The Color of Disparity: Racialized Income Inequality and Support for Liberal Economic Policies [Running Header: The Color of Disparity]

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ABSTRACT

A corpus of research on the effect of exposure to income inequality on citizens' economic policy preferences renders inconclusive results. At the same time, a distinct body of work demonstrates that ethnic fragmentation within a polity reduces government spending, presumably due to opposition among the public to spending believed to benefit stigmatized ethnic minorities. Focusing on the American context, this short article ties these two bodies of work together by arguing that the effect of routine exposure to income inequality should depend on the racial composition of the "have-nots," with citizens being most likely to support liberal economic policies in the face of pronounced inequality only when potential beneficiaries are not a highly stigmatized minority group, such as Black Americans. Using geocoded survey data, we find that exposure to local economic inequality is only systematically associated with increased support for liberal economic policies when the respective "have-nots" are not Black. Keywords: income inequality; racial inequality; public opinion; economic policy

APPENDICES: Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

DATA AND REPLICATION MATERIALS: Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (<u>http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop</u>). The empirical analysis has been successfully replicated by the JOP replication analyst.

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Research on the effect of exposure to income inequality has rendered mixed findings about its impact on public support for redistribution¹. Complementing this work is research demonstrating that ethnic diversity and fragmentation are associated with reduced government spending (Alesina et al. 1999; Hero 1998). This research maintains that this finding derives from racialized economic hierarchies, where stigmatized racial or ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented among the poor and citizens oppose government spending that would benefit stigmatized minorities (Alesina et al. 2001). Focusing on the United States, this study ties these bodies of work together by exploring the effect of *racialized* income inequality on public support for liberal economic policies, with our primary expectation being elevated support for economic policies benefiting lower-income Americans in the face of pronounced inequality only when the respective "have-nots" are not stigmatized racial outgroups.

Recent work finds that exposure to income inequality generates skepticism about economic opportunity (McCall et al. 2017) and support for redistributive policies (Franko 2016; Newman 2020; Sands and de Kadt 2020). Much of the research exploring residential (Franko 2016; Newman 2020) or experimental (Boudreux and MacKenzie 2018; McCall et al. 2017) exposure to inequality, however, does not account for race as a factor often present both in people's minds when considering "the poor" and in geographic contexts with high levels of economic inequality². In the United States, long-standing stigmatizing linkages between Black Americans, poverty and welfare in media discourse and the public mind (Gilens 1999) are accompanied by evidence that a notable portion of the growth in income inequality in recent decades is accounted for by between-race inequality (Hero and Levy 2016). Importantly,

¹ See Franko (2016) or Schmidt-Catran (2016) for excellent reviews of the mixed results in the literature.

 $^{^{2}}$ One exception is Sands (2017), who experimentally evokes inequality by inserting poor-looking individuals into affluent contexts and varies the race of these individuals. This treatment, however, was short-term relative to the type of recurrent exposure to inequality implied by residing in a high-inequality context.

research establishing the centrality of racial prejudice to public opposition to welfare (Gilens 1999; Peffley et al. 1997) and racial context to Whites' policy preferences (Glaser 1994; Taylor 1998) do not explicitly incorporate income inequality into theoretical or empirical models. In short, an important bridge can be built between the literature on income inequality and redistribution and scholarship on race and welfare by investigating the impact of exposure to inequality *conditional upon* the race of the poor.

Focusing on support for liberal economic policy among the American public, we test the hypothesis that exposure to income inequality will be associated with support for liberal policies only when the respective "have-nots" are not stigmatized racial minorities, which in the American context has traditionally been Black Americans. Where the "have-nots" are stigmatized minorities (e.g., Black), existing literature on diversity and public goods (Alesina et al. 1999), the racialization of welfare (Gilens 1999), and the racial structure of economic inequality (An et al. 2019; Hero and Levy 2018) suggests that exposure to inequality will either have no effect or will dampen support for policies that benefit those with lower incomes. Two general and complementary rationales underlie these expectations: First, racialized economic inequality in nations like the United States is associated with stigmatizing learned negative stereotypes and legitimizing myths about the nonwhite poor that promote tolerance of inequality (Alesina et al. 2001; Gilens 1999); second, mass preferences over economic policy are strongly influenced by social affinity with policy beneficiaries (An et al. 2019; Hero and Levy 2018), with support for liberal policies most likely to develop in response to inequality when the perceived lower-income beneficiaries of the such policies are not disliked outgroups.

THE NATIONSCAPE SURVEY

We analyze Americans' support for liberal economic policies in response to exposure to income inequality in their local residential context. We focus on local income inequality as the "treatment" because prior research demonstrates that Americans, while innumerate with respect to nationwide income inequality (Bartels 2008; Kenworthy and McCall 2008), are decidedly aware of local levels of inequality (Newman et al. 2018). Given the long-standing targeting of Black Americans in the racialization and stigmatization of poverty (Gilens 1999; Peffley et al. 1997), we concentrate on assessing Americans' response to local inequality conditional on the prevalence of Blacks among the local "have-nots." Previous research finds that Americans are aware of the size of Black populations in their local context (Velez and Wong 2017) and that exposure to large Black populations can lead to conservative voting patterns (Enos 2016).

