Appendix A: Alternate Working-Class Operationalization

Table A.1: Working Class as Lower Income

	Dependent variable:							
	Vot	e Switch Tr	ump	Vot	e Switch Cli	nton		
	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP	WWC Dem	WWC Ind	WWC GOP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Racial Attitudes	2.935***	2.013***	0.913	-0.610	-3.024***	-5.057***		
	(0.510)	(0.389)	(0.710)	(1.039)	(0.724)	(1.225)		
Immigration Attitudes	1.800***	1.875***	1.653***	-2.119***	-1.622***	-1.930**		
	(0.315)	(0.258)	(0.420)	(0.636)	(0.427)	(0.656)		
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.007	-0.005	-0.002		
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)		
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.835***	0.717*	0.893	0.796	-0.456	-2.108*		
	(0.421)	(0.317)	(0.540)	(0.881)	(0.499)	(0.827)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003	0.005	0.013	0.003	-0.018	0.002		
-	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.014)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.004	0.002	0.005	-0.001	0.001	0.004		
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)		
Family Income (low-high)	0.106	0.139	-0.091	-0.043	0.034	0.256		
	(0.106)	(0.083)	(0.136)	(0.203)	(0.127)	(0.213)		
Unemployed	-0.345	0.077	0.331	0.650	-0.102	0.534		
•	(0.433)	(0.321)	(0.509)	(0.971)	(0.470)	(0.776)		
Pct. Foreign Born	0.003	0.0002	-0.005	-0.007	-0.0002	-0.002		
ret. roleigii bolli	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)		
Union (no was is)	-0.023	0.220	-0 506*	-0.229	-0.097	-0.089		
	(0.149)	(0.129)	(0.229)	(0.314)	(0.215)	(0.313)		
Female	0.151	0.218	0.054	0.274	0 772**	0.388		
remaie	(0.204)	(0.160)	-0.034	(0.403)	(0.772)	(0.333)		
Idealogy (lib consy)	0 572***	0.517***	0.401*	0.487*	0.652***	1 099***		
Ideology (IID-collsv)	(0.118)	(0.106)	(0.183)	(0.239)	(0.154)	(0.250)		
0 4	0.111	(0.100)	(0.105)	0.0(0	0.202	(0.250)		
South	(0.247)	(0.180)	(0.218)	(0.430)	0.303	-0.039		
G 11	(0.247)	(0.100)	(0.516)	(0.439)	(0.282)	(0.499)		
College	-0.526	-0.494*	-0.535	0.860	0.319	-0.281		
_	(0.340)	(0.213)	(0.388)	(0.477)	(0.282)	(0.530)		
Constant	-7.258***	-6.408***	-2.302*	1.094	0.684	3.254*		
	(0.670)	(0.565)	(1.028)	(1.172)	(0.768)	(1.418)		
Observations	2,663	1,706	294	211	1,556	2,120		
Log Likelihood	-405.922	-553.991	-178.879	-100.324	-246.923	-123.452		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	841.843	1,137.981	387.758	230.649	523.847	276.905		

Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Working class in these models is specified as being in the lower tercile of the 2016 CCES income distribution. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix B: Bias in 2012 Vote Recall

Previous research has argued that poor recall, social desirability, and lying may bias such selfreports of past voting (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000; Krosnick 1991). If this is the case in the CCES, it could be artificially inflating the number of Obama to Trump vote switchers. Further, if racially conservative white Trump voters were concerned about being labeled racist for their support of Trump, they might say they voted for Obama in 2012 as an act of what Effron et al. (2009) call "moral credentialing," an alternative explanation for this study's core findings. In this section, however, we argue that poor recall is actually a smaller problem than past research suggests and does not threaten analyses that rely on past vote recall.

Studies have suggested that vote recall is biased towards the winner of an election (Wright 1993). This research finds, though, that misreporting in *presidential elections* is actually quite small, somewhere between 1% (Rivers and Lauderdale 2016) and 1.5% (Wright 1993), and that it is a product of memory, not intention to mislead interviewers (Wright 1993). Higher rates of winner bias in self-reported votes generally emerge in recalled House, Senate, and Gubernatorial votes (Carsey and Jackson 2001).

Other research finds that biased recall doesn't tend to move in favor of the winning candidate but in the direction of making the previous vote consistent with the vote the respondent most recently cast (Benewick et al. 1969; Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978) leading to an overestimate of stability in voting, not towards the winner of the previous election. This effect, some argue (Van Elsas et al. 2014), is due to the desire to reduce cognitive inconsistencies and strengthens as time passes between actual vote and recall. If this bias is present in our data, it would actually reduce rates of switching, not inflate it.

Finally, a recent study commissioned by Doug Rivers and Ben Lauderdale (2016) at YouGov finds little cause for concern about poor recall of past presidential voting. In 2016, the researchers selected 1,597 YouGov panelists who had been interviewed immediately after the 2012 election, matched them to voter files, and re-contacted them to ask who they had voted for in 2012. They found extremely high levels of correct recall between 2012 and 2016. About 95% of respondents gave the same answer both times and there was little asymmetry in who they recalled voting for, leading to about a 1% overstatement in vote for Obama.

Given these findings, we are less concerned about bias towards the winner in recall of past vote that might be producing the results we find in our study. Nevertheless, we wanted to further investigate the possibility that White voters who supported Trump but who wanted to avoid appearing racist on the survey might have lied about voting for Obama in 2012 as an act of "moral licensing" (Effron, Cameron, and Monin 2009). We first argue that the order of the questions in the CCES reduce the likelihood of social desirability in lying about voting for Barack Obama in 2012. Second, we use the 2008-2009 ANES panel survey to assess the number of racially conservative voters who say they were supporting McCain in October of 2008 but report voting for Obama just after the election in November. We estimate that about 1.25% of racially resentful Whites did so, a number just slightly higher than but not statistically distinguishable from all White voters (1%) or racially liberal voters (0.66%), and in line with previous estimates of vote lying.

First, we argue that several components of the design of the CCES survey will minimize social desirability and thus lying about 2012 vote choice. Researchers have shown social desirability to

be minimized in a web-based research setting, as opposed to in-person or phone-based, both of which feature live interviewers asking the questions (Krysan 1998; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). The CCES is completed by respondents on their own computers, is completely anonymous, and can be completed in as private a location as the respondent chooses. Second, respondents might be more likely to lie about their 2012 vote choice if the question was asked close to or immediately after respondents were asked their 2016 vote choice. This is not the case. In the CCES, respondents were asked about their 2012 vote early in the survey and in the middle of a number of questions about political knowledge and general approval of different institutional bodies (congress, parties, etc.), before Trump was even mentioned in the survey, reducing the priming effect that might have accompanied questions about Donald Trump.

