Xenophobia in the Time of Pandemic: Othering, Anti-Asian Attitudes, and COVID-19

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Abstract

As the number of COVID-19 cases rose in the U.S. and around the world in early 2020, conservative elites in the United States racialized the pandemic, referring to the coronavirus as the "Chinese flu" or the "Wuhan virus." Existing research suggests that this linking of the viral pandemic to a social group will "activate" anti-Asian attitudes in the mass public, helping bring those attitudes to bear on behaviors and attitudes related to COVID-19. Despite anecdotal evidence of a spike in discriminatory behavior targeted at Asians across western countries, little empirical evidence for this "othering" hypothesis exists. Using a large survey (n=4,311) benchmarked to national demographics, we analyze the relationship between attitudes toward Asian Americans, xenophobia, concern about contracting the coronavirus, and a variety of behavioral outcomes and policy attitudes. We find evidence that anti-Asian attitudes are associated with concern about the virus but also with xenophobic behaviors and policy preferences. These relationships are unique to Asian American attitudes, are not related to attitudes toward other outgroups, and do not hold for a variety of placebo outcomes. Together our findings suggest that anti-Asian attitudes were activated and were associated with a variety of COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors in the early stages of the pandemic.

Keywords: infectious disease, othering, coronavirus, pandemic, Asian American politics, racial and ethnic politics

On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency over the novel coronavirus, an outbreak of contagious disease that would shortly be declared a global pandemic.[1] While the threat to public health and the economy of this pandemic were very real, President Trump and other prominent Republicans added fuel to the fire, demonizing Chinese and other Asian Americans by referring to COVID-19 as the "Wuhan virus," "Chinese virus," and the "Kung Flu," part of a larger and familiar political strategy of demonizing foreigners as threatening and dangerous.[2] In rural Kansas, an elected official stated his community was generally safe because there aren't many Chinese people there. Texas Senator John Cornyn openly justified the blame on Chinese, advancing racist tropes about Chinese eating bats, snakes and dogs.[3]

While these racial appeals---and even the linking of outgroups with fear of germs and disease---are nothing new in politics, they may be politically consequential, potentially serving to link xenophobic, anti-Chinese, and even broad anti-Asian American attitudes to worries about the coronavirus in the U.S., what scholars call "othering" (Eichelberger 2007; Nelkin and Gilman 1988; Kam 2019; Dionne and Seay 2015). Elites have long attempted to shape mass attitudes by framing certain policies as linked with groups like welfare and African Americans or immigration and Latinos (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Gilens 1999; Perez 2016).

We suspect that this elite rhetoric in early stages of the pandemic caused anti-Asian attitudes to mix with newfound worry over the coronavirus in toxic ways that manifest in racially charged, xenophobic policy sentiment and behavior among some in the mass public. Indeed, in the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic, news stories exposed sheer drops in visits to Chinese restaurants and empty Chinatowns in major urban centers.[4] More recently stories emerged of Asian Americans being verbally or physically attacked in the United States[5], reminiscent of historical violence following pandemics, from attacks on Jews during the 14th century Black Death outbreak to attacks on LGBTQ Americans during the late 19th century A.I.D.S. epidemic.

The vast majority of literature on attitudes toward pandemic and disease, however, finds little systematic empirical evidence for this "othering" hypothesis---that mass understanding of disease can become merged with prejudice toward a stigmatized group framed as responsible for the disease (Kam 2019; though see Eichelberger 2007; Nelkin and Gilman 1988). Instead, extant literature points to the "behavioral immune system," and disgust sensitivity in particular, as the primary driver of attitudes toward disease, pandemics, and even foreigners more broadly (Aaroe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017; Kam 2019; Faulkner et al. 2004).

Yet we argue that at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States, elite rhetoric blaming China and the Chinese for spreading the virus created ideal conditions for the most rigorous test to date of the "othering" hypothesis in mass attitudes. We hypothesize that elite blame-rhetoric in the early days of COVID-19 activated pre-existing xenophobia and anti-Asian

[1] Throughout this article we will use coronavirus, novel coronavirus, and COVID-19 interchangeably.
[2] E.g. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/stop-trying-make-wuhan-virus-happen/607786/
[3] See https://themercury.com/news/rodriguez-blames-the-chinese-draws-rebuke-from-reddi/article_4ea74d2e-778b-57ad-b4b9-90b68a3c9a21.html and https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/19/coronavirus-china-cornyn-blame/
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/nyregion/coronavirus-nyc.html
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html

sentiment, bringing those attitudes to bear on emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral reactions to the coronavirus in the United States. It could be that later in the pandemic racial attitudes begin to play a role as African Americans are identified as disproportionately contracting and dying from the virus, however this article considers the very outset of the virus when few cases were yet reported in the U.S.

To test our hypotheses we designed and fielded an online survey between March 12, 2020 and March 15, 2020, when attention to the coronavirus was growing but state and local governments had not yet enacted strict Stay-At-Home policies that halted the economy and before too many actives cases (n=1,581) or deaths (n=41) from the virus were reported. We consider this first wave to represent Americans' baseline attitudes in the early stages of a racialized pandemic.

Using Lucid, we surveyed a total of n=4,311 people across the United States, balanced demographically and weighted to the national population, and asked questions about political attitudes and behaviors. We explore the degree to which xenophobia and attitudes toward Asian Americans and other groups are associated with anxiety about the coronavirus, changes in behavior as a result of the pandemic, and attitudes toward coronavirus-specific and broad immigration policies in the early days of the pandemic. We find convincing and consistent evidence for the othering hypothesis---that attitudes toward Asian Americans were associated with anxiety about the coronavirus, that these attitudes toward Asian Americans, but not other groups, are predictive of changes in xenophobic behaviors and policy attitudes, but not less racialized behaviors or general immigration attitudes. We conclude that this survey presents the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that elites succeeded, early in the pandemic, in linking mass anti-Asian prejudice to emotional reactions to coronavirus, behaviors, and evaluations of coronavirus-related policies. This study also provides rigorous evidence of the othering hypothesis in attitudes toward infectious disease which other work has cast doubt on. We conclude with limitations and implications for future research.

Framing and Blaming

On December 31, 2019 Chinese government officials confirmed that health authorities were treating dozens of patients for an outbreak of pneumonia. Days later researchers pinpointed a new virus that appeared to be the root cause of the illnesses and traced its origin to a market in Wuhan. Despite close monitoring by Chinese officials, the novel coronavirus spread quickly. By January 20, 2020, U.S. officials confirmed the first case in the U.S. and by the 30th, the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) declared the outbreak a global health emergency. The disease, which the W.H.O. later dubbed "COVID-19," would continue to spread exponentially over the subsequent months with epidemiologists in mid-March of 2020 suggesting that infections in the United States alone could range from anywhere in the tens of thousands to half a million or more.[6]

While a handful of early transmissions in the United States could be traced to those who had travelled to China, it only took a few weeks and 14 confirmed cases before "community

[6] https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/infectious-disease-experts-dont-know-how-bad-the-coronavirus-is-going-to-get-either/

transmission," a confirmed case with no known origin, emerged as the primary mode of spread.[7] Despite this fact, elites[8], and Donald Trump in particular, continued to blame China and the Chinese for the disease, continually referring to the pathogen as the "Chinese virus."[9] U.S. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) even suggested that a Chinese lab developed the virus.[10] In response to pushback over the racial appeals, other government officials and media elites mocked Democrats and liberals for being offended.[11]

Figure 1: Media Coverage and Google Searches



Notes: Lines indicate New York Times article keyword counts collected from New York Times API (Panel A) and Google Search Terms normalized to range between 0-100 collected from Google Trends API (Panel B) between Feb 15, 2020 and Mar 16, 2020. Grey rectangle indicates survey field date.

[7] https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226-Covid-19-spread.html
[8] We use the word elite throughout this document to refer broadly to both political and media elites: the president, administration officials, parties and party officials, members of congress, reporters, cable show hosts, and others. The president, though, is his party's principle spokesperson and plays an outsize role in setting the agenda and determining what will be covered and talked about by other elites (Groeling 2010; Miles 2014).
[9] https://theintercept.com/2020/03/17/trump-blames-china-virus-white-house-aide-makes-racist-joke-asian-reporter/
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/business/media/coronavirus-tom-cotton-china.html
[11] For example see Tucker Carlson: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbyPW8lJX2E&feature=youtu.be

This continued linkage of the virus to China is reflected in both media coverage and Google search behavior. In Figure 1, we display the number of mentions of "coronavirus" alone (solid line) and paired with "china" (dashed orange line) in The New York Times (panel A), revealing that the vast number of articles mentioning Coronavirus at this time also mentioned China. We then show that this elite political and media framing spilled over into mass behavior in terms of Google search behavior. In panel B, we see that Google searches for "Chinese Virus," "Chinese Flu," and "Kung Flu" increased at similar rates as internet searches for "Coronavirus" and "COVID-19" and peaking over this time period during the fielding phase of our survey.