Our main analysis relies on the Nationscape survey ("NS") (Tausanovitch and Vavreck 2020), which is one of the largest surveys of Americans available. We utilize 71 waves of the NS collected from July 2019 to November 2020, yielding a large sample (N=449,080) that is benchmarked to national demographics. Recent research suggests that the racial structure of inequality not only affects welfare provision (Hero and Levy 2017) but also government spending on a variety of services (An et al. 2018). This work is complemented by research suggesting that rising inequality is associated with liberal shifts in economic policy mood (Franko 2016; Newman 2020) and support for policies that enhance opportunity (e.g., education spending) and regulate employer pay practices (Franko 2016; McCall 2013). Given this, our analysis focuses on respondents' support for increased government spending on services, as well for policies that benefit lower-income Americans: spending on welfare, subsidized education and healthcare, and raising the minimum wage. These items serve as the dependent variables in our analysis and the inclusion of this range of items allows us to assess whether our findings are

isolated to specific outcomes or emerge as a consistent pattern across different types of liberal economic policies. Each variable was coded so that higher values indicate greater support for the policy and were recoded to range from 0 to 1 (see Appendix A for question wording and coding).

The NS contains zip codes for all respondents, enabling us to merge in zip code data from the 2014-2018 American Community Survey. The independent variable in our analysis is the Gini Coefficient in respondents' zip code, and the zip-level moderator used to capture the local prevalence of stigmatized racial minorities is the Percent in Poverty Black, which is the total number of Black persons living in poverty divided by the total persons living in poverty. While this variable captures the prevalence of Blacks among the local poor, it is highly correlated with overall zip code percent Black (r=.93), making it unsurprising that the results presented below are nearly identical when using percent Black as the moderator (see Table B4). We estimate linear probability models with heteroskedastic-robust zip code clustered standard errors that include zip-level controls (median income, unemployment, and population density), individuallevel controls (education, income, age, gender, race and partisanship), survey-wave fixed-effects and county-level Republican vote share in the 2016 Presidential Election. Given our focus on Black Americans as the stigmatized group potentially conditioning the effect of local inequality, as well as evidence that Latino and Asian Americans harbor anti-Black prejudice at rates equal to or greater than Whites (Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Johnson et al. 1997), we perform our analysis on non-Black respondents; however, we demonstrate that our results hold when confined to non-Latino Whites (Table B3). Our principal expectation is that an increase in local income inequality will be associated with greater support for liberal economic policies when the accompanying local "have-nots" are not Black. When the local "have-nots" are heavily Black,

Figure 1: Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Liberal Economic Policies Conditional on Racial Composition of the Poor



Note: Plots display changes in probability of policy support associated with increases in recoded zip code *Gini Coefficient* across the full range of *Percent in Poverty Black*, holding all other variables at their means. 95% confidence intervals generated from heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at zip code level. Full tables in Appendix Table B1.

however, our expectation is that an increase in local inequality will either have no effect or will be associated with more conservative policy preferences.

Figure 1 (Table B1) presents the results from our analysis via changes in the predicted probability of policy support associated with an increase in *Gini* across values of *Percent in Poverty Black*. In contexts absent Black people living in poverty, an increase in local inequality is consistently associated with significant increases in policy support. The constituent terms for *Gini* at the minimum value of *Percent in Poverty Black* across the four models are: $\Box = 0.18$, p<0.001 (spending on services); $\Box = 0.27$, p<0.001 (raising minimum wage); $\Box = 0.15$, p<0.001 (spending on education); and $\Box = 0.16$, p<0.001 (subsidized healthcare). Conversely, in contexts with numerous Black people living in poverty (i.e., the max value of *Percent in Poverty Black*), the effect of local inequality is consistently statistically indiscernible from zero and the estimates are negative for three of the four outcomes. In examining the interaction terms from the models underlying Figure 1, we find negative terms that are statistically significant in three out of four

cases: $\Box = -0.27$, p=0.002 (spending on services); $\Box = -0.39$, p=0.001 (raising minimum wage); $\Box = -0.29$, p=0.001 (subsidized education); and $\Box = -0.16$, p=0.22 (subsidized healthcare).

In sum, for all four outcomes, the conditional effect of *Gini* when the local poor are not Black is in the expected direction and statistically significant. Moreover, for three out of four outcomes, the estimated conditional effects of *Gini* are statistically different from one another at low and high values of *Percent in Poverty Black*. In one case (subsidized healthcare), the estimated interaction fails to attain significance, leaving us only with the observation that the moderator defines conditions under which *Gini* exerts statistically significant positive effects (zips absent poor Blacks) and effects statistically indiscernible from zero (zips with numerous poor Blacks). Overall, the results provide preliminary evidence that the race of the "have-nots" may influence how Americans respond to high levels of economic inequality.

The pattern of results in Figure 1 hold when excluding control variables (Table B2), restricting the sample to non-Latino Whites (Table B3), using percent Black as the moderator (Table B4), logging the *Percent in Poverty Black* to adjust for right skew (Table B5), using logistic regression (Table B6), estimating multilevel models (Table B7), and using the diagnostic check on interactions recommended by Hainmueller et al. (2018) (Figure B1). Importantly, results do not replicate when examining Black respondents (Table B8). Given the observational nature of our data, it is possible that our results are due to residential selection, with left-leaning (right-leaning) Americans selecting into high (low) inequality zips without poor Black people. Appendix C contains results from analyses that assuage concerns over differential partisan selection, including analysis of support for non-economic policies with left-right opinion divides (Table C1), controlling for urbanicity and neighborhood walkability (Tables C2 and C3), and subsample analyses by zip code residential tenure (i.e., householder move-in dates) (Table C4).

