Whites. *Racism* is not measured exactly the same across all waves. Each CES wave measures attitudes that are some combination of items from the FIRE racism scale (DeSante and Smith, 2020) or racial resentment scale. Within each wave, we index these attitudes in an additive manner. As mentioned early in Study 1, although the racial resentment scale directly measures attitudes toward Black people, prior evidence demonstrates the scale is intimately linked to negative attitudes toward immigrant groups like Latinos (Mora and Paschel, 2020). See Table A15 for *racism index* measurement details and component availability across waves.[43] Despite differences in intra-wave *racism index* measurement across waves, we demonstrate the different intra-wave *racism index* measures appear to capture the same concept since they are reliably correlated with the same individual-level socio-demographic and political covariates across waves (see Figure A7). That is, respondents higher on the *racism index* mostly tend to be men, less educated, lower-income, evangelical, and conservative across each CES wave.

Analysis: We replicate our main findings using pooled CES data to increase sample size. Results are nearly identical to our Nationscape finding across the board. The only difference we uncover is a substantively small positive association (first-difference = 0.057) between county-level Δ *% Latino* and support for legal abortion for those lower in prejudice, though the association is significantly stronger among those higher in the *racism index* (first-difference = 0.132), a difference of 0.08 95%CI [0.01, 0.14].

[43] Although DeSante and Smith (2020) indicate the FIRE scale should not be summed in an additive index, this is only if you believe the components have differential effects on different outcomes. We believe Whites who believe racism is isolated, deny White structural advantages, are fearful of other races, and are not angry that racism exists may be the kinds of Whites who are antipathic toward a growing non-White population. Indeed, since we find the summed index moderates Δ *% Latino* in the CES, our assumption is empirically valid even if it is against the general prescription of DeSante and Smith (2020).

A.17 CES Results

(A) Descriptives



(B) First Order Assocation



(C) Heterogeneity by Prejudice



Figure A6: Replication of Main Results with Pooled CES data 2016-2022. Panel (A) shows bivariate results by decile of county-level Δ *% Latino* for White and non-White respondents. Panel (B) shows predicted support for legal abortion among White respondents and non-White respondents in fully controlled models holding all other covariates at their means (controls: county-level % Latino (2009), total population (2009), population density (2009), median household income (2009), % unemployed (2009), % college (2009), % McCain (2008), individual-level age, gender, college-education, income, partisanship, ideology, evangelical, racism index, catholic identification, change in % Republican between 2008-2016, and individual-level religiosity). Panel (C) shows results for the models where we interact prejudice with Δ *% Latino* and present predicted support for abortion across the full hypothetical ranges of Δ *% Latino*. We accompany this figure with a first-difference plot to show the full magnitude of the change in support for abortion moving Δ *% Latino* from its minimum to maximum values for those higher and lower in prejudice. We adjust for different measures of individual religiosity. The three measures are 1) religious importance: how much a respondent indicates religion is important to them from "not at all important" to "very important"; 2) church attendance: how often a respondent indicates they attend religious services from "never" to "more than once a week"; 3) frequency of prayer: how often a respondent reports they pray from "never" to "several times a day."

A.18 CES Outcome Measurement Across Waves

Table A14: Outcome Item Availability Across CES Waves

Survey Item	In CES 2016?	In CES 2017?	In CES 2018?	In CES 2020?	In CES 2022?
Always Allow: "Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice" (binary, 1 = support, 0 = oppose)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose 20th: "Prohibit all abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Employer: "Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Prohibit: "Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Illegal: "Make abortions illegal in all circumstances" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: "Y" denotes that a survey item is included in a particular survey wave ("yes"). "N" denotes that a survey item is NOT included in a particular survey wave ("no")