Extant research suggests that this framing, specifically the linking of social groups to political objects, should play an important role in shaping mass understanding of the coronavirus (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Elites have long highlighted which groups stand to gain (or lose) from public policy in an attempt to shape public opinion toward that policy. Researchers, for example, have clearly established the role that attitudes toward African Americans play in shaping individual support or opposition to affirmative action (Kinder and Sanders 1996), welfare (Gilens 1999), crime (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997) and size or role of government (Parker and Barreto 2013). Attitudes toward Latinos have similarly become strongly predictive of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy (Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Perez 2016). It's likely that elites have succeeded in framing the threat of coronavirus, at least in some Americans' minds, as an Asian threat, and that racial primes work to activate those attitudes, bringing them to bear on subsequent evaluations (Mendelberg 2001; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017; Valenzuela and Reny 2020).

Attitudes Toward Pandemics: Othering or The Behavioral Immune System

It's clear that elites succeeded in racializing the coronavirus pandemic in its early stages as "Asian," suggesting that conditions should be ripe at this point in the pandemic for attitudes toward Asian Americans to influence emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral reactions to the coronavirus public health crisis. Yet, there is little systematic evidence for this "othering" hypothesis. Instead extant literature points to a "behavioral immune system" and its related psychological responses like disgust, as playing the primary role in shaping behaviors and attitudes toward infection disease (Kam 2019).

The behavioral immune system is an unconscious psychological process that constantly scans environments for harmful pathogens (Schaller 2006; Oaten, Stevenson, and Case 2009). The body is hypervigilant toward pathogens, which cannot be seen or detected, using disgust as a primary mechanism to protect humans from potentially dangerous objects or people (Schaller and Neuberg 2012). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, researchers have established a robust link between disgust sensitivity and broader xenophobic attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants as members of foreign outgroups could carry disease or pathogens that the in-group has not yet developed immunity to (Faulkner et al. 2004; Aaroe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017; Schaller et al. 2015).

Similarly, Kam (2019) finds that disgust sensitivity is the most robust predictor of attitudes toward infectious disease. Notably, in the same manuscript, Kam also submits the othering

hypothesis to its most rigorous large-N empirical test and finds no systematic relationship between attitudes toward specific groups (Blacks, Latinos) and associated disease (Ebola, Zika). These findings echo Bishop et al.'s (1991) findings that concerns about AIDS were driven more by fear of contagion than prejudice toward LGTBQ individuals. In sum, the weight of the evidence points toward underlying disgust sensitivity and not out-group prejudice as the primary driver of attitudes and behaviors in response to contagious disease.

And yet there is good reason to believe that the othering hypothesis could hold under certain conditions. There is ample evidence throughout history of specific groups being implicated for the spread of disease. Researchers have argued that understandings of syphilis were tied to attitudes toward Indians of the New World, of AIDS to homosexuals (Nelkin and Gilman 1988), of SARS to Chinese (Eichelberger 2007), and of Ebola to Africans (Dionne and Seay 2015). Indeed, in her conclusion, Kam (2019) notes that while she found no evidence for the othering hypothesis, she suggests that others subject the hypothesis to further empirical scrutiny, particularly using measures "calibrated to the dominant narratives and the specific groups implicated by particular diseases" (1385).

We suspect that conditions were ripe in the early days of the pandemic for understandings of coronavirus to be rooted, at least partly, in group-based prejudice. Before we test this hypothesis, however, it's important to review how mass attitudes toward Asian Americans, and the Chinese in particular, are already rooted in fear over foreignness and propensity for disease, increasing the likelihood that othering could emerge as an important component of public opinion in coronavirus attitudes and behaviors.

Attitudes towards Asian Americans

Most scholarship on Asian Americans finds that Asians in the United States have long been racialized differently from either African Americans or Latinos. The group is defined by a mix of both positive and negative stereotypes that celebrate the group's socio-economic status and work ethic while at the same time labelling them as never truly "American." These stereotypes play an important role shaping mass opinion on the group but also group-related policies.

Asians are seen on the one hand as a so-called "model minority," an "industrious and intelligent" group which has been able to achieve educational and economic success (Ng, Lee, and Pak 2007; Chou and Feagin 2008). On the other hand, they are seen as perpetual foreigners, never quite worthy of full American status and continually seen as outsiders and a foreign threat (Kim 1999; Chang 2004; Masuoka and Junn 2013).

One particular trope has been that Asian Americans refuse to assimilate. This was popularized in 1952 by Sociologist Paul Siu who described Chinese immigrants as sojourners who "clings to the culture of his own group" and who "is unwilling to organize himself as a permanent resident in the country of his sojourn" (Siu 1952). Extensive research by Yang (1999; 2000) demonstrates that the sojourner depiction was *overly* applied to Chinese immigrants and not to other immigrant groups. In fact, research by demographers, sociologist and historians concludes that in the 1800s and early 1900s most immigrant communities can be described as sojourners and not settlers (Foner 1997; Erickson 1972). Historic census and immigration data shows that immigrants from

Poland, Greece, Russia, Italy, English and Spain all had high rates of return to their home country, in many instances higher than the sojourner rates of Chinese. However, the permanency of the return following the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and then again in 1924 set in motion a stereotype of Chinese immigrants in particular, as unwilling to assimilate or to become a part of America.[12]

In addition to being perpetual foreigners, Chinese immigrants have been stereotyped as culturally exotic and as dirty acute vectors of disease. One specific argument advanced in the late-1800s was that the Chinese, "ignoring all laws of hygiene and sanitation, bred and disseminated disease, thereby endangering the welfare of the state and the nation" (Trauner 1978, pp 72). More specifically, miasmatic theories of disease, which were popular at the time, argued that epidemics were caused by poor sanitary conditions which tainted the local air. Public health officials would frequently blame Chinese immigrant enclaves, with their "foul and disgusting vapors" as the primary source of pollution and thus disease within U.S. cities (Trauner 1978).

Chinese laborers were often subjected to harsher medical scrutiny and more invasive and traumatic medical examinations than other immigrants at borders (Markel and Stern 2002) and lawmakers frequently cited public health and safety as justification for laws banning Chinese immigrants (Kil 2012). These stereotypes are clearly alive and well today. Not only do scholars find very little discussion of Asian Americans that could combat these stereotypes in K-12 history or social studies education but the stereotypes continue to be reinforced in much popular entertainment and political media today (Lee and Kumashiro 2005; Smith et al. 2018; Ramasubramanian 2011). On March 19, 2020, for example, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) justified labelling coronavirus the "Chinese virus" saying: "China is to blame because the culture where people eat bats and snakes and dogs and things like that…"[13]

Theoretical Expectations

While little extant research lends empirical support to the othering hypothesis, we suspect that elite rhetoric in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic helped link attitudes toward Asian Americans to responses to the coronavirus pandemic, creating ideal conditions for a rigorous test of the hypothesis. More specifically, we propose a model of response (Figure 2) to coronavirus that is rooted in anti-Asian prejudice. We argue that elite rhetoric tying Asians to the coronavirus will activate these attitudes which in turn will directly influence levels of anxiety (worry about coronavirus) as well as both directly and indirectly (through worry) shape related behaviors and policy attitudes.

[12] This, of course, is not borne out in the data. Following immigration changes in 1965, data points to the Chinese community as following what Yang (2000) describes as the "settler" model whereby they see America as their new home and in fact report higher rates of naturalization and home ownership than other immigrant groups, evidence of settling and putting down roots in the United States.

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/19/coronavirus-china-cornyn-blame/

Figure 2. Theoretical Model



Note: Proposed theoretical model. Asian American favorability has a direct effect on worrying about coronavirus and also behaviors / policy attitudes while exerting an indirect effect through coronavirus worry making it a partial mediator.