Second, we analyzed existing panel data with questions on candidate support before an election and vote choice after an election to try and get a sense of what proportion of white voters might lie about voting for Obama and whether certain subsamples of White voters are more likely to lie about their votes. Given the secret ballot in the US, we cannot, of course, know whether respondents are truly lying. And indeed there are some voters who might switch their votes at the last minute (Hopkins 2016). This analysis, however, will give us an upper bound estimate of how many White voters might lie about voting for Obama.

To do this, we collected and analyzed the 2008-2009 ANES panel dataset which includes a candidate support question asked in the October 2008 wave and retrospective vote reported in the November 2008 wave. Using this dataset, we can look at how many racially resentful White voters indicated support for McCain one month or less before the election and then reported voting for Obama almost immediately after the election occurred, a group that is likely to contain both liars and actual last-minute vote switchers. We can then conduct several subgroup analyses to see if this lying is more pronounced among those with above-median levels of racial resentment.

We present the weighted proportion of all whites, all whites with or without a college education, and whites who fall above or below the median racial resentment score in Table [vote_lie] below. Assuming every respondent here actually voted McCain in 2008 and lied about it, we estimate a ceiling of less than 1% for all whites and 1.28% for white respondents high in racial resentment and 0.66% for those low in racial resentment, a statistically indistinguishable difference (p = 0.19). In sum, there may be a very small bias in favor of reporting a vote for Obama in 2012, but the size of the bias is small enough to not elicit concerns about the manuscript's core analyses and does not appear to be significantly more pronounced among those high in racial resentment than those low in racial resentment.

\mathbf{I}	Table	B. 1	l:	Assessing	Potentia	l Lvin	g in	2008	Vote	Recall
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Table B.1: Assessing Potentia	al Lying in 2008 Vote Rec
Subgroup	ANES 08-09
All Whites	0.83%
College Whites	0.94%
WWC	0.78%
Low Racial Resentment Whites	0.66%
High Racial Resentment Whites	1.28%

Note: weighted percent who indicated support for McCain in October wave and a vote for Obama in November wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey.

Appendix C: Pooled Regression Models

Table C.1: Pooling Across Partisans

	Dependent variable:									
	Trump All	Trump WWC	Trump Non-WWC	Clinton All	Clinton WWC	Clinton Non-WWC				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Racial Attitudes	2.556***	2.306***	3.241***	-2.846***	-2.501***	-3.305***				
	(0.171)	(0.198)	(0.342)	(0.116)	(0.151)	(0.184)				
Immigration Attitudes	1.921***	1.821***	2.201***	-1.062***	-1.084***	-1.040***				
	(0.110)	(0.127)	(0.224)	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.106)				
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002**	0.002*	0.002	0.0004	-0.0001	0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.042***	1.175***	0.611*	-0.163*	-0.477***	0.162				
	(0.142)	(0.164)	(0.283)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.118)				
Relative Deprivation	-0.270*	-0.284*	-0.215	-0.211***	-0.193*	-0.247**				
	(0.114)	(0.130)	(0.232)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.086)				
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.002	0.0003	0.010	0.007***	0.006**	0.008**				
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)				
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001***	0.001*	0.002**				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Family Income (low-high)	-0.024	-0.018	-0.036	-0.036***	-0.031*	-0.044**				
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)				
Unemployed	-0.034	0.040	-0.394	-0.209*	-0.335*	0.034				
	(0.171)	(0.183)	(0.482)	(0.106)	(0.135)	(0.180)				
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0003	0.001	0.001	-0.0002				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Union (no, was, is)	0.053	0.0003	0.204*	0.058*	0.114***	-0.012				
	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.089)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.034)				
Female	0.252***	0.221**	0.302*	0.025	0.017	0.028				
	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.140)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.053)				
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.614***	0.617***	0.581***	-0.126***	-0.129***	-0.120***				
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.087)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.034)				
South	0.096	0.140	-0.050	0.004	-0.038	0.077				
	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.169)	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.066)				
Partisanship (R)	0.375***	0.368***	0.386***	-0.402***	-0.504***	-0.291***				
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.080)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.028)				
College	-0.634*** (0.083)			-0.058 (0.040)						
Constant	-6.964***	-6.825***	-7.832***	2.330***	2.506***	2.166***				
	(0.278)	(0.321)	(0.565)	(0.136)	(0.187)	(0.198)				
Observations	15,661	8,422	7,239	15,661	8,422	7,239				
Log Likelihood	-3,147.305	-2,314.319	-821.592	-9,307.065	-4,930.421	-4,333.113				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,328.609	4,660.639	1,675.185	18,648.130	9,892.843	8,698.225				

Appendix D: Question Wording, Variable Coding, Key Variable Distributions, and Detailed Survey Information

Racial Attitudes

The racial attitudes scale was constructed of three items in the CCES, listed below, (α =0.68). These items have an average inter-item correlation of 0.42 and all load highly together on a single factor (Q1: 0.61, Q2: 0.72, Q3: 0.62).

- 1. "I am angry that racism exists" (5=strongly disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, 1=strongly agree)
- 2. "White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin" (5=strongly disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=somewhat agree, 1=strongly agree)
- 3. "Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations." (1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=somewhat agree, 5=strongly agree)



Figure D.1: Distribution of Racial Attitudes Scale

Immigration Attitudes

The immigration attitudes scale was constructed of four items in the CCES, listed below (α =0.69). The items have an average inter-item correlation of 0.35 and all load together on a single factor (Q1: 0.73, Q2: 0.66, Q3: 0.48, Q4: 0.53). Respondents were asked "What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply."

- 1. Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. (0=selected, 1=not selected)
- 2. Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. (0=not selected, 1=selected)
- 3. Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school (0=selected, 1=not selected)
- 4. Identify and deport illegal immigrants (0=not selected, 1=selected)



Figure D.2: Distribution of Immigration Attitudes Scale

Distribution of immigration attitude scale

While our Cronbach's alpha for both scales falls slightly below the frequently cited 0.70 minimum for non-applied settings (Nunnally 1978; Hair et al. 2010), we follow Cho and Kim (2015) in suggesting that arbitrary cut offs for acceptable criteria are not advised and instead focus on a range of criteria including average inter-item correlation and single-factor loading. We find that our two scales are measuring a single underlying latent variable with moderate levels of internal consistency.