REPLICATION TESTS

We perform replication tests using the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study ("CCES", N=60,000) (Schaffner et al. 2019). While the sample size of this survey is nearly 7.5 times smaller than the NS, it is the largest sample of Americans available within a close time period to the NS. To make these analyses comparable to those using the NS, we use questions in the 2018 CCES soliciting support for spending on welfare, education, and healthcare, as well as for raising the minimum wage (see Appendix A). We estimate each model using the same controls used in the NS and present results for key parameters in Table 1. For all four outcomes, we observe positive and significant constituent terms for *Gini*, indicating that residing in a high inequality area is associated with increased support for liberal economic policies when the local "have-nots" are not Black. Alternately, when the local poor are heavily Black, the estimates for *Gini* are attenuated and indiscernible from zero for three out of four outcomes. Moreover, for two outcomes, the interaction term is significant, indicating the estimated effects of *Gini* at min and max values of *Percent in Poverty Black* are significantly different from one another.

CONCLUSION

The findings in this short article provide evidence that the presence of stigmatized racial minority groups among the poor may condition how public opinion responds to income inequality. Eight models are presented using two large datasets: we find positive and significant effects of *Gini* when the "have-nots" are not Black in all eight models, we find effects indiscernible from zero when the "have-nots" are heavily Black in all but one model, and we find negative interaction terms in all but one model. The balance of evidence suggests that the race of the poor defines a condition under which exposure to inequality is associated with support for liberal economic policies and a condition where it is not. As predicted, we find uniform evidence

	Spending Welfare (Ordered Logit)	Minimum Wage (LPM)	Spending Education (Ordered Logit)	Spending Health (Ordered Logit)
Gini Coefficient	1.271***	0.175***	0.754***	1.004***
	(0.165)	(0.035)	(0.176)	(0.169)
Percent in Poverty Black	-0.024	0.111	1.309**	1.417***
	(0.410)	(0.084)	(0.432)	(0.421)
Gini × Pct. in Pov. Black	0.303	-0.188	-1.439*	-2.036**
	(0.692)	(0.139)	(0.733)	(0.709)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	42,005	42,095	41,967	42,004
R ²	0.280	0.251	0.157	0.236

Table 1. Replication Tests Using 2018 CCES

Note: Regression coefficients with zip code-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Full regression results can be found in Appendix Table B9. p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.01

that exposure to inequality when the respective poor are not Black is associated with increased support for liberal policies. These findings bear on the puzzle of unabated inequality growth in the U.S. by adding evidence in support of the longstanding assertion that ethnic fragmentation can undermine class-based collective action in pursuit of redistribution (Alesina et al. 2001).

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Biographical Statement

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APPENDIX A Information about Surveys

I. Nationscape Survey

This rolling cross-section survey began in July 2019 and our analysis includes data collected up through November 2020 (i.e., 71 waves of weekly collections). Each wave averages \sim N=6,250, yielding a total sample of N=449,080 and N=396,247 non-Black respondents. While the sample is opt-in, it is benchmarked to national demographics and a representativeness assessment of the data finds that the samples are comparable to those collected by Pew and YouGov (Tausanovitch et al 2019). For more information, see: <u>https://www.voterstudygroup.org/nationscape</u>

<u>Dependent Variables</u> <u>Spending Government Services</u> "Which of the following comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right" (mean=0.51)

I favor a larger government with more services (1) I favor a smaller government with fewer services (0)

Minimum Wage

We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: "Raise the minimum wage to \$15/hour" (mean=0.72)

Agree (1) Disagree (0)

Subsidized College

We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: "Ensure that all students can graduate from college debt free" (mean=0.71)

Agree (1) Disagree (0)

Subsidized Health Care

"We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Enact Medicare-for-All" (mean=0.64)

Agree (1) Disagree (0)

Independent and Control Variables

	min	max	mean	sd
Gini Coefficient	0	1	0.57	0.07
Pct in Poverty Black	0	1	0.16	0.21
Median Income	0	1	0.26	0.10
Unemployment	0	1	0.06	0.03
Population Density	0	1	0.02	0.04
Trump Vote 2016	0	1	0.46	0.20
Age	0	1	0.36	0.20
Male	0	1	0.48	0.50
Education	0	1	0.31	0.48
Income	0	1	0.52	0.32
Party ID	0	1	0.47	0.37

The CCES is a survey fielded in two waves (pre- and post-election) between the September 27 and December 3, 2018. The total sample size is N=60,000 with N=54,369 non-Black respondents. CCES works with YouGov to collect a matched random sample that is representative of the national adult population. For more information see: (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZSBZ7K/WZWCZ1)

Variables

Minimum Wage

If your state put the following questions for a vote on the ballot, would you vote FOR or AGAINST? "Raise the state minimum wage to \$12 an hour" (mean=0.70)

For (1) Against (0)