We present three sets of hypotheses:

H1: Unfavorable attitudes toward Asian Americans, but not other groups, will be associated with higher levels of worrying about coronavirus.
H2a: Being worried about the coronavirus will be associated with greater levels of avoidance behavior targeted at foreigners.
H2b: Unfavorable attitudes toward Asian Americans will be associated with greater levels of avoidance behavior targeted at foreigners but not general avoidance behaviors.
H3a: Being worried about the coronavirus will be associated with greater support for xenophobic coronavirus policies.
H3a: Unfavorable attitudes toward Asian Americans will be associated with greater support for xenophobic coronavirus policies but not general immigration policies.

Data and Methods

Between March 12, 2020 and March 15, 2020, we fielded a survey with Lucid's Academic Marketplace, Theorem. Lucid is a firm that provides quota-based samples, for a total sample of n=4,311 respondents. We weighted the data to 2018 American Community Survey targets. Existing research finds Lucid samples to be of high quality (Coppock and Green 2016; Coppock and Mcclellan 2019), and when attention is given to random selection of demographic groups (Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto, Reny, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2017), and properly weighted, provide samples that are similar in quality to respected survey respondent panels like Pew's American Trends Panel (Tausanovitch et al. 2019). For more information on the sample, weighting procedure, and Lucid, see Appendix B.[14] The majority or our data (n=2,573) was collected before Trump's emergency declaration on March 13 and all of the data was collected before states and localities began enacting social distancing measures. The Bay Area's six county "Stay-

[14] If we drop Asian American respondents (n=182) from the dataset, the relationship between Asian affect and each outcome strengthens. However, because some Asian American respondents may have negative attitudes toward other Asians or Asian immigrant in the United States, we chose to retain them in the sample.

At-Home" order was announced on March 16. It wasn't until March 20 that the first state, California, issued a state-wide "Stay-At-Home" order. Further, the number of active cases was comparatively low on March 12 when our survey fielded, only n=1,630 cases in the U.S. compared to 327,848 by April 5,2020. Likewise, few deaths had been reported, only 41 on March 12, compared to 9,325 deaths by April 5, 2020.

Figure 2: Daily Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in U.S.



Note: Bars indicate daily confirmed COVID-19 cases in U.S. (in thousands). Grey bar indicates field dates of survey.

For our first dependent variable, we asked respondents "How worried are you about you or someone in your family being infected with the Coronavirus?" Answer ranged from "very worried" (4) to "not at all worried" (1) (mean=3.87). The second set of dependent variables, behavioral measures, asked respondents whether they had "done any of the following things to prevent the spread of coronavirus," these included: "changed travel plans" (mean=0.39), "worked from home instead of going to your usual place of work" (mean=0.32), "changed any usual behavior" (mean=0.48), and "kept away from foreigners" (mean=0.37). Respondents could answer "yes" (1) or "no" (0). Respondents were also asked about restaurant preferences in a quasi-behavioral hypothetical: "if you were to go out to eat at a restaurant with friends and family today or tomorrow and you have access to any of the following cuisines, how likely is it that you would choose each of the following?" Choices included "Chinese," "French," "Indian," "Thai," and "Moroccan." Responses ranged from "very likely" (1) to "not at all likely" (4). We created a preference scale for restaurant pairs subtracting non-Chinese restaurants from the Chinese preference scale yielding a scale of -3 to 3 where 3 indicates an extremely strong preference for the other cuisine over Chinese and -3 indicates an extremely strong preference for Chinese over the other cuisine. Finally, respondents were asked a series of policy questions: "now thinking about political issues in the U.S., please indicate how strongly you agree with the following policies." These policies include Asian-specific coronavirus-related policies like "reduce the number of visas for high-skilled immigrants from Asia" (mean=2.52) and "require a mandatory quarantine of all travelers from Asia" (mean=3.09), as well as the more general "shut down borders entirely until coronavirus is under control" (mean=3.11). We also asked some placebo immigration policy questions including "increasing deportations of immigrants currently

in the country illegally" (mean=2.76) and "build a wall along the entire U.S.-Mexico border" (mean=2.50). Responses ranged from "strongly support" (4) to "strongly oppose" (1).

Our main independent variables include group feeling thermometers where respondents were asked: "We would like to get your feelings toward some groups in society. We will show you the name of a group and we'd like you to rate that group on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 indicates that you feel very cool toward the group (unfavorable) and 7 indicates that you feel very warm toward the group (favorable). How would you rate the following:" Responses were rescaled between 0 and 1 and flipped so that higher values indicate feeling more unfavorable toward the group. Groups included 1) "People from China" (mean=0.38); 2) "Asian Americans (mean=0.32); 3) "African Americans" (mean=0.30); and 4) "Latinos" (mean=0.32). To measure contact with Asian Americans, we measured two types of contact: 1) passive contact; and 2) intimate contact. The first asked respondents "How often, if at all, do you have everyday relationships with people from the following groups, such as exchanging a few words, or buying something at a store, and so on". Responses ranged from "Every day" (5) to "Never" (1) (mean=3.15). The second asked "In the last six months, have you shared a meal with someone from the following groups." Respondents could choose "Yes" (1) or "No" (0) (mean=0.33). Our other key independent variable was a 6-item additive xenophobia scale that was recoded to range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating highest level of xenophobia (mean=0.43). Details on the individual items and scale construction can be found in Appendix C.

Finally, our regression models all control for standard confounders including political interest (high=4), partisanship (strong Republican = 7), gender (female=1), education (college=1), age, ideology (very conservative=5), family income, and dummies for race (white, black, Latino). Because disgust sensitivity is a primary driver of attitudes toward infection disease we also constructed an additive disgust sensitivity scale (1=highest disgust sensitivity) using seven questions widely used in existing research (Clifford and Piston 2017). Our first model (Figure 1; Table 1) also includes a variable indicating financial impact of coronavirus-related market drops (5=most impacted). Means and ranges of these control variables can be found in Appendix C. Full question wording for all items in the survey can be found in Appendix A.

We use multivariate regression with survey weights for all analyses. While all of our models control for the full set of control variables specified above, we present truncated regression tables throughout the main body of the manuscripts together with simulated counterfactuals of interest. Full regression tables can be found in Appendix D.

Results

Worry About Coronavirus

In our first model we examine the correlates of being worried about the coronavirus. In particular we want to see whether out-group attitudes and general xenophobia predicts whether a respondent is worried or not. We estimated an ordered probit model, regressing the 4-pt coronavirus worry question on the Chinese feeling thermometer (model 1), the Asian American feeling thermometer (model 2), and two measures of intergroup threat and contact (model 3). All models also include the Latino and Black feeling thermometers, the general xenophobia scale,

and the full set of control variable, including disgust sensitivity---the strongest predictor of infectious disease attitudes (Kam 2019)---and whether the respondent had seen financial damage as a result of the stock market reactions to COVID-19. The third model also includes a control for total population at the zipcode level to remove confounding that might be introduced by living in an urban area with greater population density. We present the key coefficients in Table 1 below.

Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that both the Chinese feeling thermometer (column 1) *and* the Asian American feeling thermometer (column 2) are positively associated with being worried about COVID-19. Xenophobia is also positively correlated with being worried, though importantly, neither the Latino nor Black feeling thermometers are, suggesting that the effect is Asian specific, not general anti-Black attitudes (African Americans) or outgroup animus targeted at another specific group also characterized as foreigners (Latinos).

Our third model uses a different operationalization of attitudes toward Asian Americans, whether the respondent has regular contact with Asian Americans. The first variable picks up daily passive contact with Asian Americans such as "exchanging a few words, or buying something at a store." We expect this measure to proxy individual-level daily exposure to, though not meaningful intergroup contact with Asian Americans, which we expect to be correlated with greater concern (Allport 1954; Enos 2017). The second measure picks up more intimate exposure via friendship with Asian Americans asking if the respondent has, in the last six months, shared a meal with an Asian American. Consistent with Allport (1954), we expect that this contact will be proxying for meaningful intergroup contact which should break down stereotypes and inoculate respondents against xenophobic rhetoric from elites. Consistent with expectations, everyday exposure is associated with greater levels of worry but meaningful, intimate exposure is associated with less concern.

Table 1. Predicting Worry About Coronavirus

	Dependent variable:		
	Worried About Coronavirus		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Chinese FT	0.215***		
	(0.075)		
Asian Am FT		0.378***	0.407***
		(0.090)	(0.092)
Latino FT	0.065	-0.005	0.008
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Black FT	-0.105	-0.183**	-0.171*
	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Passive Contact			0.079***
			(0.017)
Intimate Contact			-0.101**
			(0.042)
Xenophobia	0.235***	0.236***	0.262***
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	4,142	4,142	4,109

Ordered probit regression coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Full table Appendix Table D1.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

We simulate the predicted probability of feeling "very worried" for our key independent variables below in Figure 3. In panel A we show the change in probability of feeling "very worried" moving the xenophobia scale from its lowest to highest observed values (least xenophobic to most xenophobic), holding all other variables at their means. In panels B and C, we do the same but move the Chinese and Asian American feeling thermometers from their lowest to highest observed values (most favorable to least favorable).

