

Perceived Opposition to Racially Progressive Policies and Negative Affect toward the Republican Party among Democrats

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Abstract

The American public is increasingly affectively polarized. A growing body of research has associated this affective polarization with two key phenomena: ideological polarization and social group sorting. Although there is ample evidence that social group sorting, particularly along racial and ethnic lines, is driving Republicans' affect toward the Democratic Party, it is not clear how it shapes Democrats', particularly White Democrats', feelings toward the predominantly White Republican Party. We propose a third model that bridges these two theoretical approaches, a racial ideology model that helps explain Democrats' feelings toward the Republican Party. Specifically, we argue that Democrats increasingly dislike Republicans because they view them as standing in opposition to racially progressive policies. Using a preregistered conjoint experiment we find that Americans across party lines see Republicans as opposing efforts to reduce racial inequality and that this perception is associated with negative affect toward the Republican Party among both White and non-White Democrats.

A consistent finding in recent research on American political behavior is that Americans are politically divided. An area of particular concern is the increasing tendency of ordinary Americans to view opposing partisans as a stigmatized outgroup. Researchers refer to this phenomenon as affective polarization, and it has been shown to have deleterious social, economic, and political effects (Iyengar et al. 2019).

Although the origins of affective polarization are numerous, two theoretical approaches predominate: the ideology model and the group sorting model. The ideology model proposes that the policy differences between the two parties drive affective polarization. The group sorting model, by contrast, suggests that the compositions of partisan coalitions, particularly the racial compositions, are central factors. The group sorting model helps to explain Republicans' affect towards the Democratic Party, which is increasingly racial and ethnically diverse (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). At the same time, it does not fully explain Democrats'—and especially White Democrats'—negative affect toward the predominantly White Republican Party.

In this research note, we argue that a third approach, a racial ideology model, could bridge these two competing theories and explain negative affect toward the Republican Party among Democrats. Specifically, we argue that Democrats increasingly dislike the Republican Party not necessarily because Republicans are seen as overwhelmingly White, but because they are seen as opposing policies intended to reduce racial inequality. Democrats now perceive supporting such policies as a part of their party's identity: during her 2016 campaign, Hillary Clinton claimed that “ending racial inequality” would be “the mission of her presidency.”¹ Clinton's comment was indicative of coming trends in the Democratic Party. From 2016 to 2024, the Democratic Party drastically and visibly increased its commitment to fighting racial inequality in both rhetoric and policy platforms (Sides, Tausanovitch, and Vavreck 2022; Sides, Tesler, and Griffin 2024). More recently during the 2024 presidential election, Kamala Harris spoke of people “trying to destroy access to opportunity for those who have been left out” in a thinly-veiled reference to Republican politicians.² In response,

White Democratic voters’ racial attitudes and voting behavior have largely followed the same elite trends (Engelhardt 2021; Mikkelsen 2025).

Using a preregistered conjoint survey experiment with a large sample of Americans, we find evidence for a racial-ideology model of affective polarization. Not only is perceived racial ideology a strong dimension of perceptions about contemporary Republicans but these perceptions are consistently associated with negative affect toward the Republican Party among both White and non-White Democrats.

Race, Ideology, or Racial Ideology?

Existing literature offers two central pathways to affective polarization in the mass public. The first model, an ideology model, suggests that ideological and policy-based differences between the two major parties in the United States—on issues like abortion or size of government—explain affective polarization (Fowler et al. 2024; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Myers 2023). An alternative model, a social group sorting model, suggests that animosity toward social—and particularly racial and ethnic—groups that make up modern partisan coalitions is a central driver of affective polarization (Mason 2018; Westwood and Peterson 2022; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022). As the Democratic Party becomes increasingly non-White, attitudes toward groups seen as parts of the Democratic coalition, like Black Americans and Latinos, spill over into affective evaluations of the party itself.

We propose a third pathway that bridges these two theoretical camps and might explain anti-Republican affect among Democrats: a racial ideology model. There is ample evidence of increasing polarization in the United States along the lines of racial ideology. President Obama’s election, subsequent two terms in office, and positioning on issues of race, ethnicity, immigration, and policing increased the salience of race in American politics (Tesler 2016). The image of an increasingly racially progressive Democratic Party and racially conservative Republican Party was brought into even brighter contrast during the 2016 election campaign. Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton took starkly diverging positions on

issues of race, ethnicity, and American identity. Trump has used a “racial bullhorn” in ways not seen in contemporary politics (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek 2018; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019), whereas the Democratic Party has adopted one of the most racially progressive platform in the Democratic Party’s history (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019).