A.19 CES Moderator Measurement Across Waves

Table A15: Moderator (Racism) Item Availability Across CES Waves

Survey Item	In CES 2016?	In CES 2017?	In CES 2018?	In CES 2020?	In CES 2022?
Angry: "I am angry racism exists" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	Y	Y	N	N	N
Advantage: "White people have advantages because of the color of their skin" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Fearful: "I often find myself fearful of other races" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	Y	Y	N	N	N
Isolated: "Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Special Favors: "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Generations: "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Deserve: "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	N	N	Y	N	N
Try Hard: "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only tryharder they could be just as well off as whites" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	N	N	Y	N	N

Note: "Y" denotes that a survey item is included in a particular survey wave ("yes"). "N" denotes that a survey item is NOT included in a particular survey wave ("no")

A.20 CES Moderator Validation



Figure A7: The *racism index* is reliably associated with particular individual-level socio-demographic and political covariates. The x-axis is the univariate association with the *racism index* for each individual-level covariate on the y-axis. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: CES.

A.21 CES Results, Subsetting To Long-Term Residents



Figure A8: The relationship between Δ % Latino and support for legal abortion is robust to subsetting the CES data to long-term residents. These panels show predicted support for legal abortion among White (left-panel) respondents and non-White (right-panel) respondents in fully controlled models holding all other covariates at their means. Controls are the same as in Figure A6. The CES data used for these analyses are subset to respondents who have lived in either their current address or city for 5 years or more. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: CES.

A.22 Ruling Out Residential Selection

Table A16: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Counties That Are Increasingly Latino

	Change Latino Pop T2-T1					
	(CES)	(CES)	(VSG)	(VSG)	(CES)	(CES)
(Intercept)	0.04***	0.42***	0.05***	0.42***	0.00***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Abortion Attitudes T1	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Change % Latino ('00-'10)	0.92***	0.23***				
	(0.01)	(0.03)				
Abortion Attitudes T1 Missing			−0.00	−0.01		
			(0.00)	(0.01)		
Change % Latino ('00-'11)			0.90***	0.22***		
			(0.01)	(0.04)		
Change % Latino ('10-'20)					0.93***	0.23***
					(0.01)	(0.05)
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White	White	White	White
Movers Only	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Waves	14-'10	14-'10	16-'11	16-'11	22-'20	22-'20
Adj. R^2	0.86	0.06	0.82	0.05	0.87	0.05
Num. obs.	9422	838	6438	832	7710	618

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

All data are from the CES 2010-2014, VSG 2011-2016, and CES 2020-2022 panels. Outcome measured as change in county Latino population across panel 2014-2010 (CES), 2016-2011 (VSG) and 2020-2022 (CES). Covariates characterizing the change in Latino population at the county level is change in the proportion of the county population between 2000 to 2010 (CES 14-'10), 2000 to 2011 (VSG), or 2010 to 2020 (CES 22-'20). Abortion attitudes measured in Wave 1 of each panel. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

B Study 2

B.1 White-Latino Reanalysis



Figure B9: Perceived Local Population Growth and Support for Abortion as a Means of Population Control. The y-axis characterizes predicted values for favoring various reproductive policies as population control for Latina women. The x-axis characterizes perceptions of local Latino population growth which ranges from "Decreased a lot" (0) to "Increased a lot" (1). Shades denote the lowest and highest levels of differential favorability towards Whites relative to Latinos. Annotations denote coefficient for interaction between local Latino population growth and White-Latino favorability. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Cloud Research Connect Survey July 2025.

B.2 Interflex Reanalysis



Figure B10: Replicating Study 2 Using Interflex. From left to right, the y-axis characterizes the marginal effect of old-fashioned racism on support for abortion, contraception, sterilization, and the reproductive scale for Latinas (not White women) using three statistical bins via the `interflex` package in R (Hainmueller et al., 2019). The x-axis characterizes levels of local perceived Latino population growth. Across the board, those who are old-fashioned racist are more likely to support limitations on Latina reproduction when Latino population growth is higher. Source: Cloud Research Connect Survey July 2025.