We show that the predicted change in probability of feeling "very worried" is similar for all three models. Xenophobia is associated with a 7.8 percentage point increased, the Chinese feeling thermometer with a 7.3 percentage point increase, and the Asian American feeling thermometer with a 12.9 percentage point increase, about a quarter of a standard deviation shift. This last finding suggests that while anti-Chinese specific animus is associated with being worried, consistent with expectations given elite rhetoric, the predicted change is greatest for the Asian American feeling thermometer. This suggests that anti-Chinese sentiment alone is not driving responses to the crisis but rather broader anti-Asian American sentiment. As such, from this

point forward we will use the general Asian American favorability question as a main independent variable.

The substantive relationship between contextual threat and impact is slightly smaller but no less meaningful. Moving from no daily passive contact to daily passive contact with Asian Americans is associated with a 10.3 percentage point increase in feeling "very worried" (95% CI: [5.87,14.60]). Moving from no intimate contact with Asian Americans to intimate contact is associated with a 3.3 percentage point decrease in feeling "very worried" (95% CI: [-5.82,-0.50]).

Figure 3. Outgroup Affect and Concern over Coronavirus



Note: Lines are predicted probability of being "very worried" about coronavirus moving from min to max on each independent variable (Panel A: low xenophobia to high xenophobia; Panel B: high Chinese favorability to low Chinese favorability; Panel C: high Asian American favorability to low Asian American favorability) while holding all other variables at their means. Ribbons indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression table in Appendix Table D1.

Coronavirus-Linked Behaviors

Next we use a logistic regression to estimate the relationship between two sets of predictors---worrying about COVID-19 and attitudes toward Asian Americans---and a series of behavioral outcomes that respondents indicate they have taken to reduce the spread of coronavirus. Results are displayed in Table 2. In the first column we estimate the most xenophobic outcome, that the respondent is staying away from foreigners. This outcome is consistent with media reports of Americans avoiding Chinese restaurants and Chinatowns in the early days of the outbreak. The other three outcomes---changing travel, changing usual behaviors, and working from home---are less racially-charged, thus serving as useful placebos.

We find, as expected and consistent with hypothesis 2, that being worried about the coronavirus has a strong, positive relationship with all four behavioral outcomes. Key to our theory, however,

is the finding that attitudes toward Asian Americans are positively associated with specifically staying away from foreigners, less precisely associated with changing travel plans ($p<0.10$), and is not associated with changing usual behavior or working from home. Further, we find that staying away from foreigners, while strongly predicted by underlying xenophobia, is not picking up general anti-immigrant sentiment, as attitudes toward Latinos do not predict this behavior, and is fact negatively correlated with the outcome.

Table 2. Behavioral Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Stay Away Foreigners	Changed Travel	Changed Behavior	Worked from Home
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corona Worry	0.691***	0.739***	0.949***	0.617***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Asian Am FT	0.708***	0.334*	0.083	0.151
	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Latino FT	-0.324*	-0.171	0.025	-0.024
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Black FT	0.479***	0.285	0.051	0.258
	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.185)	(0.186)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	4,047	4,047	4,047	4,047

Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Full table in Appendix D2.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

To illustrate the magnitude of the substantive relationships between each of the independent variables and each outcome, we plot the changes in predicted probability of engaging in each behavior moving each of the independent variables from their observed minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at their means (Figure 4). On the left, we display changes in the probability of engaging in each behavior conditional on corona worry (least to most). On the right we do the same but for the Asian American favorability (highest to lowest, green circles) and Latino favorability (highest to lowest, orange diamonds).

Perhaps not surprisingly, the relationship between being worried about the coronavirus and engaging in social distancing behaviors is substantively large, ranging from an increase of 33 percentage points for working from home to 58 percentage points for changing some usual behavior. Notably we find that the magnitude of the relationship between Asian American attitudes and the most racialized outcome---staying away from foreigners---is the strongest. Those with the most unfavorable attitudes toward Asian Americans are over 16 percentage points more likely to report staying away from foreigners, about a third of a standard deviation shift. As noted above, anti-Latino attitudes appear to have no statistically significant relationship with any of the reported behaviors and indeed the point estimate is often negative.

Figure 4. Behavioral Outcomes



Note: Points are changes in predicted probability engaging in each behavior moving from minimum to maximum observed values on each independent variable (Panel A: least to most worried; Panel B: highest to lowest Asian American and Latino favorability) while holding all other variables at their means. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression table in Appendix Table D2.

Another racialized behavior linked to the spread of the coronavirus is the avoidance of certain spaces associated with Asian Americans like Chinese restaurants. As aforementioned, there is anecdotal evidence that in the early stages of the pandemic urban Chinatowns were empty and Chinese restaurants struggled to stay afloat with plummeting business. Our survey question on restaurant preferences aims to replicate this avoidance behavior in a survey setting by comparing restaurant preference pairs across underlying levels of worry about the coronavirus. The hypothesis is that if concern about coronavirus is partially fused with anti-Chinese animus, then concern should predict avoidance of Chinese food restaurants relative to other non-Chinese restaurants. We chose a few restaurants and cuisines associated with foreignness---Thai, Moroccan, and Indian---that allow us to control for general aversion to food or spaces associated with immigrant groups. We included French to have a European comparison. Each outcome is a scale ranging from strong preference for going to a Chinese restaurant on the lower end (-3) to strong preference for going to the other type of restaurant on the upper end (+3). We use ordinary least squares regression for these models and report results in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Restaurant Preferences

	Dependent variable:			
	Thai>Chinese	Moroccan>Chinese	French>Chinese	Indian>Chinese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corona Worry	0.071***	0.040**	0.081***	0.051**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Asian Am FT	0.093	0.440***	0.354***	0.376***
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Latino FT	0.098	0.010	-0.019	0.010
	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Black FT	0.015	-0.179*	-0.074	-0.111
	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	4,014	4,006	4,016	4,016

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Full table Appendix D4.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These models offer additional evidence in favor of avoidance behavior in response to coronavirus and in support of hypothesis 2. We show across all four models that being worried about the coronavirus is associated with a preference for Thai (column 1), Moroccan (column 2), French (column 3), and Indian (column 4) over Chinese among those who are most worried. It's notable that the results hold even with the Thai, Moroccan, and Indian pairings, three cuisines that could be seen as relatively "foreign" to the average American palette, suggesting that this is not an aversion to "exotic food" more broadly among those who are worried but rather a Chinese restaurant specific aversion. In other words, those who are most worried want to avoid Chinese spaces but not necessarily spaces with other "foreigners." Notably, the Asian American feeling thermometer is not predictive of differences in the Thai>Chinese pairing, given that both are eastern/southeastern Asian cuisines, but not for the other cuisines (while Indian is South Asian, it may be the case that the mental image of the prototypical Asian American in the United States is not South Asian). We show in Figure 5 that the magnitude of these effects is not huge, ranging between 0.12 and 0.23 points on a 7-pt scale, but larger than the average difference in preferences for each restaurant pairing between Republicans and Democrats (mean difference=0.09).

Figure 5. Restaurant Preferences



Note: Points are changes in predicted scale of preferring each restaurant over a Chinese restaurant moving worry about coronavirus from its minimum to maximum observed values on each independent while holding all other variables at their means. Ribbons indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression table in Appendix Table D4.

Coronavirus Policy Attitudes

Finally, we estimated the same model using a series of policy preference outcomes. Two of these outcomes are Asian specific (reducing visas to Asian immigrants and mandatory quarantines for all Asians coming into the U.S.), one is a non-group specific but extreme coronavirus measure (closing down all U.S. borders), and two placebos that are associated with strong anti-immigrant or xenophobic attitudes but should not be related to coronavirus concerns (building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border and increasing deportations of undocumented immigrants). Results are presented in Table 4.

Consistent with our third hypothesis, we find that worrying about the coronavirus and general Asian American affect are positively correlated with each of the racialized or general coronavirus policy issues, each of which were more extreme than anything being proposed by infectious disease specialists[15] (columns 1 to 3), but *not* predictive of support for non-coronavirus but immigration-related policies (columns 4 and 5), offering further evidence that coronavirus specific rhetoric has thoroughly racialized the pandemic in the United States but is not simply being driven by general xenophobia or anti-immigrant attitudes.