Figure D.3: Growth of County Latino Population



Figure D.4: Retrospective Economic Evaluations

• "Over the past FOUR YEARS, has your household's annual income increased a lot (1), increased somewhat (2), stayed about the same (3), decreased somewhat (4), or decreased a lot (5)?"



Figure D.5: Distribution of relative Economic Deprivation



Figure D.6: Distribution of % Change in Manufacturing



Figure D.7: Distribution of % Change In Unemployment



Control variables:

- Which of the following best describes your current employment status? 1=unemployed, 0=else
- Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 1=Less than \$10,000; 2= \$10,000 \$19,999; 3=\$20,000 \$29,999; 4=\$30,000 \$39,999; 5= \$40,000 \$49,999; 6=\$50,000 \$59,999; 7= \$60,000 \$69,999; 8=\$70,000 \$79,999; 9=\$80,000 \$99,999; 10= \$100,000 \$119,999; 11=\$120,000 \$149,999; 12= \$150,000 or more.
- Are you a member of a labor union? Other than yourself, is any member of your household a union member? 1 = Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union; Yes, a member of my household is currently a union member; 2 = I formerly was a member of a labor union; A member of my household was formerly a member of a labor union, but is not now 3 = I am not now, nor have I been, a member of a labor union; No, no one in my household has ever been a member of a labor union
- Are you male or female? 1 = female, 0 = male
- In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very liberal (1); Liberal (2); Moderate / Not sure (3); Conservative (4); Very conservative (5)

Appendix E: Disaggregating Scales

There has long been debates over the true stability of public opinion (Zaller 1992), suggesting that responses to single survey items may be plagued by measurement error due to inattentiveness, vague response categories, and confusing question wording among others. One way to reduce measurement error is to use multiple measures and average across the responses (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), which is what we do for the immigration attitudes and racial attitudes questions from our survey.

We don't suspect, however, that this is cause for concern with our economic measures. First, concern about attitude stability and measurement error typically focus on questions about policy attitudes (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), which can be confusing to respondents or for which individuals may simply have no views (Zaller 1992). Of our four economic indicators, only one question is actually asking respondents to give us their subjective opinion on their economic standing (retrospective measure) and the other three are constructed from their response to their income question (relative deprivation) or from county level measures (change in unemployment and change in manufacturing). Further, asking respondents whether they and their families are better off today than they were a year before is far less prone to measurement error than other economic perception questions (Healy, Persson, and Snowberg 2017). Nevertheless, we attempt to level the playing field and disaggregate our racial attitude and immigration attitude scales into single issue items in our models, which we display in Table E.1.We find that some of the individual items do indeed have stronger associations than others, but that the substantive story is the same.

	Dependent variable:							
	Vot	e Switch Tr	ump	Vot	e Switch Cl	inton		
	Dem	Ind	Rep	Dem	Ind	Rep		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Not Angry Racism Exists	0.295***	0.103*	0.065	-0.053	-0.300**	-0.100		
	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.133)	(0.096)	(0.112)		
Whites Don't Have Advantages	0.385***	0.446***	0.237***	0.042	-0.428***	-0.456***		
	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.096)	(0.068)	(0.082)		
Racial Problems are Rare	0.112	0.054	0.048	-0.342**	-0.294***	-0.400***		
	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.113)	(0.073)	(0.093)		
Deport Undocumented	0.750***	0.729***	0.548**	-0.188	-0.376*	-0.226		
	(0.157)	(0.114)	(0.174)	(0.272)	(0.180)	(0.204)		
Don't Grant Legal Status	0.123	0.0004	0.032	-0.456	-0.262	-0.424*		
	(0.152)	(0.113)	(0.176)	(0.248)	(0.166)	(0.208)		
Increase Border Patrol	0.466***	0.718***	0.154	-0.020	-0.421**	-0.810***		
	(0.141)	(0.107)	(0.165)	(0.248)	(0.155)	(0.185)		
No Dream Act	0.670***	0.467***	0.377*	-0.668**	-0.404**	-0.711***		
	(0.156)	(0.112)	(0.177)	(0.234)	(0.155)	(0.194)		
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.004*	-0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.871***	0.440*	0.699*	-0.582	-0.751**	-1.343***		
	(0.283)	(0.202)	(0.315)	(0.500)	(0.283)	(0.387)		
Relative Deprivation	-0.140	-0.330*	-0.281	0.043	0.065	0.021		
	(0.218)	(0.166)	(0.261)	(0.354)	(0.222)	(0.292)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.004	0.006	0.007	-0.004	-0.001	0.005		
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003	0.002*	0.004*	0.003	0.003	0.005**		

Table E.1: Disaggregating Scales

	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.001	-0.042	-0.052	-0.0002	-0.004	0.045
	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Unemployed	0.092	-0.204	0.457	0.066	-0.298	0.145
	(0.319)	(0.261)	(0.395)	(0.635)	(0.370)	(0.553)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002	0.0005	0.0001	-0.002	0.002	-0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.110	0.126	-0.135	-0.110	-0.057	-0.372*
	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.105)	(0.152)	(0.101)	(0.148)
Female	-0.169	0.243*	0.252	0.344	0.634***	0.380*
	(0.135)	(0.100)	(0.159)	(0.241)	(0.140)	(0.193)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.537***	0.455***	0.312**	-0.305*	-0.418***	-1.036***
	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.096)	(0.131)	(0.089)	(0.125)
South	0.100	0.175	-0.169	0.049	0.173	-0.489*
	(0.169)	(0.119)	(0.182)	(0.262)	(0.160)	(0.220)
College	-0.510**	-0.441***	-0.690***	0.183	0.318*	0.350
	(0.177)	(0.116)	(0.184)	(0.272)	(0.147)	(0.197)
Constant	-8.210***	-5.985***	-2.991***	0.858	1.610**	4.203***
	(0.532)	(0.403)	(0.679)	(0.793)	(0.523)	(0.814)
Observations	9,389	5,357	915	584	5,526	7,925
Log Likelihood	-957.748	-1,452.551	-528.143	-282.227	-831.426	-549.018
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,957.495	2,947.102	1,098.285	606.453	1,704.851	1,140.035