We argue that this increasingly stark divide in the racial ideologies of the two parties—operationalized here as views on the government’s role in addressing racial disparities—is contributing to affective polarization and helps explain Democrats’ negative views of the Republican Party. More specifically, we hypothesize that racial conservatism should be a central component of stereotypes about the Republican Party above and beyond economic conservatism (H1), and that stereotypes of Republicans as racially conservative should be associated with negative affect toward the Republican Party among Democrats (H2). Similar to some existing studies on stereotypes about partisans in the United States (Barber and Pope 2022; Ogura, Miwa, and Iida 2022), we test these hypotheses in a conjoint survey experiment that allows us to disentangle racial conservatism from economic conservatism and racial identity.

Data and Methods

Between June 19 and June 22 of 2023, we fielded an original preregistered conjoint survey experiment using participants from CloudResearch’s Prime Panels.³ While Prime Panels is an opt-in online survey vendor much like Amazon MTurk, the respondents are screened in various ways for quality and have more diverse demographics (Chandler et al. 2019; Douglas, Ewell, and Brauer 2023). The final sample size was 3,109.⁴ Our sample is relatively well matched with the national population on the key demographics: the percentages of females (60%), people aged 65 or above (17%), non-Hispanic Whites (68%), college graduates (40%), and Democrats (46%) are similar to the 2023 benchmarks (US Census and the American

National Election Studies of 51%, 18%, 58%, 34%, and 47% respectively). Full comparisons can be found in Table A1 in Online Appendix.

Before the conjoint task, respondents were asked about their affect toward the Republican Party with answers ranging from 0 = "Strongly dislike" to 10 = "Strongly like." This measure is used as an outcome in our selection-on-observables analysis following the conjoint analysis. The two measures of racial attitudes used as moderators were also measured before the conjoint. These measures include the racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996) and the antiracism battery (LaCosse et al. 2023).

In the conjoint experiment, we presented respondents with hypothetical profiles of rank-and-file supporters of the Republican Party and ask respondents to rate the typicality of each profile: "On a scale 0 to 10, with 0 being extremely nontypical and 10 being extremely typical, how much do you think this person is like a typical Republican?" The typicality formulation has been validated in a recent conjoint study on stereotypes about welfare recipients (Myers, Zhirkov, and Lunz Trujillo 2024). Each respondent was asked to rate the total of 20 profiles. The profiles were described in terms of nine attributes: age, gender, race, education, social class, religiosity, views on the size of government (economic liberalism vs. conservatism), views on racially progressive policies (racial liberalism vs. conservatism), and personal traits. The two attributes of particular interest—views on size of government and views on racial ideology—were both derived from questions asked in the American National Election Study (ANES) and have been frequently used for decades by political scientists as measures of economic ideology and racial ideology, respectively. The list of personality traits were borrowed from a recent conjoint-experimental study on stereotypes about Democrats and Republicans (Myers 2023). See Table 1 for all attributes and value labels.

Values for all attributes were fully and independently randomized with uniform distributions (all values of an attribute have equal probabilities of being presented). The two exceptions were race (White with probability 50% and Black and Hispanic each with probability 25%) and social class (Upper Class with probability 50% and Middle Class and Working

Class each with probability 25%). The order of attributes was randomized between respondents. See Figure A1 in Online Appendix for an example of a conjoint profile as seen by respondents.