Spending Welfare

State Legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. How would you like your legislature to spend money on each of the five areas below: "Welfare" (mean=0.49, sd=0.3)

Greatly increase (1) Slightly increase Maintain Slightly decrease Greatly decrease (0)

Spending Education

State Legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. How would you like your legislature to spend money on each of the five areas below: "Education" (mean=0.75, sd=0.26)

Greatly increase (1) Slightly increase Maintain Slightly decrease Greatly decrease (0)

Spending Health Care

State Legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. How would you like your legislature to spend money on each of the five areas below: "Health Care" (mean=0.72, sd=0.28)

Greatly increase (1) Slightly increase Maintain

Slightly decrease Greatly decrease (0)

Independent and Control Variables

	min	max	mean	sd
Gini Coefficient	0	1	0.57	0.07
Pct in Poverty Black	0	1	0.17	0.20
Median Income	0	1	0.24	0.10
Unemployment	0	1	0.06	0.03
Population Density	0	1	0.01	0.03
Trump Vote 2016	0	1	0.49	0.19
Age	0	1	0.39	0.23
Male	0	1	0.49	0.49
Education	0	1	0.47	0.30
Income	0	1	0.24	0.22
Party ID	0	1	0.47	0.36

APPENDIX B Regression Tables and Robustness Checks

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wage	Subsidized College	e Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.177***	0.272***	0.147***	0.160***	
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.036)	
Pct in Pov Black	0.153**	0.211**	0.178***	0.082	
	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.052)	(0.079)	
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.268**	-0.386**	-0.289**	-0.162	
	(0.087)	(0.121)	(0.088)	(0.132)	
Median Income	0.026	0.083***	-0.081***	-0.092***	
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)	
Unemployment Rate	0 242***	0 368***	0.436***	0 253***	
onemployment Rate	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.071)	
Percent Trump (2016)	-0 103***	-0 145***	-0.036***	-0.092***	
recent frump (2010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	
Population Density	0 174***	0 229***	0 398***	0 443***	
r opulation Density	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.056)	
Age	_0 190***	-0.068***	_0 /19***	-0.455***	
Age	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	
Mala	0.082***	0.062***	0.059***	0.018***	
Male	(0.002)	(0.003)	-0.038 (0.002)	-0.018 (0.003)	
E1 action	0.002	0.021***	0.044***	0.025***	
Education	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.031 (0.003)	-0.044 (0.002)	-0.025 (0.004)	
_	0.0-0***		0.4.4.0 ***	0 44 - ***	
Income	-0.078^{+++} (0.004)	-0.124*** (0.005)	-0.113^{+++} (0.004)	-0.115*** (0.006)	
	(1111)	()	()	()	
Party ID	-0.390^{***}	-0.398***	-0.361^{***}	-0.462*** (0.006)	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.000)	
White	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.013***	0.001	

Table B1. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor

	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.746 ^{***} (0.017)	0.862*** (0.024)	1.038*** (0.018)	1.025*** (0.027)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	321,610	106,227	311,150	90,672
R ²	0.120	0.156	0.172	0.216

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

		Depender	nt variable:	
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wag	e Free College S	Subsidized Health
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini Coefficient	0.375***	0.489***	0.396***	0.523***
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.040)
Pct in Pov Black	0.242***	0.289***	0.208***	0.129
	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.057)	(0.090)
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.356***	-0.452***	-0.244*	-0.140
	(0.100)	(0.137)	(0.095)	(0.150)
Constant	0.272***	0.395***	0.466***	0.314***
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.026)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	340,034	111,690	327,534	95,248
R ²	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.007

Table B2. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (no controls)

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; **p<0.001

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wag	e Free College S	Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.200***	0.286***	0.155***	0.161***	
	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.039)	
Pct in Pov Black	0.153**	0.235**	0.167**	0.047	
	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.060)	(0.089)	
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.262**	-0.431**	-0.269**	-0.111	
	(0.097)	(0.142)	(0.101)	(0.149)	
Median Income	0.032	0.086***	-0.084***	-0.114***	
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.028)	
Unemployment Rate	0.310***	0.491***	0.592***	0.336***	
	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.055)	(0.082)	

 Table B3. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending

 Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Non-Latino White Respondents Only)

Percent Trump (2016)	-0.098***	-0.155***	-0.045***	-0.103***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Population Density	0.242***	0.301***	0.565***	0.593***
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.058)
Age	-0 214***	-0 089***	-0.469***	-0 509***
nge	-0.214	(0,000)	(0,006)	(0,000)
	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Male	-0.085***	-0.060***	-0.059***	-0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Education	-0.002	-0.035***	-0.048***	-0.031***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Income	-0.086***	-0 132***	-0 127***	-0.125***
meenie	(0,004)	(0.006)	(0, 004)	(0.007)
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Party ID	-0.413***	-0.425***	-0.384***	-0.485***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.724***	0.041***	1 0 4 0 ***	1 0(2***
Constant	0.734	0.841	1.049	1.003
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	250,760	82,599	241,050	70,704
R ²	0.130	0.162	0.177	0.228

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Hispanic White respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; **p<0.001

Table B4. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition (Percent Black Moderator)

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wage	e Free College S	Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.174***	0.261***	0.151***	0.157***	
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.034)	