Appendix F: Different Time Spans

Table F.1:	Differing	Time	Spans	for	Change	Variable

			Dependen	t variable:		
	Vot	e Switch Tru	ımp	Vote	e Switch Cli	nton
	00-14	10-14	14-16	00-14	10-14	14-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	2.737***	2.756***	2.743***	-3.404***	-3.391***	-3.396***
	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.282)
Immigration Attitudes	1.930***	1.926***	1.927***	-1.625***	-1.614***	-1.610***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.162)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.168***	1.179***	1.170***	-0.910***	-0.902***	-0.878***
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.200)
Relative Deprivation	-0.250*	-0.232*	-0.235*	0.053	0.085	0.067
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.003			-0.002		
	(0.003)			(0.004)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001			0.003*		
	(0.001)			(0.001)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (10-14)		-0.002			-0.001	
		(0.003)			(0.005)	
Pct. Unemployment Diff (10-14)		-0.005*			0.002	
		(0.002)			(0.003)	
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (14-16)			0.001			-0.001
			(0.003)			(0.005)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (14-16)			-0.001			-0.015**
			(0.004)			(0.006)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.018	-0.014	-0.015	-0.002	0.005	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Unemployed	-0.026	-0.025	-0.027	-0.142	-0.143	-0.133
	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.275)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Union (no, was, is)	0.021	0.020	0.023	-0.106	-0.106	-0.105
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Female	0.190**	0.185**	0.188**	0.591***	0.589***	0.594***
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.652***	0.646***	0.649***	-0.704***	-0.698***	-0.706***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
South	0.112	0.148	0.130	-0.084	-0.045	-0.034
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.111)
College	-0.591***	-0.595***	-0.597***	0.253*	0.238*	0.246*
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Constant	-6.434***	-6.381***	-6.477***	1.437***	1.529***	1.298***
	(0.268)	(0.261)	(0.270)	(0.356)	(0.345)	(0.360)
Observations	15,665	15,663	15,665	14,037	14,037	14,037
Log Likelihood	-3,199.565	-3,198.076	-3,201.251	-1,791.560	-1,795.121	-1,791.980
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,431.130	6,428.153	6,434.503	3,615.120	3,622.242	3,615.960

Appendix G: Multiple Imputation

		Trump			Clinton	
	Dem	Ind	Rep	Dem	Ind	Rep
Racial Attitudes	1.389**	0.817***	0.561***	-2.235***	-3.349***	-3.216***
	(0.477)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.145)	(0.188)	(0.569)
Immigration Attitudes	0.307	1.155***	0.536***	-1.038***	-1.068***	-1.352***
	(0.309)	(0.096)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.107)	(0.308)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.004*	-0.0003	0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.196**	0.676***	0.673***	0.437***	-0.378**	-0.233
	(0.413)	(0.116)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.125)	(0.396)
Relative Deprivation	-0.364	-0.216*	-0.262***	-0.250***	-0.167	-0.484
	(0.318)	(0.093)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.108)	(0.337)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003	0.006**	0.005**	0.010***	0.002	0.020**
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.002***	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.056	-0.012	-0.030*	-0.041***	-0.016	-0.020
	(0.054)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.059)
Unemployed	-0.133	-0.535***	-0.228	-0.159	-0.262	-0.605
	(0.498)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.163)	(0.758)
Pct. Foreign Born	0.00002	0.001	0.0003	0.0001	0.00004	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Union (no, was, is)	0.221	0.125**	0.117***	0.043	0.023	0.115
	(0.124)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.121)
Female	-0.057	0.007	0.129**	0.306***	0.046	0.279
	(0.193)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.195)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.490***	0.485***	0.306***	-0.170***	-0.024	-0.265*
	(0.120)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.114)
South	-0.070	0.216***	0.017	-0.001	-0.001	-0.115
	(0.229)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.230)
College	-0.267	-0.368***	-0.452***	-0.162***	0.105	-0.034
	(0.252)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.222)
Constant	-3.678***	-3.319***	-1.458***	1.552***	0.701**	1.025
	(0.734)	(0.234)	(0.206)	(0.157)	(0.233)	(0.766)
Observations	11,400	6,636	1,248	687	6,998	9,802

Table G.1: Core Model Results with Imputed Missing Values

Appendix H: Full Regression Tables Core Models

Table H.1: Predictors	of Shifting to	Trump in 2016

	Dependent variable:										
					Trump Switch						
	Dem (All Whites)	Ind (All Whites)	GOP All Whites)	Dem (WWC)	Ind (WWC)	GOP (WWC)	Dem (Non- WWC)	Ind (Non-WWC)	GOP (Non- WWC)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
Racial Attitudes	3.239*** (0.338)	2.559*** (0.238)	1.548*** (0.398)	2.895*** (0.379)	2.216*** (0.279)	1.544** (0.480)	4.595*** (0.756)	3.395*** (0.459)	1.548* (0.736)		
Immigration Attitudes	2.024*** (0.211)	1.952*** (0.161)	1.154*** (0.244)	2.017*** (0.236)	1.802*** (0.189)	1.064*** (0.287)	1.951*** (0.476)	2.337*** (0.308)	1.475** (0.477)		
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)		
Family Econ Situation Worse	2.015*** (0.279)	0.532** (0.200)	0.822** (0.308)	2.088*** (0.316)	0.700** (0.234)	0.788* (0.363)	1.510* (0.610)	0.081 (0.389)	0.726 (0.604)		
Relative Deprivation	-0.176 (0.217)	-0.302 (0.163)	-0.272 (0.259)	-0.120 (0.245)	-0.347 (0.190)	-0.312 (0.301)	-0.309 (0.481)	-0.174 (0.323)	-0.121 (0.525)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00- 14)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	0.023** (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.013)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.003 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.004)		
Family Income (low-high)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.053 (0.044)	0.012 (0.043)	-0.039 (0.033)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.053)	-0.064 (0.084)		
Unemployed	0.008 (0.322)	-0.286 (0.258)	0.367 (0.391)	0.092 (0.339)	-0.177 (0.279)	0.286 (0.413)	-0.510 (1.079)	-0.629 (0.669)	1.100 (1.148)		
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.00001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)		
Union (no, was, is)	0.103 (0.084)	0.137* (0.068)	-0.126 (0.104)	0.020 (0.096)	0.100 (0.081)	-0.132 (0.126)	0.414* (0.178)	0.267* (0.128)	-0.137 (0.195)		
Female	-0.116 (0.133)	0.305** (0.098)	0.289 (0.156)	-0.170 (0.148)	0.330** (0.115)	0.136 (0.185)	-0.055 (0.308)	0.172 (0.192)	0.600* (0.303)		
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.543*** (0.080)	0.458*** (0.068)	0.315*** (0.095)	0.548*** (0.091)	0.493*** (0.080)	0.306** (0.112)	0.542** (0.179)	0.344** (0.130)	0.276 (0.190)		
South	0.103 (0.168)	0.209 (0.117)	-0.138 (0.180)	0.116 (0.187)	0.259 (0.139)	-0.081 (0.211)	-0.036 (0.405)	0.080 (0.224)	-0.217 (0.359)		
College	0.596*** (0.175)	0.564*** (0.114)	- 0.740*** (0.181)								
Constant	7.405*** (0.510)	5.341*** (0.390)	2.681*** (0.646)	7.465*** (0.581)	5.174*** (0.456)	-2.377** (0.756)	-7.631*** (1.081)	6.268*** (0.776)	-3.841** (1.319)		
Observations	9,389	5,357	915	4,887	2,936	599	4,502	2,421	316		
Log Likelihood	-966.969	-1,487.120	-532.005	-746.279	-1,057.267	-381.149	-209.087	-420.517	-147.858		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1.965.938	3.006.240	1.096.011	1.522.558	2.144.534	792.297	448,174	871.034	325.716		