Table 1: Conjoint Attributes and Values

Attributes	Values
Age	<i>Younger:</i> 20–39 <i>Older:</i> 40–59
Gender	Male Female
Race	White <i>Non-White:</i> Black, Hispanic
Education	<i>No College:</i> High School, Some College <i>College:</i> 4-Year College Degree, Graduate Degree
Social Class	Upper Class Middle Class, Working Class
Religiosity	Attends Church Regularly Doesn't Attend Church
Views on Government Size (<i>Economic ideology</i>)	<i>Economically conservative:</i> Government Should Provide Fewer Services <i>Economically liberal:</i> Government Should Provide More Services
Views on Racial Equality (<i>Racial ideology</i>)	<i>Racially Liberal:</i> Government Should Help Blacks <i>Racially conservative:</i> Blacks Should Help Themselves
Personal Traits	<i>Positive:</i> Honest, Smart, Open-Minded, Hardworking, Caring, Patriotic, <i>Negative:</i> Dishonest, Ignorant, Close-Minded, Lazy, Selfish, Unpatriotic
Note: Age selected from the specified intervals	

Results

We begin by exploring the contents of beliefs about supporters of the Republican Party by estimating conditional average marginal component effects (AMCEs) by race and partisanship using OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent.⁵ The results are presented in [Figure 1](#).⁶

We find that White Democrats (left panel), non-White Democrats (central panel), and White Republicans (right panel) all have perceptions of a typical Republican Party supporter as being White, religious, and economically conservative.⁷ At the same time, and central to our theory, the perceived opposition to policies aimed at reducing racial equality, our measure of racial conservatism, is stronger than the effects of all other profile attributes among Democrats, particularly non-White Democrats. Focusing on the comparisons between racial and economic ideology, the difference in the two coefficients is relatively small but

statistically significant among White Democrats ($\Delta\beta = 0.24$, $p < .01$), while it is large and highly significant among non-White Democrats ($\Delta\beta = 0.88$, $p < .001$). The same difference is not significant among White Republicans ($\Delta\beta = 0.08$, $p = .34$). The strong perception of non-White Democrats about Republicans' racial conservatism is shared by both Black Democrats and Democrats belonging to other non-White groups (see Figure A6 in Online Appendix). Even among White Republicans, it is as important an attribute as economic ideology.

Analysis by racial attitudes shows similar patterns (see Figures A7 and A8 in Online Appendix). All respondents agree that a typical Republican is White, religious, economically conservative, and racially conservative—but the perception of racial conservatism is stronger among those who are lower in racial resentment or higher in a measure of antiracism. The pattern of stronger perceptions about Republicans' racial conservatism holds when we break down the results by racial attitudes within each of the three subgroups displayed in Figure 1 (see Figures A9 and A10 in Online Appendix).

These results show initial support for the racial-ideology model. While existing research emphasizes the role of social groups, issue positions, and personality traits in partisan stereotypes, we show that *racial ideology* may be particularly important. Racial conservatism is a very strong component of stereotypes about supporters of the Republican Party that rivals or exceeds economic conservatism across all groups in our sample, including Republicans themselves. In short, Americans of all stripes see conservative racial ideology as central to being a Republican.

So far we have shown that racial ideology is an important component of stereotypes about supporters of the Republican Party in the minds of Americans. We find this effect to be particularly pronounced among non-White Democrats but also present among White Democrats, White Republicans, and those low in racial prejudice. However, these analyses do not assess the degree to which different dimensions of beliefs about Republican voters contribute to affective polarization. To do so, we turn to a selection-on-observables approach




Figure 1: The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.

where we predict affect toward the Republican Party with perceptions about typical Republicans measured via individual marginal component effects (IMCEs; Zhirkov 2022) extracted from our conjoint experiment.

Figure 2 presents the results of OLS regression models with and without controls (age, gender, education, income, and ideology) across the same subsets as before.⁸ For White Democrats (left panel), perceptions about both economic and racial conservatism among Republicans predict negative affect toward the Republican Party. For non-White Democrats (central panel), a perception that Republicans are racially conservative is the *only* statistically significant predictor of negative affect toward the Republican Party. Finally, for White Republicans (right panel), viewing co-partisans as economically conservative and or hav-

ing negative personal traits are associated with negative affect (but racial conservatism is not). The latter finding may explain Republican rank-and-file support for President Trump’s sometimes heterodox views regarding government spending. While nearly all groups associate Republicans with racial conservatism, this association predicts negative affect toward the Republican Party only among Democrats, potentially fueling affective polarization.⁹




Figure 2: Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Affect toward the Republican Party
 Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, and ideology.