Pct Black	0.211**	0.274**	0.292***	0.131
	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.065)	(0.100)
Gini X Pct Black	-0.368***	-0.478***	-0.465***	-0.247
	(0.110)	(0.141)	(0.108)	(0.167)
Median Income	0.026	0.085***	-0.079***	-0.092***
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Unemployment Rate	0 247***	0 356***	0 429***	0 2 5 7***
	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.072)
D	0 100***	0.140***	0.025***	0.00 2 ***
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.102	-0.142	-0.035	-0.092
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Population Density	0.171***	0.226***	0.396***	0.442***
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.056)
Age	-0.190***	-0.068***	-0.419***	-0.455***
0	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Mala	0.002***	0.0(2***	0.059***	0.010***
Male	-0.082	-0.063	-0.058	-0.018
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	-0.003	-0.031***	-0.044***	-0.025***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Income	-0.078***	-0.124***	-0.113***	-0.115***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Party ID	0 300***	0 308***	0 361***	-0.462***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.000)
White	-0.011***	-0.022***	-0.013***	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.747***	0.866***	1.034***	1.026***
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Survey Wave FFs?	Y	V	V	V
Observations	321.827	106 302	311.351	90 731
R^2	0.120	0.156	0.172	0.216
				-

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; *p<0.01; **p<0.001

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wage	Free College	Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.206***	0.333***	0.160***	0.157**	
	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.049)	
ln(Pct in Pov Black)	0.104**	0.155***	0.083*	0.021	
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.051)	
Gini X ln(Pct in Pov Black)	-0.167**	-0.275***	-0.130*	-0.051	
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.059)	(0.090)	
Median Income	0.029^{*}	0.084***	-0.081***	-0.091***	
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)	
Unemployment Rate	0.212***	0.337***	0.425***	0.238***	
	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.070)	
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.098***	-0.142***	-0.035***	-0.092***	
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	
Population Density	0.183***	0.246***	0.402***	0.447***	
	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.057)	
Age	-0.190***	-0.068***	-0.419***	-0.455***	
-	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	
Male	-0.082***	-0.063***	-0.058***	-0.018***	
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Education	-0.003	-0.031***	-0.044***	-0.025***	
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	
Income	-0.078***	-0.124***	-0.113***	-0.115***	
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	

Table B5. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Logged Pct in Pov Black)

Party ID	-0.390***	-0.398 ^{***}	-0.361***	-0.462***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
White	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.013***	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.724 ^{***}	0.827 ^{***}	1.028 ^{***}	1.029***
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	321,610	106,227	311,150	90,672
R ²	0.120	0.155	0.172	0.216

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

	Dependent variable:					
	Spending Gov't Minimum Wage Free College Subsidized Health					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Gini Coefficient	0.798***	1.525***	0.792***	0.849***		
	(0.106)	(0.181)	(0.135)	(0.196)		
Pct in Pov Black	0.684**	1.115**	0.909**	0.381		
	(0.237)	(0.415)	(0.309)	(0.445)		
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-1.202**	-2.028**	-1.445**	-0.759		
	(0.399)	(0.699)	(0.522)	(0.754)		
Median Income	0.121	0.462***	-0.444***	-0.491***		
	(0.064)	(0.122)	(0.098)	(0.129)		
Unemployment Rate	1.093***	2.192***	2.856***	1.555***		
	(0.202)	(0.380)	(0.281)	(0.395)		
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.462***	-0.797***	-0.225***	-0.490***		
r	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.061)		

Table B6. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Logistic Regression)

Population Density	0.851***	1.930***	2.783***	3.036***
	(0.188)	(0.316)	(0.245)	(0.326)
	0.050***	***	~ ~ ~ . * * *	• • • • • * * *
Age	-0.853	-0.345	-2.354	-2.408
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Male	-0.369***	-0.353***	-0.337***	-0.105***
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Education	0.015	0 160***	0 245***	0 122***
Education	-0.013	-0.100	-0.243	-0.133
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Income	-0.352***	-0.660***	-0.629***	-0.605***
	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.033)
Party ID	-1 675***	-2 138***	-1 962***	-2 328***
- w	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.030)
W 71.:4 -	0.040***	0 1 40***	0 1 40***	0.022
white	-0.049	-0.149	-0.140	-0.023
	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Constant	1.062***	1.850***	2.961***	2.721***
	(0.079)	(0.135)	(0.100)	(0.147)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	321,610	106,227	311,150	90,672

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. p<0.05; p<0.01; p>0.01; p>0.01

Table B7. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Random Intercepts Multilevel Model)

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wag	e Free College	Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.181***	0.280***	0.119***	0.137***	
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.033)	