					Dependent variabl	le:			
					Clinton Switch				
	Dem (All Whites)	Ind (All Whites)	GOP (All Whites)	Dem (WWC)	Ind (WWC)	GOP (WWC)	Dem (Non- WWC)	Ind (Non-WWC)	GOP (Non- WWC)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Racial Attitudes	-1.253* (0.598)	4.208*** (0.420)	4.153*** (0.546)	-0.758 (0.671)	3.795*** (0.594)	4.288*** (0.773)	-3.262* (1.504)	4.846*** (0.611)	-3.948*** (0.785)
Immigration Attitudes	- 1.240*** (0.357)	1.497*** (0.242)	- 2.080*** (0.296)	- 1.299** (0.408)	- 1.316*** (0.337)	- 1.993*** (0.417)	-0.838 (0.858)	- 1.719*** (0.356)	-2.207*** (0.427)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	-0.495 (0.485)	-0.790** (0.282)	1.400*** (0.385)	-0.196 (0.570)	-0.494 (0.420)	-1.057 (0.542)	-1.379 (1.048)	-1.036** (0.384)	-1.838*** (0.556)
Relative Deprivation	-0.003 (0.347)	0.077 (0.222)	0.015 (0.290)	0.117 (0.414)	0.193 (0.330)	0.442 (0.401)	-0.575 (0.730)	-0.038 (0.309)	-0.454 (0.446)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00- 14)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.005 (0.019)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.011)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00- 14)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.011 (0.060)	-0.003 (0.037)	0.042 (0.050)	0.038 (0.073)	-0.004 (0.056)	0.067 (0.067)	-0.154 (0.117)	0.003 (0.052)	0.016 (0.076)
Unemployed	0.147 (0.622)	-0.288 (0.370)	0.152 (0.549)	-0.142 (0.824)	-1.305* (0.642)	-0.047 (0.742)	1.606 (1.290)	0.638 (0.487)	0.354 (0.853)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.091 (0.149)	-0.062 (0.101)	-0.366* (0.147)	-0.031 (0.176)	-0.134 (0.155)	-0.284 (0.205)	-0.153 (0.311)	0.009 (0.135)	-0.445* (0.215)
Female	0.345 (0.232)	0.612*** (0.139)	0.346 (0.191)	0.335 (0.284)	0.803*** (0.211)	0.462 (0.285)	0.737 (0.463)	0.423* (0.189)	0.277 (0.263)
Ideology (lib-consv)	-0.255* (0.128)	0.423*** (0.088)	- 1.037*** (0.124)	-0.140 (0.156)	0.714*** (0.131)	1.057*** (0.162)	-0.470 (0.261)	-0.148 (0.123)	-1.010*** (0.195)
South	0.079 (0.259)	0.179 (0.160)	-0.485* (0.220)	0.028 (0.306)	0.361 (0.234)	-0.384 (0.293)	-0.163 (0.603)	-0.039 (0.225)	-0.597 (0.335)
College	0.178 (0.267)	0.348* (0.146)	0.396* (0.193)						
Constant	0.384 (0.757)	0.609 (0.511)	3.088*** (0.777)	-0.769 (0.920)	1.091 (0.752)	2.465* (1.027)	3.438* (1.548)	0.377 (0.707)	3.866** (1.233)
Observations	584	5,526	7,925	435	3,426	5,238	149	2,100	2,687
Log Likelihood	-287.715	-832.646	-554.341	-207.086	-413.015	-298.933	-73.030	-408.075	-251.312
Akaike Inf. Crit.	607.430	1,697.292	1,140.682	444.172	856.031	627.865	176.061	846.151	532.625

Table H.2 Predictors of Shifting to Clinton in 2016

Appendix I: Model Fit

Given that "vote switchers" represent a low percentage of the overall electorate, we calculated a number of fit statistics to determine how well our models were performing. Because we want to avoid selecting arbitrary thresholds to classify predicted probabilities as successes and failures, we instead follow Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks (2011) and produce both ROC plots (Robin et al. 2011), AUC scores, and separation plots. The ROC plot and AUC score gives us a general overview of model fit while the separation plot provides a nice visual representation where each line represents the predicted probability of a success. We find that our model does a very good job predicting Trump vote switching among Democrats and Independents, and Clinton vote switching among Republicans and Independents. It has a harder time predicting Republican Obama to Trump switchers and Democratic Romney to Clinton switchers, the two categories with the smallest numbers in our data. Nevertheless, the AUC numbers generated from the ROC plots indicate a decent fit for all of the models. We display the results in Figure I.1.