Analysis by racial attitudes, again, replicates the same patterns (see Figures A15 and A16 in Online Appendix). Perception of Republicans as racially conservative is associated with negative affect toward the Republican Party only among those who are low on racial resentment and/or high on antiracism. For those who hold conservative racial attitudes themselves, these perceptions are inconsequential.

Conclusion

Americans are increasingly affectively polarized across party lines, and animosity toward racial and ethnic groups usually associated with the Democratic Party likely explains some of Republicans’ negative affect toward Democrats. But what drives negative affect toward the Republican Party among Democrats, especially White Democrats? Combining insights from two popular theories of affective polarization—the ideology model and the group sorting model—we advance an argument that bridges these existing approaches. Specifically, we argue that Democrats increasingly dislike the Republican Party not because they see Republicans as overwhelmingly White. Instead, this antipathy is fueled by Democrats’ perception of Republicans as opposing policies aimed at reducing racial inequality.

We test this argument in an original preregistered conjoint survey experiment on a large sample of Americans. We find consistent evidence that Americans indeed perceive typical Republicans to oppose policies aimed at reducing racial inequality. We also show that this perception contributes to negative affect toward the Republican Party among both White and non-White Democrats.

In agreement with the ideology model, we find that ideological stereotypes about the Republican Party (economic and racial conservatism) are generally stronger than group-based ones (being White and religious). Ideological stereotypes are also more strongly associated with affect toward the Republican Party. At the same time, we find interesting differences in the effects of stereotypes across racial (economic vs. racial conservatism) and party (ideology vs. personal traits) lines.

The present study is not without limitations. Our findings strongly suggest that perceptions about Republicans’ racial conservatism among Democrats play a role in fueling affective polarization. At the same time, we cannot test the extent to which these perceptions have changed over time or whether they might have become more important in recent years with Donald Trump at the helm of the Republican Party. We similarly only test a single

operationalization of racial conservatism using language from the racial resentment scale. Other salient dimensions of racial conservatism—like the debates around diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives or border control and immigration enforcement—have become prominent in U.S. politics in recent years. We encourage scholars to test the robustness of our results using alternative operationalizations of racial conservatism. Finally, our study is not designed to test the extent to which partisan stereotypes vary by racial or ethnic groups, or the consequences of such divergence for intergroup solidarity between different minoritized groups in the United States (Geiger and Reny 2024; Perez 2023), though these debates become increasingly important in the rapidly diversifying American polity. Future studies could include larger and more diverse samples and measures of intergroup solidarity (e.g., People of Color identity) to better test these questions.

Overall, this research note makes an important contribution to the literature by proposing and testing a racial ideology model of partisan affect that bridges existing works on the ideological or identity-based origins of affective polarization. Our findings also have important practical implications for American politics. The ongoing divergence on the issues of race will likely continue to exacerbate partisan affective polarization and thus have dire consequences for both political and non-political domains of American life.

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Notes

¹<https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/16/politics/hillary-clinton-civil-rights-groups-leaders-harlem/index.html>

²<https://americanjournalnews.com/vice-president-kamala-harris-naacp-convention-boston-republicans-affirmative-action-diversity-inclusion/>

³The preregistration can be found online at: <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/7WPTU>.

⁴This number excludes 116 respondents who straight-lined responses to the conjoint profiles, in accordance with our preanalysis plan, and 2 respondents whose conjoint values are not captured due to a system error.

⁵For the results in the full sample, see Figure A2 in Online Appendix. For the results by race and partisanship, see Figures A3 and A4 in Online Appendix.

⁶The regression table can be found in Table A2 in Online Appendix.

⁷Our sample included only 182 non-White Republicans. Those results are not included in the main analysis due to low statistical power. They can be found in Figure A5 in Online Appendix. The only attribute associated with a typical supporter of the Republican Party among non-White Republicans is personality traits.

⁸The regression table can be found in Table A3 in Online Appendix.

⁹We present the results of the same regression model estimated in the full sample (Figure A11), with racial resentment and antiracism as additional controls (Figure A12), and by race (Figure A13) and partisanship (Figure A14) separately in Online Appendix. The results are substantively similar regardless of controls. Subgroup analyses reveal that perceived racial conservatism predicts negative affect toward the Republican Party only among Democrats. For independents and Republicans, pooled across race, perceived racial conservatism is not associated with greater levels of negative affect.