B.3 Omitted Interaction Bias

Table B17: Adjusting for omitted interactions (Latina Outcomes)

	Abortion (1)	**Contraception** (2)	**Sterilization** (3)	**Scale** (4)
Local Latino Change x OFR	0.47	0.65*	0.86*	0.66*
	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.29)
Local Latino Change x Party ID	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Local Latino Change x Ideology	−0.06	−0.38	−0.51	−0.32
	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.23)
Local Latino Change x Evangelical	0.14	0.24	0.09	0.16
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Local Latino Change x Income	−0.01	−0.19	−0.09	−0.10
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Local Latino Change x College	0.10	0.06	0.14	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Local Latino Change	−0.13	0.01	−0.13	−0.08
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Party ID	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Ideology	−0.33	0.02	0.06	−0.08
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.17)
Evangelical	−0.36**	−0.22	−0.14	−0.24*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Income	−0.03	0.10	0.04	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.09)
College	−0.04	−0.05	−0.13	−0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.41	0.16	0.12	0.28
Num. obs.	739	739	739	739

Note: ***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$. All outcomes here refer to Latina women. Other controls are in model but control coefficients are omitted from table.

C Study 3

C.1 Experiment 1 Details (March 2024)

We fielded our first experiment with Cloud Research Connect between March 24-25, 2024 (N=1,134 White adults). We pre-registered our design here at https://tinyurl.com/4c7drxy2. The design features two experimental treatment arms. In the first, respondents were exposed to either an implicit Latina or White prime or an explicit Latina or White prime, as outlined in the manuscript. The design and cell sample sizes are portrayed in Figure C12. We present only the explicit treatment in the manuscript. The IRB at REDACTED INSTITUTION FOR REVIEW deemed our experiment was exempt from review. Respondents were provided with information concerning the purpose of the study before they partook in the study, consistent with principles of informed consent.

The implicit treatment images were paired with a textual introduction which read: "The United States population has grown by nearly 50% over the last 20 years. This means that in communities throughout the United States there is increased demand for limited resources like affordable housing, clean water, transportation, healthcare, and quality education. A significant contributor to population growth over the past decade was reproduction and high birth rates." This text was split across three screens each with an accompanying image presented in randomized order.

This text was followed by the measurement of our explicit treatment which was embedded in our DVs: "The following are some ways that could help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following policies": (1) "Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them"; (2) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception"; and (3) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)."

Table C18 presents sample statistics for the Connect sample dropping the 11 respondents removed who failed the attention check.

In the following section we present results of our pre-registered analyses. To summarize, while we find results for our "explicit" treatment, the other "implicit" treatment failed to have effects on attitudes. This could be for a variety of reasons, including the fact that pictures of Latino families may be too weak of a treatment to cognitively link the group to subsequent policies, that images in survey experiments taken on cellphones or tablets might be too small or brief to delivery a strong "dose," or that pictures may introduce other information into the experiment that is not properly controlled for. For example, images of seemingly happy families might elicit compassion/care norms that counteract threat-based reactions.

Tables C20 and C21 show our conditional average treatment effects for both implicit and explicit treatments. Table C22, C23, and C24 show results for fully interacted treatments, implicit CATEs for just those in the explicit control condition, and explicit CATEs for just those in the implicit control condition.

Table C25 shows pre-registered results where we evaluate if the effect of the explicit treatment on the additive index of reproductive policy support is driven by class-based attitudes instead of racial attitudes. Inconsistent with the notion that the explicit treatment is driven by class-based attitudes, the effect of the explicit treatment is not heterogeneous by

(A) Latino Images

(B) White Images

Figure C11: Images used in experiment 1. Respondents in the implicit treatment condition saw the three Latino family pictures in random order together with text. Respondents in the control condition saw the three White family pictures in random order together with the text.

unfavorability toward the poor, unfavorability toward the rich, and unfavorability toward poor Whites. However, crucially, the effect of the explicit treatment is heterogeneous by unfavorability toward the *Latino poor*. Specifically, White respondents in Experiment 1 are more inclined to support abortion, contraception, and sterilization for Latinas (relative to White women) conditional on negative attitudes toward the Latino poor, not negative attitudes toward the poor in general.