Pct in Pov Black	0.188***	0.224**	0.184***	0.080
	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.047)	(0.075)
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.330***	-0.410***	-0.298***	-0.164
	(0.079)	(0.114)	(0.079)	(0.125)
Median Income	0.019	0.079***	-0.116***	-0.104***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Unemployment Rate	0.240***	0.371***	0.429***	0.296***
1 5	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.067)
Percent Trump (2016)	-0 101***	-0 141***	-0.024***	-0.087***
10100nt 11ump (2010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Population Density	0 221***	0.255***	0 200***	0.411***
ropulation Density	(0.036)	(0.233)	(0.041)	(0.051)
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Age	-0.189***	-0.065***	-0.405***	-0.449***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Male	-0.083***	-0.065***	-0.062***	-0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	-0.004*	-0.032***	-0.045***	-0.027***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
_	***			
Income	-0.078	-0.126	-0.115	-0.117***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Party ID	-0.388***	-0.397***	-0.361***	-0.462***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
White	-0.010***	-0.020***	-0.013***	-0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0 743***	0 858***	1 057***	1 039***
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.025)
	~ /	× /	× /	× /
Survey Wave FFs?	Y	V	V	V
Observations	321.610	106.227	311.150	90.672
	, - · · •	,,	,	

Note: Linear probability model coefficients from random intercepts multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

	Dependent variable:					
	Spending Gov't Minimum Wage Free College Subsidized Health					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Gini Coefficient	-0.009	0.132	-0.0001	0.050		
	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.105)		
Pct in Pov Black	0.007	0.131	-0.017	0.059		
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.056)	(0.113)		
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	0.007	-0.220	0.040	-0.115		
	(0.127)	(0.135)	(0.094)	(0.188)		
Median Income	0.078	0.015	-0.013	0.029		
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.030)	(0.058)		
Unemployment Rate	-0.084	0.017	-0.059	0.021		
1 5	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.066)	(0.135)		
Percent Trump (2016)	-0 084***	-0.015	-0.019	-0.023		
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.026)		
Population Density	0 132	0 134*	0.082	0 201*		
r opulation Density	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.091)		
Δge	0 298***	0 181***	0 059***	0.012		
Age	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.022)		
Male	0.042***	0 020***	0.044***	0 022**		
	(0.042	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)		

Table B8. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Black Respondents Only)

Education	-0.002	-0.031***	-0.021***	-0.036***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Tu a cui c	0.044***	0.045***	0.010*	0.025
Income	-0.044	-0.045	-0.018	-0.025
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.017)
Party ID	-0.188***	-0.179***	-0.163***	-0.206***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Constant	0.662***	0.842***	0.969***	0.842***
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.075)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	42,035	14,441	42,912	11,864
\mathbb{R}^2	0.043	0.063	0.039	0.038

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Black only respondents. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

 Table B9. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending

 Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (CCES Data)

	Dependent variable:						
	Spending Welfare Minimum Wage Spending Education Spending Health						
	(Ordered Logit)	(LPM)	(Ordered Logit)	(Ordered Logit)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Gini Coefficient	1.271***	0.175***	0.754***	1.004***			
	(0.165)	(0.035)	(0.176)	(0.169)			
Pct in Pov Black	-0.024	0.111	1.309**	1.417***			
	(0.410)	(0.084)	(0.432)	(0.421)			
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	0.303	-0.188	-1.439*	-2.036**			
	(0.692)	(0.139)	(0.733)	(0.709)			
Median Income	0.127	0.109***	-0.721***	-0.534***			
	(0.118)	(0.025)	(0.124)	(0.115)			
Unemployment Rate	-0.503	0.247**	-0.036	-0.087			
	(0.421)	(0.091)	(0.426)	(0.425)			

Percept Trump (2016)	-0.178**	-0.118***	0.347***	0.217***
	(0.062)	(0.013)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Population Density	0.636	0.241***	0.323	1.619***
	(0.431)	(0.061)	(0.410)	(0.398)
Age	-0.650***	-0.014	-0.710***	0.151***
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Male	-0.075***	-0.093***	-0.324***	-0.341***
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education	0.273***	-0.107***	0.268***	-0.223***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Income	-1.480***	-0.168***	-0.109*	-0.928***
	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Party ID	-2.780***	-0.571***	-1.949***	-2.620***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.029)
White	0.026	-0.019***	0.021	0.056^{*}
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	42,005	42,095	41,967	42,004

Note: Regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure B1. Diagnostic Check on Main Results Using Binning Estimator by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2018)



Note: Figure presents results from same models estimated in Figure 1 in main manuscript and Table B1 in the Appendix using Hainmueller et al.'s binning estimator (*interflex* package) to account for potential nonlinearity in the interaction between *Gini* and each moderator.

APPENDIX C Residential Selection

One challenge in studying contextual effects in a selection-on-observables study is accounting for residential selection (Sampson 2008). Within the context of our findings, where the most pronounced differences in economic policy preferences are observed across low and high inequality zip codes where the poor are not Black, one alternative explanation for our results is differential partisan residential selection, with left-leaning Americans selecting into high inequality zips and right-leaning Americans selecting into low inequality zips. In other words, rather than context predicting attitudes, attitudes predict context. While the observational nature of our data prevents us from eliminating this possibility as an explanation for our results, we have taken several measures to account for this possibility, which we believe help assuage the concern that our results are driven by partisan selection.

First, all of our models control for respondent partisanship, as well as county-level partisan context (i.e., vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election). These are crucial control variables in light of concern over partisan residential selection. Individual partisanship may predict residing in a low versus high inequality zip and is a known predictor of economic policy preferences (Lenz 2012), thus its inclusion as a control helps account for it as a potential omitted variable linked to residential selection. Turning to contextual partisanship, it might be the case that politically liberal environments attract liberal residents who bring with them their liberal policy attitudes and that liberal environments also tend to have higher levels of income inequality. Given this possibility, controlling for partisan context is important, as it helps account for this possible omitted variable linked to partisan selection.