Online Appendix

Table A1. Demographic Comparison

	Our Sample	Benchmark
Female	60%	51% (US Census 2023)
Age 65 or above	17%	18% (US Census 2023)
Non-Hispanic White	68%	58% (US Census 2023)
Hispanic	7%	20% (US Census 2023)
College	40%	34% (US Census 2023)
Democrat (including leaner)	46%	47% (ANES 2020)
Independent (excluding leaner)	20%	12% (ANES 2020)
Republican (including leaner)	34%	42% (ANES 2020)

Source: [US Census QuickFacts 2023](#), [American National Election Studies 2020](#)

Table A2. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race and Partisanship

	White Democrat	Non-White Democrat	White Republican
Old	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
Male	0.08 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.13 (0.04)
White	0.49 (0.05)	0.42 (0.06)	0.21 (0.04)
No College	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
Religious	0.20 (0.04)	0.12 (0.05)	0.28 (0.04)
Upper Class	0.08 (0.04)	0.13 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Economically Conservative (β_7)	0.91 (0.06)	0.43 (0.07)	0.66 (0.06)
Racially Conservative (β_8)	1.15 (0.07)	1.31 (0.10)	0.74 (0.06)
Negative Traits	0.19 (0.05)	0.12 (0.06)	-0.85 (0.05)
$\beta_8 - \beta_7$	0.24 ($p < 0.01$)	0.88 ($p < 0.001$)	0.08 ($p = 0.34$)

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by respondents using R package “cregg.” Clustered SEs in parenthesis. Baseline categories are Young, Female, Non-White, College, Non-Religious, Middle/Working Class, Economically Liberal, Racially Liberal, and Positive Traits.

Table A3. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect by Race and Partisanship

	White Democrat	White Democrat	Non-White Democrat	Non-White Democrat	White Republican	White Republican
Old	−0.03 (0.08)	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.10)	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.07)	−0.00 (0.07)
Male	−0.06 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.09)	−0.08 (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
White	−0.16 (0.07)	−0.14 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.08)	−0.03 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.07)
No College	0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)
Religious	0.03 (0.07)	−0.00 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.06)
Upper Class	−0.10 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	−0.16 (0.07)	−0.13 (0.07)
Economically Conservative	−0.29 (0.06)	−0.17 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.14 (0.05)	−0.16 (0.05)
Racially Conservative	−0.28 (0.05)	−0.21 (0.05)	−0.17 (0.05)	−0.16 (0.05)	0.09 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Negative Traits	−0.12 (0.06)	−0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	−0.20 (0.05)	−0.15 (0.05)
Constant	3.26 (0.11)	3.03 (0.41)	2.87 (0.12)	2.68 (0.49)	7.50 (0.09)	5.81 (0.38)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	861	849	593	583	871	862

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, and ideology.

Here is a description of a person:

Social Class	Upper Class
Education	High School
Gender	Female
Age	22
Personal Traits	Patriotic
Views on the Size of Government	Government Should Provide Fewer Services
Race	White
Religiosity	Attends Church Regularly
Views on Racial Equality	Government Should Help Blacks

On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being extremely nontypical and 10 being extremely typical, how much do you think this person is like a typical Republican?

Extremely nontypical 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely typical



Figure A1. An Example of Conjoint Task




Figure A2. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regression with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A3. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A4. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Partisanship

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A5. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race and Partisanship including Non-White Republicans

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A6. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race and Partisanship among Democrats

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A7. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Racial Resentment

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A8. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Anti Racism

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A9. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race, Partisanship, and Racial Resentment

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A10. The Effects of Attribute Values on Republican Profiles Typicality Ratings by Race, Partisanship, and Anti Racism

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at respondent and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A11. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, race, and partisanship.




Figure A12. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect with Additional Controls of Racial Attitudes

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, race, and partisanship.




Figure A13. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect by Race

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, and partisanship.




Figure A14. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect by Partisanship

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, and race.




Figure A15. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect by Racial Resentment

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, race, and partisanship..




Figure A16. Beliefs about Typical Republicans and Republican Party Affect by Anti Racism

Note: Coefficients estimated by OLS regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Control variables are age, gender, education, income, ideology, race, and partisanship..