Figure C12: Design of Experiment 1: March 2024

	White (Exp)	**Latina (Exp)**
White (Imp)	N = 282	N = 283
Latina (Imp)	N = 288	N = 292

Note: Cell sizes for explicit (column) and implicit (rows) treatment and control conditions.

Table C26 shows pre-registered tests where we evaluate if the interaction between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism where the outcome is the additive index of reproductive policy support is robust to adjusting for the interaction between the explicit treatment and alternative mechanisms that may motivate support for reproduction such as attitudes toward the rich or poor, evangelicalism, partisanship, and ideology. The positive and statistically significant interaction coefficient between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism is robust to adjusting for interactions between the explicit treatment and unfavorability toward the rich, unfavorability toward the poor, and evangelical group membership (Models 1-4). However, the interaction coefficient between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism becomes statistically insignificant after adjusting for the interaction between the explicit treatment and partisanship (higher values = Republican-identifying) in addition to the interaction between the explicit treatment and ideology (higher values = conservative-identifying, Models 5-6). We do not believe this is dispositive evidence that our results are not driven by racial attitudes, but rather ideology and partisanship, for two reasons. First, preexisting evidence demonstrates racial attitudes shape partisanship and ideology, so adjusting for the interaction between the treatment and both partisanship and ideology may attenuate the interaction effect between the treatment and old-fashioned racism since partisanship and ideology are downstream products (i.e. mediators) of racial attitudes (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Sidanius et al., 1996). Second, if treatment effect heterogeneity by old-fashioned racism is actually driven by partisanship and ideology, we

should be able to replicate the null interaction effect between old-fashioned racism and the same treatment in Experiment 2 after adjusting for the interaction between partisanship, ideology, and the treatment. However, in Experiment 2, the same explicit treatment has a heterogeneous effect on an additive index of support for contraception policies conditional on old-fashioned racism net of adjusting for interactions between the treatment and both partisanship and ideology (Table C32). Therefore, we do not think the results on Table C26, Models 5-6 fundamentally discount our argument that racial attitudes play a role in shaping support for reproductive policy. **Experiment 2 clearly shows that the effect of the explicit treatment conditional on old-fashioned racism is net of the interaction between the treatment, partisanship, and ideology.**

Table C18: Sample Statistics Cloud Research Connect March 2024

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	41.17	12.94	19	79
Female	0.45	0.50	0	1
Evangelical	0.14	0.35	0	1
College	0.54	0.50	0	1
Income	5.97	5.97	1	11
Republican	0.22	0.22	0	1
Democrat	0.62	0.62	0	1
Ideology (C)	0.39	0.39	0	1
Old-Fashioned Racism	0.22	0.22	0	1

Note: Sample statistics for Cloud Research Experiment fielded in March 2024. Ideology and old-fashioned racism have been recoded to range between 0-1. All other variables are dichotomous or use original measured values (age).

C.1.1 Experiment 1: Reduced Form Treatment Effects

Table C19: Experiment 1: Reduced Form Treatment Effects

	Abortion	**Contraception**	**Sterilization**	**Scale**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.66***	0.82***	0.73***	0.74***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Implicit Treat	0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Explicit Treat	0.03·	0.02	−0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Controls?	N	N	N	N
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	1134	1134	1134	1134
RMSE	0.35	0.24	0.29	0.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Note: average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