Second, if it is simply the case that left-leaning Americans who hold liberal attitudes are selecting into high inequality zips, then we should expect to see a similar relationship between Gini and Percent in Poverty Black when examining support for other well-known policy issues with left-right opinion divides in the United States. If the results in Figure 1 of our short article are driven by left-leaning Americans selecting into high inequality zips, the pattern of relationships observed in Figure 1 should also be observed for a range of other political issues. In Table C1, we show that the pattern of results observed for economic policy items in Figure 1 fail to emerge when examining preferences over immigration (the Dream Act), international affairs (Chinese tariffs and military support for Saudi Arabia), gun control (mandatory background checks), drug policy (legalization of marijuana), gender and sexuality (allowing transgendered people to serve in the military), or abortion (requiring an ultrasound and mandatory waiting period before attaining an abortion). These results do not support a partisan residential selection explanation for our results; instead, they suggest that the pattern of relationships we observe in Figure 1 are confined to economic policy attitudes. As such, these "placebo" tests on noneconomic policy issues suggest that the findings in Figure 1 may be due to recurrent local exposure to inequality, when the respective "have-nots" are not Black, generating more liberal attitudes. Importantly, this type of interpretation of our results is consistent with recent work by Martin and Webster (2020), who find significant evidence that, in contrast to the prevailing notion that political orientations predict residential context, residential context shapes political orientations.

Third, cutting-edge extant research on residential selection suggests that partisan considerations are not driving neighborhood selection (Mummolo and Nall 2016; Martin and Webster 2020) but instead show that partisans differentially select on other indicators like population density, urbanicity, and neighborhood walkability. Given that these factors may be correlated with

income inequality, they represent possible confounds. While we already control for population density, we run two additional tests to attempt to control for confounds that may influence partisan selection into low versus high inequality zips. In the first, (Table C2), we run our main models but controlling for a measure of urbanicity. In the second (Table C3), we estimate the same models but this time controlling for Walkscore data collected for each zip code in the Nationscape dataset. Walkscore is an aggregate score that takes into account access to public transit, commuting, and distance and ease of access to nearby amenities (like block length, intersection density, among others, see https://www.walkscore.com/methodology.shtml for more information). Our results are robust to these additions.

Finally, we collected data on the number of households in each zip code in the U.S. and the length of residency for each in that zip code. We then calculated the percent of households in each zip code that moved into that zip code before 2010. If our results are driven by sorting, we might expect to see effects emerge only in areas with greater numbers of new residents (having moved in after 2010). We split our sample by terciles and run our model just with residents who live in areas with the highest levels of residential sorting (lowest percentage of residents who moved in before 2010) and with residents who live in areas with the lowest levels of residential sorting (highest percentage of residents who moved in before 2010). In Table C4 we show that consistent effects only emerge for residents who live in areas with the lowest levels of residential sorting, additional suggestive evidence that our effects are not driven by residential sorting.

Table C1. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Non-Economic Placebo PoliciesConditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor

Dependent variable:

	Dream Act	Chinese Tariffs	Support Saudis	Gun BG Checks	Legal Marijuana	Trans Military	Abortion Wait
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Gini Coefficient	0.002	0.026	0.013	-0.001	0.032	-0.049	0.067
	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Pct in Pov Black	-0.024	-0.004	-0.059	0.049	-0.105	-0.094	-0.013
	(0.043)	(0.089)	(0.117)	(0.036)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.085)
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	0.015	-0.023	0.056	-0.093	0.164	0.083	-0.086
	(0.072)	(0.149)	(0.196)	(0.062)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.143)
Median Income	-0.002	0.026	-0.094**	0.050***	-0.081***	0.026	0.107***
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Unemployment Rate	-0.186***	-0.087	-0.288**	-0.117***	0.027	-0.247***	0.004
	(0.039)	(0.079)	(0.109)	(0.028)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.076)
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.056***	-0.080***	-0.092***	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.126***	-0.174***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Population Density	-0.158***	-0.065	-0.039	-0.166***	-0.289***	-0.192**	-0.560***
	(0.027)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.061)
Age	-0.048***	-0.295***	0.078***	0.104***	-0.353***	-0.213***	-0.173***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Male	-0.052***	0.012**	-0.040***	-0.076***	0.025***	-0.092***	-0.045***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.022***	0.041***	0.022***	-0.009***	-0.068***	0.027***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Income	0.030***	-0.038***	-0.002	0.012***	-0.042***	0.020***	0.016^{*}
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Party ID	-0.258***	-0.355***	-0.140***	-0.083***	-0.276***	-0.398***	-0.392***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
White	0.004	-0.011*	0.018**	0.010***	0.081***	0.032***	0.051***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.982***	0.607***	0.729***	0.963***	0.942***	1.098***	0.744***
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)

Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	318,055	65,021	41,150	346,896	105,262	102,039	96,684
\mathbb{R}^2	0.072	0.125	0.021	0.041	0.089	0.151	0.113

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Dependent variable:
Spending Gov't Minimum Wage Subsidized College Subsidized Health

Table C2. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Urban Fixed Effects)