Anonymized Pre-Analysis Plan, 2023-05-10

Study Information

1. Title (required)

A Conjoint Study on Anti-Racism and Partisan Affect

2. Authors (required)

3. Description (optional)

Existing research shows that affective polarization in the US has been increasing over time (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019) and has deleterious social and political consequences (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Bartels, 2020; Kingzette et al., 2021, but see Broockman, Kalla & Westwood, 2022). Extant research suggests that affective polarization is driven predominantly by ideological polarization (Bougher, 2017; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016; Webster & Abramowitz, 2017), increasingly partisan media sources (Lelkes, Sood & Iyengar, 2017; Levendusky, 2013; Stroud, 2010, 2011; Puglisi & Snyder Jr, 2011), and divisive political campaigning (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). Yet as Iyengar et al (2019) point out in a review of this literature, these factors are hardly comprehensive. One less explored area is the role of race and racial sorting on affective polarization. Some studies have firmly established that race and partisanship are tightly linked in the American mind and that Republican affect toward the Democratic Party is heavily influenced by the perceived racial composition of Democratic partisans (Ahler and Sood 2018; Westwood & Peterson, 2020; Zhirkov & Valentino, 2022). But what about Democratic affect toward Republicans?

We posit that Democrats have increasingly perceived the Republican Party as racist and that these beliefs contribute to higher levels of negative affect toward Republicans. We propose to test this theory using a conjoint experiment where we vary the attributes of rank-and-file Republican profiles and ask respondents to estimate the likelihood that each profile is a Republican based on their racial attitudes among other attributes. This will allow us to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect of racial attitudes as stereotypes underlying partisan imagery but also use Individual Marginal Component Effects (Zhirkov 2022) to then see how individual-level beliefs about racism and the Republican Party correlate with affect toward the party.

4. Hypotheses (required)

Among Democrats, we expect (1) positive AMCEs for racial conservatism and (2) negative effects of IMCEs for racial conservatism on Republican affect.

Design Plan

In this section, you will be asked to describe the overall design of your study. Remember that this research plan is designed to register a single study, so if you have multiple experimental designs, please complete a separate preregistration.

5. Study type (required)

Part 1: Conjoin Experiment –

Respondents will be presented with descriptions of hypothetical Republicans and asked how typical each Republican is. Attributes of the Republicans presented to respondents will be the following: age, gender, race, education, views on the size of government, religiosity, views on racial equality, and personal traits.

Part 2: Observational Study –

Using IMCE from the conjoint we will then see how the racial attitude attribute correlates with affect toward Republicans.

6. Blinding (required)

Respondents will not be aware of the purpose of the study.

7. Is there any additional blinding in this study?

No

8. Study design (required)

Respondents will first consent to the study and answer pre-treatment questions (demographics, political predispositions, feeling thermometers toward the parties, and racial attitudes). Each respondent will then be asked to make such evaluations about 20 Republican profiles. Republicans will be described using eight attributes: age, gender, race, education, views on the size of government, religiosity, views on racial equality, and personal traits. See Table 1 for all attributes and value labels.

Table 1. Conjoint Attribute Values

Attributes	
Age	Uniform distribution 20-59
Gender	Male, Female
Race	White, Black, Hispanic
Education	High School, Some College, 4-Year College Degree, Graduate Degree
Views on the Size of Government	Government Should Provide Fewer Services, Government Should Provide More Services
Religiosity	Attends Church Regularly, Doesn't Attend Church
Views on Racial Equality	Government Should Help Blacks, Blacks Should Help Themselves
Social Class	Middle Class, Working Class
Personal Traits	Honest, Dishonest, Open-minded, Close-minded, Caring, Selfish, Smart, Ignorant, Hard-working, Lazy, Patriotic, Unpatriotic

9. Randomization (optional)

Values for all attributes will be fully and independently randomized with uniform distributions—all values of an attribute will have equal probabilities of being presented, with the exception of race which will draw White with probability 50% and Black and Hispanic each with probability 25%. The order of attributes will be randomized between respondents.

Sampling Plan

In this section we'll ask you to describe how you plan to collect samples, as well as the number of samples you plan to collect and your rationale for this decision. Please keep in mind that the data described in this section should be the actual data used for analysis, so if you are using a subset of a larger dataset, please describe the subset that will actually be used in your study.