Figure I.1: Assessing Model Fit

Note: ROC curves (Robin et al., 2011) and separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks, 2011) for Trump and Clinton vote switching models. In Panel A we display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan split-sample models of Trump switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.88, Democrat 0.90, Independent 0.96, Republican 0.73) and their corresponding separation plots in Panel B. In panel C we display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan splitsample models of Clinton switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.87, Democrat 0.73, Independent 0.88, Republican 0.87) and their corresponding separation plots in Panel D.

Appendix J: Panel Data

Learning or Priming?

Recent research in political science has shown that, rather than holding policy attitudes that inform their candidate choices, most voters simply adopt the policy views of the leaders they support (Lenz 2012). This may lead some readers to worry that voters in our data switched their support to Trump for reasons not captured by our independent variables, and then simply adopted his anti-immigrant views. We are skeptical that this is the case with immigration attitudes, which like racial attitudes are likely to be sufficiently crystallized, salient and durable as to constitute a predisposition largely immune to change (Tesler 2015). Nevertheless, the possibility of reverse causality between immigration attitudes and vote-switching exists and requires an approach different from ours to rule out.

To address this, we leveraged a multi-wave study, the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group VOTER Survey (https://www.voterstudygroup.org/about), and tested the extent to which immigration attitudes as measured in 2011, long before Trump's rise to prominence, predicted a vote-switch to Trump in November of 2016.1 The panel nature of the VOTER Survey allows us to test whether pre-existing immigration attitudes are related to switching to Trump, before respondents had been exposed to Trump's racially conservative or anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric. If respondents' pre-existing immigration attitudes, free of exposure to leaders' policy positions, are related to vote-switching, we will be less worried about a reverse causal process.

The VOTER Survey worked with YouGov to poll adults whom had participated in political surveys in 2011, 2012, and 2016. In total, 8,000 adults (age 18 or older) with internet access took the 2016 survey between November 29 and December 29, 2016 (margin of error +/- 2.2%). Respondents had been interviewed in December of 2011 and a second time in 2012 as part of the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) survey. The sampling strategy is the same as that for the CCES, as reported in the body of this manuscript.2

All variables in the VOTER Survey have been coded the same way as variables in the CCES with minor changes. First, racial attitudes were measured using the classic 4-item racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996) that has been rescaled to range between 0 (racially liberal) to 1 (racially conservative). Immigration attitudes were measured using a 3-question battery of immigration policy attitudes, which are detailed below. The economic measures were identical to those used with the CCES.

Because the VOTER Survey contains a much smaller sample size than the CCES, we have far less statistical power and therefore have to pool the data rather than estimate models for each partisan group. Despite this limitation, the pattern of results, presented in Table [panel], is essentially identical to those reported previously. We find that white citizens with racially conservative or conservative immigration views (as measured before Trump's rise) were significantly more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016, compared to those with racially

¹ We again defined our dependent variable as switching from voting for someone other than Romney in 2012, to voting for Trump in 2016 and voting for someone other than Obama in 2012 and voting for Clinton 2016.

² More information can be found at https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/methodology

conservative views or positive attitudes towards immigrants. Similar effects also hold for the Clinton models. Racially liberal whites and whites with more expansionary views on immigration were more likely to switch to Clinton compared to their racially conservative or anti-immigrant counterparts. Similar effect sizes emerge for the retrospective economic measure as well as the three contextual economic measures for both Trump and Clinton models. These results help assuage our concerns about the potential endogeneity of racial and immigration attitudes.

Racial Resentment

- 1. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (5=Strongly agree; 1=Strongly disagree).
- 2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors (5=Strongly disagree; 1=Strongly agree).
- 3. It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would just try harder they could be just as well off as whites (5=Strongly disagree; 1=Strongly agree).
- 4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class (5=Strongly agree; 1=Strongly disagree).

Immigration Attitudes

- 1. Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain? (3=Mostly a drain; 2=Neither; 1=Mostly make a contribution)
- 2. Do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become a U.S. citizens? (1=Oppose; 0=Favor)
- 3. Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the United States legally than it is currently? (5=Much harder; 1=Much easier)

	Dependent variable:						
		Trump		Clinton			
	All Whites	WWC	Non-WC	All Whites	WWC	Non-WC	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Racial Attitudes	2.201***	2.334***	1.897**	-1.902***	-1.085	-2.904***	
	(0.367)	(0.438)	(0.721)	(0.490)	(0.698)	(0.745)	
Immigration Attitudes	1.844***	1.278***	3.191***	-1.197**	-0.464	-1.689**	
	(0.295)	(0.349)	(0.585)	(0.373)	(0.539)	(0.556)	
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.00003	-0.00001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Family Econ Situation Worse	1.184***	1.113***	1.302**	-0.690*	-0.113	-1.319**	
	(0.251)	(0.306)	(0.458)	(0.311)	(0.435)	(0.479)	
Relative Deprivation	0.057	0.084	0.148	-0.209	0.095	-0.842	
	(0.268)	(0.321)	(0.489)	(0.312)	(0.430)	(0.503)	
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.003	-0.006	0.002	0.003	0.014	-0.024	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.013)	

Table J.1: Learning or Priming

Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.002	-0.005**	0.005	-0.00004	-0.0004	0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.028	0.007	-0.095	-0.053	-0.056	-0.088
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.078)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.077)
Unemployed	0.082	0.213	-1.156	-1.897**	-0.886	-3.992**
	(0.351)	(0.384)	(0.974)	(0.715)	(0.670)	(1.348)
Pct. Foreign Born Change	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Union (no, family, is)	-0.015	-0.073	0.171	-0.156	-0.210	-0.170
	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.217)	(0.163)	(0.231)	(0.244)
Female	0.123	0.222	-0.160	0.687***	0.614*	0.558
	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.291)	(0.189)	(0.270)	(0.293)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.718***	0.712***	0.791***	-0.855***	-0.945***	-0.941***
	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.231)	(0.137)	(0.185)	(0.234)
South	0.010	0.009	0.161	0.232	0.336	-0.178
	(0.174)	(0.205)	(0.345)	(0.214)	(0.294)	(0.335)
College	-0.255			0.320		
	(0.172)			(0.200)		
PID (Republican)	0.675***	0.669***	0.729***	-0.689***	-0.729***	-0.632***
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.106)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.114)
Constant	-9.088***	-8.781***	-10.502***	6.334***	5.618***	7.830***
	(0.647)	(0.761)	(1.320)	(0.762)	(1.044)	(1.230)
Observations	3,020	1,658	1,362	3,507	2,172	1,335
Log Likelihood	-645.481	-457.388	-175.962	-467.156	-257.873	-192.985
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,324.962	946.775	383.923	968.311	547.746	417.970

Appendix K: Racial Conservatives Still Supporting Obama in 2012?