C.1.2 Experiment 1: Implicit CATES With and Without Controls

Table C20: Experiment 1: Implicit CATEs With and Without Controls

	Abortion (1)	**Abortion** (2)	**Contraception** (3)	**Contraception** (4)	**Sterilization** (5)	**Sterilization** (6)	**Scale** (7)	**Scale** (8)
Implicit Treat	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
OFR Scale	−0.47***	−0.13*	−0.23***	−0.08	−0.34***	−0.12†	−0.35***	−0.11*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Implicit Treat X OFR Scale	−0.15	−0.04	−0.10	−0.07	−0.12	−0.08	−0.13	−0.06
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Explicit Treat	0.04*	0.04*	0.03†	0.02†	−0.00	−0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Adj. R^2	0.13	0.43	0.07	0.18	0.09	0.20	0.12	0.34
Num. obs.	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Implicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls. Control covariates included in models where "Controls?" = "Y," but coefficients are omitted from table.

C.1.3 Experiment 1: Explicit CATES With and Without Controls

Table C21: Experiment 1: Explicit CATEs With and Without Controls

	Abortion (1)	**Abortion** (2)	**Contraception** (3)	**Contraception** (4)	**Sterilization** (5)	**Sterilization** (6)	**Scale** (7)	**Scale** (8)
Explicit Treat	0.03	0.02	−0.00	−0.01	−0.05†	−0.05*	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
OFR Scale	−0.59***	−0.20**	−0.36***	−0.19**	−0.49***	−0.27***	−0.48***	−0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Explicit Treat X OFR Scale	0.06	0.09	0.14†	0.15*	0.18*	0.20*	0.13†	0.15*
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Implicit Treat	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Adj. R^2	0.12	0.43	0.07	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.12	0.34
Num. obs.	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Explicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls. Control covariates included in models where "Controls?" = "Y," but coefficients are omitted from table.

C.1.4 Experiment 1: Fully Interacted Treatments

Table C22: Experiment 1: Fully Interacted Treatments (Without Controls)

	Abortion (1)	**Abortion** (2)	**Contraception** (3)	**Contraception** (4)	**Sterilization** (5)	**Sterilization** (6)	**Scale** (7)	**Scale** (8)
Implicit	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Explicit	0.05	0.02	0.04†	−0.03	−0.02	−0.08*	0.02	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Implicit*Explicit	−0.02	0.02	−0.04	0.05	0.02	0.06	−0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
OFR		−0.54***		−0.40***		−0.48***		−0.47***
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Implicit*OFR		−0.10		0.08		−0.04		−0.02
		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.11)
Explicit*OFR		0.12		0.32**		0.27*		0.24*
		(0.14)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)
Implicit*Explicit*OFR		−0.11		−0.35*		−0.16		−0.21
		(0.20)		(0.15)		(0.18)		(0.15)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.08	−0.00	0.09	−0.00	0.13
Num. obs.	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Note: Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses.

C.1.5 Experiment 1: Implicit CATES Conditional on Explicit/Implicit Subsets

Table C23: Experiment 1: Implicit CATEs Conditional on Subset of Explicit Treatment

	Abortion (1)	**Abortion** (2)	**Contraception** (3)	**Contraception** (4)	**Sterilization** (5)	**Sterilization** (6)	**Scale** (7)	**Scale** (8)
Implicit	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
OFR		−0.54***		−0.40***		−0.48***		−0.47***
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Implicit*OFR		−0.10		0.08		−0.04		−0.02
		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.11)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.12	0.00	0.09	−0.00	0.12	−0.00	0.14
Num. obs.	566	566	566	566	566	566	566	566

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Note: Implicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1 subsetting to just those who answered DVs about White women (e.g. explicit treatment = 0). Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

Table C24: Experiment 1: Explicit CATEs Conditional on Subset of Implicit Treatment