	Spending Gov't Minimum Wage Subsidized College Subsidized Health					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Gini Coefficient	0.177***	0.267***	0.141***	0.151***		
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.035)		
Pct in Pov Black	0.147**	0.207**	0.173***	0.086		
	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.052)	(0.079)		
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.261**	-0.379**	-0.282**	-0.166		
	(0.087)	(0.120)	(0.088)	(0.132)		
Median Income	0.021	0.083***	-0.082***	-0.084***		
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.024)		
Unemployment Rate	0.235***	0.366***	0.434***	0.263***		
	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.071)		
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.091***	-0.138***	-0.027**	-0.096***		
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)		
Population Density	0.151***	0.207***	0.360***	0.400***		
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.061)		
Age	-0.190***	-0.068***	-0.418***	-0.455***		
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)		
Male	-0.082***	-0.063***	-0.059***	-0.018***		
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)		

Education	-0.003	-0.031***	-0.044***	-0.026***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Income	-0.079***	-0.124***	-0.113***	-0.115***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Party ID	-0.390***	-0.398***	-0.361***	-0.462***
5	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
White	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.013***	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.734***	0.861***	1.034***	1.037***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Urban-Rural FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	321,610	106,227	311,150	90,672
R ²	0.120	0.156	0.172	0.216

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C3. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive SpendingConditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (Controlling for Walkscore)

	Dependent variable:				
	Spending Gov't	Minimum Wage	Subsidized College	Subsidized Health	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gini Coefficient	0.161***	0.249***	0.131***	0.147***	
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.035)	
Pct in Pov Black	0.144**	0.198**	0.178***	0.090	
	(0.052)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.080)	
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.256**	-0.364**	-0.289***	-0.179	
	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.087)	(0.134)	
Median Income	0.032*	0.091***	-0.074***	-0.084***	
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)	

Unemployment Rate	0.255***	0.382***	0.451***	0.266***
	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.071)
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.087***	-0.121***	-0.017*	-0.072***
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Population Density	0.114**	0.142**	0.331***	0.377***
	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.063)
Age	-0.189***	-0.068***	-0.417***	-0.455***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Male	-0.083***	-0.063***	-0.059***	-0.018***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	-0.004	-0.031***	-0.044***	-0.026***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Income	-0.079***	-0.124***	-0.113***	-0.116***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Party ID	-0.389***	-0.397***	-0.360***	-0.460***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
White	-0.011***	-0.020***	-0.012***	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Walkscore	0.027***	0.040***	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Constant	0.739***	0.850***	1.029***	1.011***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	318,460	105,175	308,132	89,779
K-	0.120	0.156	0.172	0.215

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001**Table C4. Effect of Local Income Inequality on Support for Redistributive Spending Conditional on the Racial Composition of the Poor (By Residential Tenure)**

	Spending Gov't		Minimum Wage		Subsidized College		Subsidized Health	
	Lower Tercile	Upper Tercile	Lower Tercile	Upper Tercile	Lower Tercile	Upper Tercile	Lower Tercile	Upper Tercile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gini Coefficient	0.162***	0.190***	0.199***	0.317***	0.061	0.176***	0.240***	0.058
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Pct in Pov Black	0.108	0.432***	0.216*	0.398**	0.023	0.393***	0.157	0.265*
	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.152)	(0.076)	(0.096)	(0.130)	(0.127)
Gini X Pct in Pov Black	-0.195	-0.734***	-0.362*	-0.725**	-0.041	-0.654***	-0.282	-0.468*
	(0.134)	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.264)	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.212)	(0.220)
Median Income	0.004	0.069***	0.019	0.128***	-0.074*	-0.070**	-0.075	-0.085*
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.034)
Unemployment Rate	0.295***	0.222**	0.225*	0.512***	0.432***	0.549***	0.372**	0.319**
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.119)	(0.109)
Percent Trump (2016)	-0.136***	-0.071***	-0.196***	-0.113***	-0.114***	0.007	-0.161***	-0.048**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Population Density	0.082	0.282***	0.136	0.337***	0.284***	0.267***	0.343***	0.325***
	(0.049)	(0.073)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.091)
Age	-0.161***	-0.204***	-0.049***	-0.070***	-0.377***	-0.438***	-0.407***	-0.494***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Male	-0.078***	-0.087***	-0.048***	-0.068***	-0.043***	-0.071***	-0.001	-0.031***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Education	0.005	-0.013**	-0.023***	-0.037***	-0.039***	-0.050***	-0.021**	-0.031***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Income	-0.070***	-0.084***	-0.090***	-0.145***	-0.084***	-0.135***	-0.076***	-0.135***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Party ID	-0.377***	-0.401***	-0.375***	-0.421***	-0.333***	-0.390***	-0.433***	-0.497***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)
White	-0.014**	-0.011*	-0.031***	-0.016*	-0.017***	-0.014**	-0.005	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Constant	0.768***	0.725***	0.926***	0.818***	1.072***	1.035***	0.921***	1.103***

Dependent variable:

	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.039)
Survey Wave FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	104,639	113,823	34,908	37,208	102,511	108,989	29,833	31,676

Note: Linear probability model regression coefficients with zipcode-clustered heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Non-Black respondents only. Data from Nationscape Survey. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; **p<0.001

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