Why would racially resentful voters who switched their votes to Trump in 2012 because of their racial conservatism and anti-immigrant views still be voting for President Obama in 2012 after four years of a highly racialized first term in office where numerous issues from racial justice (Trayvon Martin) to immigration (DACA) dominated headlines and perceptions of the Democratic Party as increasingly Black and Latino were already cemented (Tesler 2016b).

There is evidence that racial attitudes have become more strongly associated with a variety of outcomes over time, including between 2012 and 2016. Enders and Scott (2018) show that correlations between racial resentment and party identification, ideology, presidential candidate thermometer ratings, voting, and attitudes towards health insurance and government services strengthened between 2012 and 2016. Using different data, Tesler (2016c) shows that racial attitudes mattered more in 2016 voting than in 2008 or 2012, helping explain why some racial conservatives were still supporting Obama in 2012. Indeed, Tesler (2016a) shows that fully a quarter of Whites who strongly opposed interracial dating still supported Obama in 2012. Finally, Sides (2017) finds that attitudes related to immigration, religion, and race were more salient to voter decision making in 2016 than in 2012 and that this pattern is not found for other attitudes.

How could this be the case? First, we argue that race and immigration were more salient in 2016 than in 2012. President Trump was more explicitly racial in his appeals than any previous candidate, shifting norms around what sort of prejudiced beliefs and rhetoric is socially acceptable (Schaffner 2018). Similarly, Clinton moved to the left of Obama on a number of race-related issues. As Gillon (2016) shows, Obama actually spoke less about race than other recent Democratic candidates.

Second, the 2016 election is part of a longer process of sorting on issues of race. Let's assume that by 2008, the most racially conservative white voters were sorted into the Republican Party and were voting for Republican presidential candidates. That can be true while at the same time there also remains some significant number of racially conservative white Democrats. Throughout 2008 and 2012, more of these racially resentful Democrats may have voted for Republicans and switched their partisanship to the Republican Party. In 2016, after eight years of a Black president, with a candidate espousing explicitly racial views, still more racially resentful white voters switched their votes to the Republican candidate. But again, some racially resentful whites could remain voting for the Democratic candidate.

If this story is true, we should see, on average, that congruent Romney to Trump voters are more racially resentful and conservative on immigration issues than Obama to Trump switchers. The corresponding inverse should be true of Obama to Clinton voters, who should be more racially liberal and pro-immigration than Romney to Clinton switchers. As we show in Figure [vote_switchers_att], that is indeed the case. Trump vote switchers were significantly more conservative on immigration and more racially resentful than Obama-Clinton voters (p = < 0.001, p = < 0.001) and Clinton switchers (p = < 0.001, p = < 0.001), but less conservative on immigration and less racially resentful than Romney-Trump voters (p = < 0.001, p = < 0.001).



Figure K.1: Vote Switchers and Racial Attitudes

Note: Circles indicate mean score for White voters on each attitude scale with high scores indicating more conservative positions on the issue. Panel A displays immigration attitudes and Panel B displays racial attitudes.

In other words, some significant variation in racial resentment and immigration attitudes remains among Trump switchers, and even among Obama-Clinton voters and Clinton switchers, even if it is lower on average than among congruent Romney-Trump voters.

Appendix L: (De)Mobilized by Trump/Clinton

	Dependent variable:					
	Trump All Trump WWC Trump Non-WWC Clinton All Clinton WWC Clinton Non					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	1.310***	1.250***	1.758**	-2.911***	-2.691***	-3.371***
	(0.208)	(0.226)	(0.543)	(0.301)	(0.348)	(0.613)
Immigration Attitudes	1.084***	1.102***	0.901*	-1.389***	-1.406***	-1.358***
	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.354)	(0.167)	(0.192)	(0.342)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.0005	0.0001	0.005*	0.001	-0.0001	0.006*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.600***	0.611***	0.345	-0.002	0.178	-0.421
	(0.156)	(0.170)	(0.409)	(0.189)	(0.226)	(0.353)
Relative Deprivation	-0.180	-0.162	-0.335	-0.198	-0.215	-0.171
	(0.135)	(0.147)	(0.343)	(0.162)	(0.196)	(0.291)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.002	0.001	0.012	0.006	0.007	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003**	0.003**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Family Income (low-high)	0.027	0.046	-0.091	0.021	0.036	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.057)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.048)
Unemployed	-0.136	-0.148	-0.038	-0.245	-0.208	-0.383
	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.473)	(0.193)	(0.216)	(0.440)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003	-0.0001	-0.005	0.001	0.001	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Union (no, was, is)	0.083	0.079	0.157	0.066	0.061	0.087
	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.148)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.124)
Female	0.061	0.046	0.028	0.001	-0.043	0.025
	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.224)	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.190)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.616***	0.593***	0.784***	-0.342***	-0.380***	-0.270*
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.130)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.106)
South	-0.027	-0.064	0.189	-0.164	-0.289*	0.172
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.238)	(0.111)	(0.134)	(0.205)
Partisanship (R)	-0.065	-0.099	0.170	-0.569***	-0.676***	-0.300**
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.155)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.099)
College	-0.189			0.383***		
-	(0.116)			(0.109)		
Constant	-5.345***	-5.262***	-5.902***	1.071**	1.268**	0.958
	(0.337)	(0.365)	(0.910)	(0.343)	(0.405)	(0.656)
Observations	6,415	5,308	1,107	6,415	5,308	1,107
Log Likelihood	-2,260.367	-1,934.798	-314.735	-1,660.528	-1,228.552	-417.576
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,554.733	3,901.596	661.470	3,355.055	2,489.105	867.151