[15] In fact many experts have argued in the past and were arguing in the early stages of this pandemic that mass travel restrictions were not only ineffective but could be counterproductive. See: https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/12/14-135590.pdf and https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/fearpoliticsebola.pdf

Table 4. Policy Preferences

	Dependent variable:				
	Reduce Asian Visas	Mandatory Quarantines	Shut Down Border	Build Wall US-Mexico	Increase Deportations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Corona Worry	0.063***	0.146***	0.171***	-0.001	-0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Asian Am FT	0.491***	0.345***	0.252***	-0.249**	-0.203**
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Latino FT	0.087	-0.241**	-0.099	0.317***	0.321***
	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Black FT	0.037	0.103	-0.103	-0.022	-0.083
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.094)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	4,142	4,142	4,142	4,142	4,142

Ordered probit regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

For ease of interpretation we plot the change in probability of strongly supporting each of these policies moving each independent variable from its minimum to its maximum while holding all other variables at their means in Figure 6. On the left we show that the magnitude of the relationship between being worried and the first outcome, reducing Asian visas, is quite modest, at 4.5 percentage points. The magnitude of the relationship grows with the other two measures. Moving worry from its minimum to maximum observed values is associated with a 16.7 percentage point increase in strongly supporting mandatory quarantines for Asian travelers and 19.8 percentage point increase in strongly supporting shutting down borders to all foreign travelers. Perhaps it isn't surprising, however, that concern over coronavirus is predictive of even radical and racialized policy proposals. A better test of the othering hypothesis is to examine the relationship between anti-Asian animus and these outcomes, controlling for concern about the coronavirus.

In panel B we show similar substantive effects from these models. Moving Asian American favorability from most to least is associated with 13.1, 13.5, and 10.1 percentage point increase in strongly supporting reducing Asian visas, mandatory quarantines, and shutting down all borders, respectfully, about a third to a fifth of standard deviation shifts, but negatively associated with placebo outcomes. Additional evidence that attitudes toward Asian Americans were being linked to support for fairly extreme policy proposals at this time.

Figure 6. Policy Outcomes



Note: Points are changes in predicted probability of strongly supporting each policy moving from minimum to maximum observed values on each independent variable (Panel A: least to most worried; Panel B: highest to lowest Asian American and Latino favorability) while holding all other variables at their means. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Dotted lines indicated placebo outcomes. Full regression table in Appendix Table D3.

Political Attention and Linking Asian Attitudes to Politics

If the linking of Asian American attitudes and coronavirus-specific outcomes is being driven by elite rhetoric, we should expect that individuals who feel unfavorable toward Asian Americans and pay attention to politics and the news are more likely to link these attitudes to each set of outcomes, all else being equal.

To test this, we run the same fully-specified models above but this time interacting our 4-pt political interest variable with our key independent variables of interest. As shown in Figure 7, and consistent with expectations, we find that the relationship between our key independent variables and each outcome strengthens for those who pay more attention to politics relative to those who do not, across the board. While these suggestive results are by no means definitive evidence that the effect is being driven by elite rhetoric, communications and public opinion scholars generally accept that the most politically attentive are most likely to receive and process elite messaging (Zaller 1992).[16]

[16] While we suspect that the process of linking group attitudes to political objects occurs regardless of the partisanship of the recipient of these messages, it may be the case that the "dosage" of rhetoric linking Asians to coronavirus is

Figure 7. Moderation Effect of Political Interest



Note: Points are changes in predicted probability for each outcome moving from minimum to maximum observed values on each independent variable for each level of political attention while holding all other variables at their means. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. IV for Model 1, 2, and 4 is Asian American feeling thermometer. IV for Model 3 is worry.

Endogeneity

One concern may be that Asian favorability is itself endogenous to worrying about coronavirus. It may be the case that as the pandemic increasingly impacts the lives of Americans and elites continue to racialize it as an Asian virus, attitudes toward Asians have themselves soured. We don't have the ability to tease this out with our dataset but we have reason to believe that it isn't a concern. Extant research suggests that outgroup attitudes are extremely crystallized and stable,

higher among Republicans, resulting in a stronger relationship between anti-Asian animus and outcomes in these models. We find little evidence of this. In Appendix Tables D5 through D8 we should that the relationships between worry, anti-Asian animus, and our outcomes of interest are similar for both Democrats and Republicans.

particularly in the short run (Tesler 2015; Henry and Sears 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Recent work examining President Trump's 2016 presidential campaign finds that Trump didn't increase anti-immigrant attitudes in the U.S. but rather activated attitudes that preceded his rise (Sides, Vavreck, and Tesler 2018) and emboldening racial conservatives to themselves voice and act on their pre-existing racial prejudice (Newman et al. 2020). In fact evidence from panel data suggests that a very gradual drop in prejudice toward African Americans and Latinos may be occurring during Trump's presidency, though it's difficult to understand the extent to which Trump himself is responsible for these changes, with the authors hypothesizing that the drop was due more to a thermostatic response to policy and not elite rhetoric (Hopkins and Washington 2019). Work looking at immigration attitudes cross-nationally finds similar conclusions that elite rhetoric activates rather than moves attitudes (Kustov, Laaker, and Reller 2019). This literature is all consistent with experiments that have failed to move immigration attitudes with racialized infectious disease primes (Navarrete and Fessler 2006; Adida et al. 2018).

One way to further check if Asian American attitudes were stable leading up to the outbreak of coronavirus in the U.S. and the fielding of this survey is to look at these attitudes overtime in a repeated cross-sectional survey. In Figure 8 we plot the weighted proportion of respondents in the U.S. who feel either "somewhat" or "very" unfavorable toward Asian Americans in weekly Nationscape data in the months leading up to the viral pandemic and our data collection efforts.[17] We can see that there were no meaningful changes in aggregate anti-Asian attitudes over this time period. In sum, it might be possible that attitudes toward immigrants more broadly and Asian Americans specifically may shift meaningfully in the long run as a consequence of the coronavirus, but there is little evidence that they were changing in the early days of the viral pandemic when we collected our data.

Figure 8. Anti-Asian Animus during Coronavirus Pandemic



Note: Points indicate weighted percentage of respondents in the U.S. who indicated that they field "somewhat" or "very" unfavorable toward Asian Americans from mid-November 2019 to

[17] The Nationscape Survey is a weekly survey of ~6,250 adults in the U.S. conducted by the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group in partnership with researchers at UCLA and using Lucid data (Tausanovitch and Vavreck 2020). For more details on the study and sample, see https://www.voterstudygroup.org/nationscape.

March 15, 2020 with 95% confidence ribbons. Data from Nationscape Survey. Lines indicate key milestones in the coronavirus pandemic and the field date of this study.

Conclusion and Discussion

Donald Trump rose to power partially by tapping into a deep vein of white racial grievance and nostalgia, scapegoating foreigners and immigrants for America's ills (Sides, Vavreck, and Tesler 2018; Jardina 2019; Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2017; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019). It's perhaps no surprise, then, that Trump and his allies in conservative media would jump on the chance to racialize the coronavirus as a Chinese---or more broadly Asian---threat. Part of this is simply Trump's political instinct. He knows that racial dog whistles or bull horns are distracting. Democratic elites and activists are quick to expose any racially divisive politics and the media quick to cover it, allowing Trump to shift the narrative away from criticism of his administration's management of the crisis in its early days while returning to a political message that he sees as crucial to his political support.[18]

And yet we also know that these words matter. Elites have long sought to shape public opinion by linking political issues to group attitudes (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Mendelberg 2001) which tend to be strongly held and emotionally charged (Henry and Sears 2009; Tesler 2015). When Donald Trump demonizes marginalized groups he not only primes attitudes toward those groups but also, over time, emboldens the most racially conservative members of society to more openly express and act on their prejudices (Newman et al. 2020; Schaffner 2018).

In the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic, we suspected that Trump and other elites' frequent linking of the infectious disease to China and the Chinese would similarly activate anti-Asian attitudes, shaping how the mass public reacted emotionally, behaviorally, and attitudinally to the pandemic. And yet, there is little rigorous empirical evidence that prejudice toward groups---what scholars call the othering hypothesis---meaningfully influences attitudes toward racialized infectious disease, even when that disease clearly emerges from a specific global region like Ebola and Africa. Instead, researchers point to the behavioral immune system, a psychological response that elicits emotions like disgust to protect us from dangerous pathogens, as the primary driver of attitudes in this domain (Kam 2019).