10. Existing data (required)

Registration prior to creation of data: As of the date of submission of this research plan for preregistration, the data have not yet been collected, created, or realized.

11. Data collection procedures (required)

Participants (adults in the United States over the age of 18) will be collected via Cloud Research's Prime Panels.

12. Sample size (required)

Our target sample size is N=3,000 respondents.

13. Sample size rationale (optional)

Based on our past research using conjoint and estimating IMCEs, N=3,000 is sufficient for our purposes including subgroup analyses which we elaborate on below.

14. Stopping rule (optional)

N/A

Variables

In this section you can describe all variables (both manipulated and measured variables) that will later be used in your confirmatory analysis plan. In your analysis plan, you will have the opportunity to describe how each variable will be used. If you have variables which you are measuring for exploratory analyses, you are not required to list them, though you are permitted to do so.

15. Manipulated variables (optional)

Age, gender, race, education, views on the size of government, religiosity, views on racial equality, and personal traits are manipulated.

16. Measured variables (required)

- 16.1. Dependent variable for Study 1 (Conjoint): "On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being extremely nontypical and 10 being extremely typical, how much do you think this person is like a typical Republican?" (slider ranges from 0 = extremely nontypical to 10 = extremely typical)
- 16.2. Dependent variable for Study 2 (IMCE): "I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party." (Republican Party; slider ranges from 0 = strongly dislike to 10 = strongly like)
- 16.3. Main IV for regression models will be IMCE from conjoint.
- 16.4. Controls include age, sex, education, race, family income, partisanship, ideology, and, in non-moderated model robustness checks, a measure of racial attitudes.
- 16.5. Potential moderators include racial attitudes (4-part racial resentment battery) and anti-racism (5-item battery from LaCosse et al, 2023).

17. Indices (optional)

Racial resentment is an additive scale using the following items, recoded to fall between 0 (low racial resentment) and 1 (high racial resentment).

- Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
- Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
- It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Anti-racism is an additive scale using the following items, recoded to fall between 0 (low anti-racism) and 1 (high anti-racism).

- It is important for people to actively try to promote equal treatment of racial and ethnic minorities.
- It is important for people to share their nonprejudiced beliefs with other people.
- People should do more than just acknowledge that racism toward Black people exists.
- People need to speak out against racial discrimination.
- People should proactively (i.e., with words and actions) show that they are against all forms of discrimination.

Analysis Plan

You may describe one or more confirmatory analysis in this preregistration. Please remember that all analyses specified below must be reported in the final article, and any additional analyses must be noted as exploratory or hypothesis generating.

A confirmatory analysis plan must state up front which variables are predictors (independent) and which are the outcomes (dependent), otherwise it is an exploratory analysis. You are allowed to describe any exploratory work here, but a clear confirmatory analysis is required.

18. Statistical models (required)

- 18.1. We will begin by estimating Average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for each attribute in the experiment, focusing on the predictive effect of knowing a profile's racial attitudes on categorization as a typical Republican.
- 18.2. We will then estimate IMCEs and run a regression predicting affect toward the Republican Party conditional on IMCE for the racial attitude attribute. We will control for age, education, income, race, sex, party ID, ideology. In robustness checks we will include racial attitudes and in another model, anti-racism.
- 18.3. We will conduct our analyses on the 1) full sample; 2) Subsamples based on race, party ID, and racial attitudes and report these in either the main paper or the appendix.

19. Transformations (optional)

N/A

20. Inference criteria (optional)

We will use traditional 2-tailed hypothesis tests.

21. Data exclusion (optional)

We will exclude respondents who straight-lined responses to the conjoint profiles.

22. Missing data (optional)

N/A

23. Exploratory analysis (optional)

N/A

Other

24. Other (Optional)

N/A

Reference

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Amendment, 2023-06-25

This is an update to the original registration

This update was made on Jun 25, 2023

Reason for update:

In the conjoint experiment, the attribute of social class is trichotomized into "Upper Class," "Middle Class," and "Working Class" with the probability 50%, 25%, and 25%, respectively in order to account for the possibility that Republicans are associated with upper class.