Table L.1: Voters Mobilized by Trump/Clinton

	Dependent variable:				
	All	Non-WWC			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Racial Attitudes	0.424*	0.326	0.609		
	(0.195)	(0.227)	(0.378)		
Immigration Attitudes	-0.028	-0.004	-0.127		
	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.250)		
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.0002	0.001	-0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Family Econ Situation Worse	-0.464**	-0.426*	-0.545		
	(0.153)	(0.181)	(0.289)		
Relative Deprivation	-0.105	-0.073	-0.117		
	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.219)		
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006		
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)		
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.004*		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
Family Income (low-high)	-0.131***	-0.134***	-0.121**		
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.037)		
Unemployed	0.397*	0.513**	-0.289		
	(0.155)	(0.167)	(0.464)		
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003	-0.001	0.002		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
Union (no, was, is)	-0.098	-0.176**	0.085		
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.092)		
Female	0.443***	0.403***	0.567***		
	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.141)		
Ideology (lib-consv)	-0.161***	-0.241***	0.058		
	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.081)		
South	0.144	0.141	0.141		
	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.158)		
Partisanship (R)	0.251***	0.268***	0.196*		
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.084)		
College	-0.412***				
	(0.085)				
Constant	-2.476***	-2.152***	-3.748***		
	(0.268)	(0.316)	(0.512)		
Observations	28,265	16,667	11,598		
Log Likelihood	-3,675.514	-2,559.006	-1,100.283		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,385.027	5,150.011	2,232.566		

Table L.2: Demobilization

Appendix M: Swing State Effect

	Dependent variable:					
	Trump All Trump WWC Trump Non-WWC Clinton All Clinton WWC Clinton Non-					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	1.220***	1.233***	1.136	-1.892***	-1.621**	-2.564**
	(0.342)	(0.370)	(0.959)	(0.451)	(0.516)	(0.971)
Immigration Attitudes	1.220***	1.127***	1.910**	-1.419***	-1.283***	-1.927***
	(0.215)	(0.231)	(0.620)	(0.259)	(0.296)	(0.578)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	-0.0003	-0.001	0.007	0.001	0.00001	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.685**	0.837**	-0.665	-0.060	0.049	-0.197
	(0.255)	(0.274)	(0.757)	(0.307)	(0.364)	(0.604)
Relative Deprivation	0.385	0.495*	-0.251	-0.209	-0.109	-0.448
	(0.231)	(0.250)	(0.668)	(0.260)	(0.317)	(0.487)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	0.021**	0.021**	0.023
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.017)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.0002	-0.001	0.008	0.005**	0.005**	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	0.106**	0.141***	-0.104	0.041	0.069	-0.043
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.111)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.087)
Unemployed	0.122	0.103	-0.261	-0.128	-0.0002	-0.413
	(0.247)	(0.257)	(1.052)	(0.331)	(0.358)	(0.885)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.001	-0.0003	-0.008	-0.0004	0.001	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Union (no, was, is)	-0.066	-0.082	0.106	0.255*	0.195	0.401
	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.275)	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.207)
Female	0.207	0.263	-0.197	-0.007	0.105	-0.395
	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.379)	(0.165)	(0.202)	(0.310)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.601***	0.585***	0.726**	-0.484***	-0.522***	-0.468**
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.229)	(0.087)	(0.102)	(0.181)
South	-0.211	-0.118	-0.684	0.084	-0.035	0.398
	(0.154)	(0.167)	(0.449)	(0.173)	(0.210)	(0.337)
Partisanship (R)	-0.057	-0.086	0.150	-0.550***	-0.768***	0.079
	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.260)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.164)
College	-0.155			0.474**		
	(0.192)			(0.175)		
Constant	-6.059***	-6.120***	-6.060***	1.144*	1.292*	1.323
	(0.577)	(0.619)	(1.711)	(0.555)	(0.649)	(1.177)
Observations	2,371	1,996	375	2,371	1,996	375
Log Likelihood	-864.403	-748.471	-107.336	-661.978	-493.052	-154.229
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,762.807	1,528.942	246.671	1,357.955	1,018.105	340.458

Table M.1: Vote Switching in Swing States

	Dependent variable:					
	Trump All Trump WWC Trump Non-WWC Clinton All Clinton WWC Clinton					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Racial Attitudes	1.375***	1.263***	2.160**	-3.739***	-3.625***	-4.028***
	(0.265)	(0.288)	(0.686)	(0.413)	(0.481)	(0.829)
Immigration Attitudes	1.010***	1.102***	0.339	-1.408***	-1.511***	-1.076*
	(0.168)	(0.183)	(0.447)	(0.221)	(0.256)	(0.445)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14)	0.001	0.0001	0.006*	0.001	0.0002	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Family Econ Situation Worse	0.555**	0.469*	0.865	0.081	0.299	-0.462
	(0.198)	(0.217)	(0.504)	(0.243)	(0.293)	(0.449)
Relative Deprivation	-0.461**	-0.521**	-0.282	-0.140	-0.216	0.009
	(0.169)	(0.184)	(0.433)	(0.211)	(0.253)	(0.391)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14)	0.004	0.002	0.013	0.0005	0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14)	0.001	0.002	-0.0005	-0.0002	-0.00001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Family Income (low-high)	-0.010	-0.003	-0.062	0.021	0.027	0.003
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.062)
Unemployed	-0.250	-0.283	-0.106	-0.280	-0.311	-0.273
	(0.192)	(0.205)	(0.559)	(0.241)	(0.275)	(0.526)
Pct. Foreign Born	-0.0003	0.0001	-0.007	0.002	0.002	-0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Union (no, was, is)	0.169*	0.179*	0.216	-0.061	-0.036	-0.093
	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.180)	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.164)
Female	-0.034	-0.094	0.205	0.013	-0.139	0.272
	(0.107)	(0.116)	(0.287)	(0.136)	(0.161)	(0.253)
Ideology (lib-consv)	0.617***	0.589***	0.863***	-0.248***	-0.273***	-0.206
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.162)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.138)
South	0.062	-0.016	0.611*	-0.407**	-0.514**	-0.055
	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.304)	(0.153)	(0.185)	(0.289)
Partisanship (R)	-0.071	-0.107	0.156	-0.583***	-0.611***	-0.524***
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.200)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.130)
College	-0.190			0.348*		
	(0.146)			(0.141)		
Constant	-5.013***	-4.775***	-6.585***	1.055*	1.216*	1.103
	(0.423)	(0.458)	(1.161)	(0.446)	(0.525)	(0.861)
Observations	4,044	3,312	732	4,044	3,312	732
Log Likelihood	-1,384.908	-1,174.313	-198.821	-977.842	-719.700	-252.209
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,803.817	2,380.627	429.641	1,989.685	1,471.401	536.417

Table M.2: Vote Switching in Non-Swing States

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