	Abortion (1)	Abortion (2)	Contraception (3)	Contraception (4)	Sterilization (5)	Sterilization (6)	Scale (7)	Scale (8)
(Intercept)	0.65***	0.77***	0.81***	0.90***	0.73***	0.84***	0.73***	0.83***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Explicit	0.05	0.02	0.04.	−0.03	−0.02	−0.08*	0.02	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
OFR		−0.54***		−0.40***		−0.48***		−0.47***
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Explicit*OFR		0.12		0.32**		0.27*		0.24*
		(0.14)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.07	−0.00	0.07	−0.00	0.10
Num. obs.	561	561	561	561	561	561	561	561
RMSE	0.34	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.29	0.28	0.26	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{.}p < 0.1$

Note: Explicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1 subsetting to just those who received pictures of White women (e.g. implicit treatment = 0). Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

C.1.6 Experiment 1: Class-Based Placebos

Table C25: Experiment 1: Class-Based Placebos

	Reproductive Policy Scale (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.94***	0.82***	0.91***	0.95***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Explicit Treat	−0.02	0.07*	0.01	−0.04†
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unfav. Poor	−0.04			
	(0.05)			
Unfav. Rich		0.13***		
		(0.04)		
Unfav. Poor Whites			0.04	
			(0.04)	
Unfav. Poor Latinos				−0.08
				(0.05)
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor	0.11			
	(0.07)			
Explicit Treat X Unfav Rich		−0.10†		
		(0.05)		
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor Whites			0.00	
			(0.06)	
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor Latinos				0.16*
				(0.07)
Implicit Treat	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adj. R^2	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
Num. obs.	1130	1130	1131	1131

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Note: Outcome for all models is the scale of the abortion, contraception, and sterilization outcome. Control covariates are included in models but control coefficients are omitted from table. Robust SEs in parentheses.

C.1.7 Experiment 1: Accounting for Omitted Interaction Bias

Table C26: Experiment 1: Accounting for omitted interaction bias

	Reproductive Policy Scale				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	0.84^{***}	0.94^{***}	0.94^{***}	0.95^{***}	0.96^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Explicit Treat X OFR	$0.13^{\dagger}$	$0.13^{\dagger}$	0.14^{*}	0.08	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Explicit Treat X Unfav Rich	$-0.09^{\dagger}$				
	(0.05)				
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor		0.07			
		(0.07)			
Explicit Treat X Evangelical			0.02		
			(0.04)		
Explicit Treat X Party ID				0.10^{**}	
				(0.04)	
Explicit Treat X Ideology					0.18^{**}
					(0.05)
Explicit Treat	0.03	−0.03	−0.02	-0.04^{*}	-0.06^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
OFR	-0.22^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.18^{***}	-0.17^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Unfav Rich	0.13^{***}				
	(0.04)				
Unfav Poor		0.01			
		(0.05)			
Implicit Treat	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	−0.03	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman	$0.02^{\dagger}$	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Evangelical	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.09^{***}	-0.09^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.06^{**}	0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party ID	$-0.05^{\dagger}$	−0.04	−0.04	-0.09^{**}	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideology	-0.34^{***}	-0.38^{***}	-0.38^{***}	-0.38^{***}	-0.46^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Adj. R^2	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35
Num. obs.	1130	1130	1132	1132	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

C.1.8 Experiment 1: Interflex



Figure C13: Replicating Experiment 1 Using Interflex. X-axis is the value of old-fashioned racism. Y-axis is the marginal effect of the "Latina" treatment on the additive reproductive policy scale (support for Abortion, contraception, sterilization). Three statistical bins are used for old-fashioned racism via the `interflex` package in R (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Data from Cloud Research March 2024 survey.

C.2 Experiment 2 Details (July 2025)

We fielded our second experiment with Cloud Research Connect on July 17, 2025 (N=1,483 White adults). We pre-registered our design here at https://tinyurl.com/mkrtn9ur. This time we only included an explicit treatment condition with one treatment (Latina, N=740) and one control (White, N=743). The IRB at REDACTED INSTITUTION FOR REVIEW deemed our experiment was exempt from review. Respondents were provided with information concerning the purpose of the study before they partook in the study, consistent with principles of informed consent.