Nevertheless, we find evidence that anti-Asian attitudes are associated with both concern about the disease but also with xenophobic behaviors and policy preferences. These relationships are unique to Asian American attitudes, do not emerge when examining attitudes toward other outgroups, and do not hold for a variety of behavioral and policy attitude placebo outcomes.

Scholars can build on these findings in a number of ways. First, future research could attempt to replicate these findings by examining survey data and elite rhetoric on other racialized infectious disease epidemics in the recent past like SARS in the early aughts. Second, researchers could leverage survey experiments and panel data to get better causal leverage on the relationship between anti-Asian prejudice and pandemic-related attitudes. One approach might be to assess whether racialized pandemic primes change pandemic attitudes conditional on pre-treatment

[18] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/trumps-chinese-virus-tweet/608263/

levels of prejudice toward the group. Third, research could examine the behavioral consequences of anti-Asian prejudice during the pandemic by examining, for example, differential shifts in human traffic to Asian enclaves during early stages of the pandemic or by priming anti-Asian attitudes and measuring biased behavioral outcomes in a lab setting. Fourth, while Chinese and Asian communities bore the brunt of the blame at the outset of the pandemic, attention eventually shifted domestically to non-white residents in cities or communities with higher infection rates. Public opinion may be shifting from blaming Chinese and Asian Americans, to now seeing black people or Latinos as carriers of the virus and therefore public health dangers (Gonzales-O'Brien 2018). Future research, especially re-contact panel studies should assess how, when, and why othering could shift during a pandemic.

Finally, we also call on researchers to continue to examine the impact that this spike in anti-Asian xenophobia is having on Asian Americans---their physical safety, mental health, perceptions of belonging, and political attitudes and behaviors. Further, they should take advantage of these opportunities to interrogate the call to respectability politics (Higginbotham 1993; Jefferson 2019) that almost always follow spikes in racist attacks on minority groups in the United States. In early April 2020, ex-Democratic Presidential candidate Andrew Yang called on Asian Americans to fight racist attacks by embracing and showing "American-ness in ways [they] never have before,"[19] as if Asian Americans are responsible for hate crimes against their communities. If history is any guide, cultural assimilation and intellectual prowess are no protection from racism in a society where racism is deeply rooted in its core institutions.

[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/andrew-yang-coronavirus-discrimination/

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Appendix A: Instrument

Let's start with a few basic demographic questions:

[Q]. In order to get a representative sample of everyone, please indicate your race or ethnicity? [ALLOW MULTIPLE]

White, not-Hispanic 1
Hispanic or Latino 2
Black or African American 3
Asian American 4
Middle Eastern or Arab 5
American Indian/Native American 6
Other [SPECIFY] 7

[Q]. [IF MULTIPLE ON Q] And what do you consider your PRIMARY race or ethnicity?

White, not-Hispanic 1
Hispanic or Latino 2
Black or African American 3
Asian American 4
Middle Eastern or Arab 5
American Indian/Native American 6
Other [SPECIFY] 7

[Q]. Please indicate your current gender

Woman 1
Man 2
Other [OPEN RESPONSE] 3

[Q]. In what year were you born?

— — — —

[Q]. In general, how would you describe your political viewpoint?

Very liberal 1
Liberal 2
Moderate 3
Conservative 4
Very conservative 5
Don't Know 6

[Q]. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Grades 1 - 8 1
Some high school 2
High school graduate or GED 3
Some college 4
Associates / 2-year college graduate 5
Bachelors / 4-year college graduate 6
Post-graduate degree 7

[Q]. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?

Republican 1
Democrat 2
Independent 3
Something else 4

[Q]. [IF Q==1/2] Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?

Strong Democrat/Republican 1
Not very strong Democrat/Republican 2

[Q]. [IF Q==3/4] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

Closer to Democratic Party 1
Closer to Republican Party 2
Neither 3

GROUP AFFECT

We would like to get your feelings toward some groups in society. We will show the name of a group and we'd like you to rate that group on a scale of 1 (very cool toward the group) to 7 (very warm toward the group). How would you rate the following?

Q. Latinos
Q. Asian Americans
Q. African Americans
Q. People from China

Very cool 1
..... 2
..... 3
..... 4
..... 5
..... 6
Very warm 7

POLICY ATTITUDES

Now thinking about the issue of immigration to the U.S., please indicate how strongly you agree with the following policy proposals [RANDOMIZE ORDER]

Q. Increase deportations of immigrants currently in the country illegally.
Q. Build a wall along the entire U.S.-Mexico border.
Q. Reduce the number of H1B high-skilled visas from Asia.
Q. Require a mandatory quarantine of all travelers from Asia.
Q. Shut down borders entirely until Coronavirus is under control.

Strongly support 1
Somewhat support 2
Somewhat oppose 3
Strongly oppose 4

XENOPHOBIA

Next you're going to read a series of statements. Please indicate how strongly do you agree with each.

Q. "I like interacting with immigrants and learning about their culture."
Q. "With increased immigration, I fear that our way of life will change for the worse."
Q. "I am afraid that our own culture will be lost with an increase in immigration."
Q. "I doubt that immigrants will put the interest of this country first."
Q. "Immigration in this country is out of control."
Q. "Immigrants have always made important contributions to America"

Strongly agree 1
Somewhat agree 2
Somewhat disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4

COVID-19

Q. How worried are you about you or someone in your family being infected with the Coronavirus?

Very worried 1
Somewhat worried 2
Not very worried 3
Not at all worried 4

CORONA PRECAUTIONS

Have you done any of the following things to prevent the spread of coronavirus?

Q. Changed travel plans.
Q. Worked from home instead of going to your usual place of work.
Q. Changed any usual behavior.
Q. Kept away from foreigners.

Yes 1
No 2

DISGUST SENSITIVITY

The following items describe a variety of concepts. Please rate how disgusting you find the concepts described in the items, where 1 means that you do not find the concept disgusting at all and 7 means that you find the concept extremely disgusting.

Q1. Stepping on dog poop.
Q2. Standing close to a person who has body odor.
Q3. Seeing some mold on old leftovers in the refrigerator.
Q4. Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms.
Q5. Accidentally touching a person's bloody cut.
Q6. Seeing a cockroach run across the floor.
Q7. Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm.

Not at all disgusting..... 1
..... 2
..... 3
..... 4
..... 5
..... 6
Extremely disgusting..... 7

CONTACT

How often, if at all, do you have everyday relationships with people from the following groups, such as exchanging a few words, or buying something at a store, and so on:

Q. Asians /Asian Americans
Q. Latinos / Hispanics
Q. Blacks / African Americans
Q. Whites
Q. Republicans
Q. Democrats
Q. Gays / Lesbians

Every day 1
Often 2
Sometimes..... 3

Rarely 4
Never 5

In the last six months, have you shared a meal in your home with someone from the following groups:

Q. Asians /Asian Americans
Q. Latinos / Hispanics
Q. Blacks / African Americans
Q. Whites
Q. Republicans
Q. Democrats
Q. Gays / Lesbians

Yes 1
No 2

STOCK MARKET

Q. Given the recent drops in the stock market, which statement comes closest to describing how you have or have not been personally impacted by these drops?

I have been severely personally impacted 1
I have been moderately personally impacted 2
I haven't been personally impacted yet but am seriously concerned that I might be 3
These events are concerning but I don't think they will impact me personally 4
I am not at all concerned 5

OTHER

Q. Some people follow what's going on in government most of time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on…

Most of the time 1
Some of the time 2
Only now and then 3
Hardly at all 4

Q. Now for something a bit different. If you were to go out to eat at a restaurant with friends and family today or tomorrow and you have access to any of the following cuisines, how likely is it that you would choose each of the following: [PRESENT IN GRID, RANOMDIZE]

Q. Chinese

Q. French
Q. Indian
Q. Thai
Q. Moroccan

Very likely 1
Somewhat likely 2
Not very likely 3
Not at all likely 4

ADDITIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS

Now we have a few more demographic questions. Like the rest of your responses, these questions are completely confidential. They will only be used to help classify responses.

[Q]. What was your total combined household income in 2018 before taxes?