The treatment mirrored the explicit treatment from the first experiment minus the embedded implicit image treatment. In other words, respondents started by reading the introductory text: "The United States population has grown by nearly 50% over the last 20 years. This means that in communities throughout the United States there is increased demand for limited resources like affordable housing, clean water, transportation, healthcare, and quality education. A significant contributor to population growth over the past decade was reproduction and high birth rates."

This text was followed by the measurement of our explicit treatment which was embedded in our DVs: "The following are some ways that could help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following policies": (1) "Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them"; (2) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception"; and (3) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)."

Table C27: Sample Statistics Cloud Research Connect July 2025

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	42.62	13.26	18	82
Female	0.53	0.50	0	1
Evangelical	0.14	0.35	0	1
College	0.58	0.49	0	1
Income	0.54	0.54	0	1
Republican	0.32	0.32	0	1
Democrat	0.59	0.59	0	1
Ideology (C)	0.41	0.41	0	1
Old-Fashioned Racism	0.20	0.21	0	1
White-Latino Fav Diff	0.49	0.13	0	1

Note: Sample statistics for Cloud Research Experiment fielded in July 2025. Ideology, old-fashioned racism, and our White-Latino favorability differential have been recoded to range between 0-1. All other variables are dichotomous or retain their original scale (age).

In the following section we again present results of all of our pre-registered analyses. As we show in the manuscript, we find strongly confirmatory results for all of our pre-registered hypotheses. Table C27 presents sample statistics for the Connect sample with the

13 respondents removed who failed the attention check.

Tables C20 and C21 show our conditional average treatment effects for both implicit and explicit treatments. Table C22, C23, and C24 show results for fully interacted treatments, implicit CATEs for just those in the explicit control condition, and explicit CATEs for just those in the implicit control condition.

C.2.1 Experiment 2: CATEs (OFR) With and Without Controls

Table C28: Experiment 2: CATEs (OFR) With and Without Controls

	Abortion (1)	**Abortion** (2)	**Contraception** (3)	**Contraception** (4)	**Sterilization** (5)	**Sterilization** (6)	**Scale** (7)	**Scale** (8)
Treat Latina	−0.02	−0.01	−0.04$^{\cdot}$	−0.04*	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.05*	−0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
OFR Scale	−0.77***	−0.20***	−0.64***	−0.30***	−0.68***	−0.34***	−0.70***	−0.28***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Treat Latina X OFR Scale	0.33***	0.28***	0.41***	0.38***	0.46***	0.43***	0.40***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Controls?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.43	0.13	0.27	0.11	0.23	0.15	0.37
Num. obs.	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using old-fashioned racism as moderator. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls. Controls include party ID, ideology, age, gender, education, income, and evangelicalism. Control coefficients omitted but included in models where "Controls?" = "Y."

C.2.2 Experiment 2: CATEs (Poor White - Poor Latino Favorability) With and Without Controls

Table C29: Experiment 2: CATEs (Poor White - Poor Lat Fav) Without Controls

	Abortion (1)	**Contraception** (2)	**Sterilization** (3)	**Scale** (4)
Treat Latina	−0.27*	−0.26**	−0.39***	−0.31***
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Poor White-Latino Fav.	−1.09***	−0.76***	−0.95***	−0.93***
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Treat Latina X Poor Wht-Lat Fav.	0.67**	0.62**	0.83***	0.71***
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	1491	1491	1491	1491

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from Experiment 2 using the Poor White - Poor Latino favorability differential as moderator. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models presented without controls.

C.2.3 Experiment 2: CATEs (White - Latino Favorability) With and Without Controls

Table C30: Experiment 2: CATEs (Wht-Lat Fav) With and Without Controls

	Abortion (1)	Abortion (2)	Contraception (3)	Contraception (4)	Sterilization (5)	Sterilization (6)	Scale (7)	Scale (8)
(Intercept)	1.17***	1.10***	1.13***	1.07***	1.15***	1.13***	1.15***	1.10***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treat Latina	−0.20***	−0.18***	−0.19***	−0.18***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.23***	−0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
White-Latino Fav.	−1.14***	−0.27***	−0.83***	−0.30***	−0.98***	−0.47***	−0.98***	−0.34***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Treat Latina X Wht-Lat Fav.	0.52***	0.46***	0.49***	0.46***	0.65***	0.63***	0.55***	0.51***
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Controls?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Adj. R^2	0.12	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.09	0.23	0.12	0.36
Num. obs.	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using the White-Latino favorability differential as moderator. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models presented with and without controls. Controls include party ID, ideology, age, gender, education, income, and Evangelicalism. Control covariates included in models where "Controls?" = "Y," but coefficients are omitted from table.

C.2.4 Experiment 2: CATEs for Class-Based Placebo Moderators Without Controls

Table C31: Experiment 2: CATEs for Class-Based Placebo Moderators

	Reproduction Scale						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treat Latina	0.09	0.29***	0.01	0.22***	0.02	0.07	0.11*
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
FT Middle Class	0.01						
	(0.01)						
Treat X FT Middle Class	−0.01						
	(0.02)						
FT Black		0.20***					
		(0.05)					
Treat X FT Black		−0.37***					
		(0.06)					
FT Rich			−0.02*				
			(0.01)				
Treat X FT Rich			0.01				
			(0.01)				
FT Poor				0.03**			
				(0.01)			
Treat X FT Poor				−0.04**			
				(0.01)			
Resent Poor					−0.13*		
					(0.06)		
Treat X Resent Poor					0.06		
					(0.08)		
Resent Rich						0.19***	
						(0.05)	
Treat X Resent Rich						−0.06	
						(0.07)	
FT Poor White							0.01
							(0.01)
Treat X FT Poor White							−0.02
							(0.01)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adj. R^2	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.35
Num. obs.	1487	1487	1492	1492	1490	1479	1488

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using the a variety of class-based affect moderators where higher values are coded to indicate positive affect. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control covariates included in models where "Controls?" = "Y," but coefficients are omitted from table.

C.2.5 Experiment 2: Accounting for Omitted Interaction Bias

Table C32: Experiment 2: Accounting for omitted interaction bias

	Reproduction Scale				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Latina X OFR	0.34***	0.38***	0.33***	0.21*	0.18*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Treat Latina X Unfav Poor	−0.02				
	(0.01)				
Treat Latina X Unfav Rich		−0.01			
		(0.01)			
Treat Latina X Evangelical			−0.09*		
			(0.04)		
Treat Latina X Party ID				0.09*	
				(0.04)	
Treat Latina X Ideology					0.13*
					(0.06)
Treat Latina	0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.05*
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
OFR	−0.26***	−0.29***	−0.20***	−0.16**	−0.15**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Unfav Poor	0.01				
	(0.01)				
Unfav Rich		−0.01			
		(0.01)			
Evangelical			−0.15***		
			(0.03)		
Party ID	−0.11***	−0.10***	−0.17***	−0.23***	−0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Ideology	−0.39***	−0.37***	−0.46***	−0.51***	−0.58***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adj. R^2	0.37	0.37	0.47	0.44	0.44
Num. obs.	1479	1479	1479	1480	1480

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Control covariates included in models where "Controls?" = "Y," but coefficients are omitted from table.

C.2.6 Experiment 2: Interflex



Figure C14: Replicating Experiment 2 Using Interflex. X-axis is the value of old-fashioned racism. Y-axis is the marginal effect of the "Latina" treatment on the additive reproductive policy scale (support for Abortion, contraception, sterilization). Three statistical bins are used for old-fashioned racism via the `interflex` package in R (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Data from Cloud Research July 2025 survey.

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