Less than $20,000 1
$20,000 to $29,999 2
$30,000 to $39,999 3
$40,000 to $49,999 4
$50,000 to $59,999 5
$60,000 to $69,999 6
$70,000 to $79,999 7
$80,000 to $89,999 8
$90,000 to $99,999 9
$100,000 to $149,999 10
$150,000 to $199,999 11
$200,000 or more 12

Appendix B. Survey Details

We collected our data from the Lucid Marketplace. Lucid is an automated marketplace that connects researchers with respondents from a variety of network survey panel companies. Many of these are double opt-in panels where respondents are invited to partake in research via emails, push notifications, in-app pop-ups, or other means. Respondents are incentivized in a variety of ways depending on the supplier.

Lucid takes a variety of steps to increase quality of respondents from these survey panel providers including: 1) blocking users from taking surveys multiple times via cookies, IP addresses, or other unique identifiers; 2) screen the quality of respondents through attention check questions and open-ended questions; 3) using third party bot detection services like Google's reCaptcha to block bots; and 4) publish and provide information on the quality of all their data suppliers.

We weighted the survey data to be representative of the American population. We use a simple raking technique (Mercer et. al 2018). The targets for the weights are derived from the 2013-2018 American Community Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau. We weight on age, gender, region, education, and race. Our weights range from 0.52 to 4.76.

As with most contemporary social science surveys, our procedures yield a convenience sample that relies on modeling decisions to ensure that our sample looks like the national population. We do not have a random sample of the U.S. population. Nevertheless, existing research finds Lucid samples to be of high quality (Coppock and Green 2016; Coppock and McClellan 2019), and when properly weighted, provide samples that are similar in quality to respected survey respondent panels like Pew's American Trends Panel (Tausanovitch et al. 2019).

	Unweighted Means	Weighted Means
White	72.9%	66.8%
Black	7.5%	13.5%
Other	19.6%	19.6%
Female	59.9%	49.4%
Age 18-22	6.8%	6.9%
Age 23-29	12.2%	12.5%
Age 30-39	21.2%	22.3%
Age 40-49	18.2%	19.1%
Age 50-59	16.2%	15.4%
Age 60-69	15.7%	14.8%
Age 70-99	9.5%	8.9%
College Education	28.7%	32.3%
Democrat (w/ leaners)	47.1%	45.6%
Republican	36.6%	39.4%

Appendix C. Variables: Means, Ranges, and Scale Construction

Variable	Weighted Mean	Min	Max
Stay Away Foreigners	0.37	0	1
Changed Travel Plans	0.39	0	1
Changed Behaviors	0.48	0	1
Worked from Home	0.32	0	1
Reduce Asian Visas	2.52	1	4
Mandatory Quarantine	3.09	1	4
Shut Down All Borders	3.11	1	4
Build Wall U.S.-Mexico	2.50	1	4
Increase Deportations	2.76	1	4
Thai Over Chinese	-0.56	-3	3
French Over Chinese	-0.50	-3	3
Moroccan Over Chinese	-0.87	-3	3
Indian Over Chinese	-0.73	-3	3
Corona Worry	2.87	1	4
Chinese FT	0.38	0	1
Asian American FT	0.32	0	1
Latino FT	0.32	0	1
Black FT	0.30	0	1
Passive Contact	3.15	1	5
Intimate Contact	0.33	0	1
Xenophobia Scale	0.43	0	1
Disgust Sensitivity	0.74	0	1
Political Interest	3.05	1	4
Party ID 7pt (D>R)	3.84	1	7
Female	0.50	0	1
College	0.33	0	1
Age	44.9	18	90
Ideology (L>C)	3.02	1	5
Fam Income	4.68	1	12
White	0.63	0	1
Black	0.12	0	1
Latino	0.13	0	1
Stock Impact	2.68	1	5

Xenophobia Scale

Variable	Weighted Mean	Min	Max
V1. I like interacting with immigrants and learning about their culture	1.98	1	4
V2. With increased immigration, I fear that our way of life will change for the worse (reverse code)	2.40	1	4
V3. I am afraid that our own culture will be lost with an increase in immigration (reverse code)	2.38	1	4
V4. I doubt that immigrants will put the interest of this country first (reverse code)	2.52	1	4
V5. Immigration in this country is out of control (reverse code)	2.64	1	4
V6. Immigrants have always made important contributions to America	1.85	1	4

Our xenophobia scale is an additive index of all six items above (alpha=0.85). Average inter-item correlation is 0.48 with full correlation matrix below. All items load on the same factor.

	V1	**V2**	**V3**	**V4**	**V5**	**V6**
V1	1.00	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.32	0.59
V2	0.32	1.00	0.75	0.65	0.67	0.33
V3	0.33	0.75	1.00	0.65	0.67	0.35
V4	0.34	0.65	0.65	1.00	0.63	0.35
V5	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.63	1.00	0.32
V6	0.59	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.32	1.00

Disgust Sensitivity Scale

Variable	Weighted Mean	Min	Max
V1. Stepping on dog poop	5.84	1	7
V2. Standing close to a person who has body odor	5.61	1	7
V3. Seeing some mold on old leftovers in the refrigerator	5.31	1	7
V4. Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms	5.07	1	7
V5. Accidentally touching a person's bloody cut	5.50	1	7
V6. Seeing a cockroach run across the floor	5.38	1	7
V7. Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm	4.93	1	7

Our xenophobia scale is an additive index of all six items above (alpha=0.84). Average inter-item correlation is 0.43 with full correlation matrix below. All items load highly on the same factor.

	V1	**V2**	**V3**	**V4**	**V5**	**V6**	**V7**
V1	1.00	0.48	0.45	0.42	0.40	0.45	0.34
V2	0.48	1.00	0.43	0.53	0.43	0.42	0.47
V3	0.45	0.43	1.00	0.38	0.39	0.47	0.35
V4	0.42	0.53	0.38	1.00	0.51	0.38	0.50
V5	0.40	0.43	0.39	0.51	1.00	0.39	0.47
V6	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.38	0.39	1.00	0.36
V7	0.34	0.47	0.35	0.50	0.47	0.36	1.00

Appendix D: Regression Tables

Table D1. Worried About Coronavirus

	Dependent variable:		
	Worried About Coronavirus		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Chinese FT	0.215***		
	(0.075)		
Asian Am FT		0.378***	0.407***
		(0.090)	(0.092)
Latino FT	0.065	-0.005	0.008
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Black FT	-0.105	-0.183**	-0.171*
	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Passive Contact			0.079***
			(0.017)
Intimate Contact			-0.101**
			(0.042)
Xenophobia	0.235***	0.236***	0.262***
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Disgust Sensitivity	0.711***	0.719***	0.758***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Pol Interest	0.130***	0.132***	0.131***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Party ID (R)	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.042***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Female	0.060*	0.058	0.053
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
College	0.012	0.009	0.008
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Age	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.152***	-0.150***	-0.144***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Fam Income	0.005	0.005	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White	0.008	0.012	0.016
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Stock Impact	0.165***	0.167***	0.164***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Pop Density			0.002**
			(0.001)
Observations	4,142	4,142	4,109

Ordered probit regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D2. Behavioral Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Stay Away Foreigners	Changed Travel	Changed Behavior	Worked from Home
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corona Worry	0.691***	0.739***	0.949***	0.617***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Asian Am FT	0.708***	0.334*	0.083	0.151
	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Latino FT	-0.324*	-0.171	0.025	-0.024
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Black FT	0.479***	0.285	0.051	0.258
	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.185)	(0.186)
Xenophobia	2.545***	0.372**	0.026	0.770***
	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.172)
Disgust Sensitivity	1.075***	0.827***	0.643***	0.613***
	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.190)
Pol Interest	0.091**	0.228***	0.263***	0.177***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Party ID (R)	0.011	-0.018	0.015	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Female	-0.177**	-0.220***	0.079	-0.048
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.076)
College	0.153*	0.311***	0.249***	0.431***
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Age	-0.014***	-0.017***	-0.007***	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.050	-0.024	-0.016	-0.132***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Fam Income	0.012	0.068***	0.056***	0.051***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
White	-0.375***	-0.586***	-0.483***	-0.546***
	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Black	-0.152	-0.318**	-0.459***	-0.257*
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.146)
Hispanic	0.071	-0.267*	-0.127	-0.276**
	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.140)
Constant	-4.094***	-3.204***	-3.880***	-2.700***
	(0.277)	(0.265)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Observations	4,047	4,047	4,047	4,047

Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D3. Policy Attitudes

	Dependent variable:				
	Reduce Asian Visas	Mandatory Quarantines	Shut Down Border	Build Wall US-Mexico	Increase Deportations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Corona Worry	0.063***	0.146***	0.171***	-0.001	-0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Asian Am FT	0.491***	0.345***	0.252***	-0.249**	-0.203**
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Latino FT	0.087	-0.241**	-0.099	0.317***	0.321***
	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Black FT	0.037	0.103	-0.103	-0.022	-0.083
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.094)
Xenophobia	1.908***	1.160***	1.281***	2.913***	2.671***
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Disgust Sensitivity	0.437***	0.828***	0.691***	0.284***	0.273***
	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.092)
Pol Interest	0.018	0.055***	0.039**	0.087***	0.060***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Party ID (R)	0.036***	0.023**	0.033***	0.170***	0.065***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female	-0.048	0.115***	0.176***	-0.135***	-0.108***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)
College	-0.046	-0.127***	-0.198***	-0.070	-0.042
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Age	-0.003***	0.004***	0.001	0.004***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.005	0.090***	0.078***	0.163***	0.148***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Fam Income	0.015**	0.008	0.011*	0.007	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White	-0.062	-0.029	-0.028	-0.022	0.003
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Black	0.076	-0.105	-0.014	0.031	-0.053
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.073)
Hispanic	0.092	0.022	-0.038	0.086	-0.104
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.071)
Observations	4,142	4,142	4,142	4,142	4,142

Ordered probit regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001

Table D4. Restaurant Preferences

	Dependent variable:			
	Thai>Chinese	Moroccan>Chinese	French>Chinese	Indian>Chinese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corona Worry	0.075***	0.041**	0.076***	0.054***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Asian Am FT	0.090	0.439***	0.357***	0.374***
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Latino FT	0.097	0.009	-0.016	0.009
	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Black FT	0.007	-0.182*	-0.065	-0.116
	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Xenophobia	-0.119	0.241***	0.346***	0.147*
	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.088)
Disgust Sensitivity	-0.141	-0.048	0.172*	-0.095
	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Pol Interest	0.008	0.019	0.009	0.051**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Party ID (R)	0.009	0.018*	0.010	0.020**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female	-0.211***	-0.261***	-0.187***	-0.211***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
College	0.227***	0.187***	0.167***	0.209***
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Age	-0.006***	-0.009***	-0.004***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.065***	-0.107***	-0.072***	-0.112***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Fam Income	0.025***	0.015**	0.008	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White	-0.202***	-0.091	0.023	-0.197***
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Black	0.052	0.183**	0.241***	0.109
	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Hispanic	-0.151**	-0.095	0.027	-0.233***
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Constant	-0.229*	-0.513***	-0.781***	-0.307**
	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.133)
Observations	4,014	4,006	4,016	4,016

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D6. Worry by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:	
	Worried About Coronavirus	
	(D)	(R)
Asian Am FT	0.337**	0.297**
	(0.139)	(0.138)
Latino FT	-0.146	0.052
	(0.141)	(0.136)
Black FT	-0.232*	-0.028
	(0.136)	(0.141)
Xenophobia	0.313***	0.089
	(0.120)	(0.138)
Disgust Sensitivity	0.796***	0.801***
	(0.135)	(0.137)
Pol Interest	0.211***	0.084**
	(0.031)	(0.034)
Female	0.053	0.034
	(0.053)	(0.057)
College	-0.087	0.067
	(0.059)	(0.065)
Age	-0.004**	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.020	-0.262***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Fam Income	0.018**	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.010)
White	-0.058	0.207***
	(0.055)	(0.068)
Stock Damage	0.128***	0.206***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Observations	1,906	1,641

Ordered probit regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D7. Behavior by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:	
	Stay Away Foreigners	
	(D)	(R)
Corona Worry	0.559***	0.730***
	(0.068)	(0.065)
Asian Am FT	0.519*	0.723**
	(0.277)	(0.284)
Latino FT	-0.175	-0.316
	(0.281)	(0.283)
Black FT	0.535*	0.275
	(0.276)	(0.291)
Xenophobia	2.961***	2.189***
	(0.255)	(0.302)
Disgust Sensitivity	1.169***	0.968***
	(0.295)	(0.289)
Pol Interest	0.231***	0.087
	(0.066)	(0.072)
Female	-0.031	-0.343***
	(0.113)	(0.121)
College	0.031	0.200
	(0.128)	(0.137)
Age	-0.011***	-0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ideology (Cons)	0.121**	-0.157***
	(0.057)	(0.055)
Fam Income	-0.002	0.027
	(0.018)	(0.019)
White	-0.320***	-0.339**
	(0.116)	(0.143)
Constant	-4.878***	-3.315***
	(0.419)	(0.443)
Observations	1,922	1,501
Log Likelihood	-1,153.733	-954.954
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,335.466	1,937.908

Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D8. Restaurants by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:							
	Thai>Chinese		Moroccan>Chinese		French>Chinese		Indian>Chinese	
	(D)	(R)	(D)	(R)	(D)	(R)	(D)	(R)
Corona Worry	0.036	0.094***	-0.022	0.087***	0.016	0.115***	-0.006	0.092***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Asian Am FT	0.119	0.158	0.345**	0.562***	0.271*	0.363**	0.374**	0.376**
	(0.134)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.160)	(0.148)	(0.156)
Latino FT	0.051	0.198	-0.016	0.106	-0.070	0.195	0.027	0.135
	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.155)
Black FT	-0.068	-0.078	-0.175	-0.350**	-0.013	-0.212	-0.226	-0.188
	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.160)
Xenophobia	0.153	-0.381***	0.644***	-0.191	0.667***	-0.086	0.532***	-0.196
	(0.114)	(0.147)	(0.125)	(0.150)	(0.127)	(0.162)	(0.126)	(0.158)
Disgust Sensitivity	-0.092	-0.109	-0.038	0.029	0.263*	0.143	-0.206	0.059
	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.154)
Pol Interest	0.003	0.060*	0.016	0.062*	0.004	0.050	0.033	0.125***
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Female	0.041	0.069*	0.013	0.148***	-0.007	0.125***	0.022	0.120***
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.043)
College	-0.176***	-0.305***	-0.273***	-0.292***	-0.181***	-0.182***	-0.197***	-0.227***
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.065)
Age	0.246***	0.144**	0.141**	0.212***	0.164**	0.169**	0.223***	0.166**
	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Ideology (Cons)	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.004**	-0.004	-0.008***	-0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fam Income	-0.066**	-0.077***	-0.086***	-0.127***	-0.025	-0.122***	-0.100***	-0.138***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
White	0.020**	0.027***	0.015*	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.004	-0.0004
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Constant	-0.313	-0.730**	-0.538**	-1.227***	-0.919***	-1.280***	-0.196	-1.063***
	(0.195)	(0.304)	(0.214)	(0.310)	(0.217)	(0.337)	(0.214)	(0.327)
Observations	1,911	1,483	1,904	1,483	1,912	1,487	1,912	1,486
R^2	0.059	0.097	0.075	0.120	0.055	0.071	0.069	0.100
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.087	0.067	0.111	0.047	0.061	0.062	0.091

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D9. Policy by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:					
	Reduce Asian Visas		Reduce Asian Visas		Mandatory Quarantines	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corona Worry	0.061**	0.098***	0.217***	0.069**	0.249***	0.092***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Asian Am FT	0.643***	0.397***	0.473***	0.070	0.119	0.410***
	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.141)	(0.152)
Latino FT	0.125	0.137	-0.162	-0.392***	0.003	-0.247*
	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.144)	(0.149)
Black FT	-0.058	0.054	0.017	0.402***	-0.037	-0.121
	(0.135)	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.154)	(0.139)	(0.152)
Xenophobia	2.088***	1.738***	0.815***	1.449***	1.129***	1.239***
	(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.120)	(0.151)	(0.122)	(0.153)
Disgust Sensitivity	0.564***	0.279**	0.808***	0.759***	0.719***	0.474***
	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.145)	(0.137)	(0.146)
Pol Interest	0.023	0.074**	0.006	0.104***	-0.008	0.077**
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.037)
Female	-0.103**	0.080	0.070	0.135**	0.149***	0.188***
	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.062)
College	-0.033	-0.055	-0.156***	-0.081	-0.130**	-0.263***
	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.070)
Age	-0.002	-0.006***	0.003*	0.003*	-0.003	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology (Cons)	0.072***	-0.048*	0.105***	0.049*	0.100***	0.036
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Fam Income	0.001	0.022**	0.007	-0.003	0.009	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
White	-0.065	-0.230***	-0.021	0.037	-0.015	-0.019
	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.055)	(0.072)
Observations	1,906	1,641	1,906	1,641	1,906	1,641

Ordered probit regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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